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Statement of the Issues and Standards of Review
Plaintiffs Susan Moss and Jamal Yanaki allege a series of tort claims1 against Parr,
Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless and three of its attorneys ("Parr firm").2 The claims
stem from a 2002 lawsuit in which Iomed, Inc. alleged that Mr. Yanaki, a former Iomed
employee, had misappropriated trade secrets. Iomed v. Yanaki, Dist. No. 020903031
("Iomed lawsuit"). To protect the trade secrets, Iomed retained the Parr firm to file a
complaint and obtain discovery orders authorizing the seizure of Mr. Yanaki's computer
files for in-camera review. An attorney from the Parr firm accompanied deputies in
executing the orders at plaintiffs' home office. The files were seized, copied, and returned
to Mr. Yanaki. The copies were reviewed by the court and Mr. Yanaki's counsel to screen
privileged and irrelevant materials. Only then were copies provided to Iomed.
In April 2003—with the Iomed lawsuit pending—plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in
federal court against Iomed and the Parr firm, alleging state tort claims and claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth Amendment violations. Yanaki v. Iomed, Inc., 319 F. Supp.
2d 1261 (D. Utah 2004) ("Judge Benson lawsuit"). United States District Court Judge
Dee Benson dismissed the section 1983 claims because defendants did not act under
"color of state law" and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the tort
claims. Id at 1266. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, accepting for purposes of its decision
plaintiffs' representation that the seizure was not authorized under state law and then
holding that "involvement of the police in executing the court-ordered search, without
more, does not convert Defendants' abuse of state law into conduct attributable to the
state for purposes of § 1983 liability." Yanaki v. Iomed, Inc., 415 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th
The tort claims are (i) abuse of process, (ii) trespass, (iii) conversion, (iv) invasion of
privacy, (v) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (vi) civil conspiracy.
The Parr firm is now known as Parr Brown Gee & Loveless.

Cir. 2005). The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Parr firm's assistance to the deputies
who executed the discovery orders did not implicate constitutional protections.
On August 1, 2005—with the lomed lawsuit still pending—Ms. Moss refiled her
state tort claims in this lawsuit against lomed and the Parr firm. In November 2005,
plaintiffs and lomed settled and dismissed all claims against each other in this lawsuit and
the lomed lawsuit. On February 7, 2006, Ms. Moss filed an amended complaint in this
lawsuit that added Mr. Yanaki as a plaintiff and removed lomed as a defendant. Thus,
lomed, the client on whose behalf the Parr firm acted, is no longer a party.
In April 2006, plaintiffs filed a second section 1983 lawsuit in federal court
against the deputies who executed the discovery orders. Moss v. Kopp, 505 F. Supp. 2d
1120 (D. Utah 2007) ("Judge Campbell lawsuit"). The court dismissed the suit
because, although the deputies were state actors, they enjoyed quasi-judicial immunity in
executing facially valid orders that "manifestly satisfied the threshold requirement of
judicial approval." Id. at 1126-27. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, agreeing the discovery
orders were facially valid and need not satisfy constitutional warrant requirements
applicable in criminal cases. Moss v. Kopp, 559 F.3d 1155, 1164 (10th Cir. 2009).
In the present lawsuit, plaintiffs have conceded that the judicial proceedings
privilege applies to the Parr firm's obtaining (as opposed to its conduct in implementing)
the discovery orders on behalf of lomed. And plaintiffs have abandoned their due
process arguments based upon the ex parte nature of the discovery orders, arguments that
appeared in the original, but not the amended, complaint. Ultimately, the tort claims stem
from the alleged conduct of one attorney—Justin Matkin—in accompanying the deputies
in seizing computer files as directed by the court in the discovery orders.

The issues in this appeal present numerous grounds to affirm and are as follows:
Issue 1: Whether the judicial proceedings privilege protects not only attorneys'
obtaining court orders but also their efforts to execute those orders as directed by a court.
Issue 2: Whether the First Amendment right to petition immunizes from tort
liability attorneys acting in good faith in representing a client in obtaining and executing
facially valid discovery orders.
Issue 3: Whether a private law firm, executing orders on behalf of a private client,
is a state actor capable of violating constitutional search and seizure protections, where the
orders were authorized under the rules of civil procedure and Utah law.
Alternative Issue 3: If a private law firm is a state actor in those circumstances,
whether attorneys assisting deputies in executing such orders enjoy quasi-judicial
immunity, where the deputies enjoy quasi-judicial immunity and the private law firm was
ordered by the court to assist the deputies.
Issue 4: Whether a party must challenge procedural defects in discovery orders in
the lawsuit in which the orders were issued before that party may prosecute a separate
lawsuit asserting tort claims stemming from the execution of the discovery orders.
Issue 5: Whether an attorney must have an ulterior motive in prosecuting a lawsuit
to incur personal liability for abuse of process or whether the client's ulterior motive is
sufficient to support the attorney's personal liability.
Issue 6: Whether the tort abuse of process requires proof of a willful act by the
defendant independent of the defendant's use of the judicial process.
Issue 7: Whether attorneys acting as agents in representing a client, and not
furthering their own independent interests, are capable of conspiring with the client.

Standard of Review: This court reviews the grant of a motion for judgment on the
pleadings de novo. Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irr. Co., 793 P.2d 897, 898 (Utah 1990).
Alternative Grounds to Affirm: The court may affirm on "any legal ground or
theory apparent on the record." Bailey v. Bavles, 2002 UT 58, U 10, 52 P.3d 1158.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
All determinative provisions are in the opening brief or attached to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
All of plaintiffs' tort claims stem from the Parr firm's representation of lomed in

the lomed lawsuit, in which lomed alleged that Mr. Yanaki misappropriated trade secrets.
(R. 41-72, 129-46.) The claims arise from the alleged conduct of one of the Parr firm's
attorneys—Mr. Matkin—who accompanied deputies in the execution of discovery orders
obtained from a state court judge. Those orders directed deputies to seize Mr. Yanaki's
computer files before he could destroy evidence of his misappropriation.
It is important for the court to have a clear understanding of what this case is .not.
This is not an appeal from the discovery orders, even though plaintiffs claim their
issuance in the lomed lawsuit was per se invalid. (AOB at 12, 19.) This case does not
involve the liability of the county deputies who executed the discovery orders because the
federal court ruled that the deputies are immune. And this case does not involve lomed,
the client on whose behalf the discovery orders were obtained and executed but who is
now alleged to have had an "ulterior motive" in filing the lomed lawsuit. (AOB at 29.)
This case involves only the Parr firm. This appeal concerns whether the district
court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' tort claims against the Parr firm as a matter of law

A

and whether the court of appeals correctly affirmed that dismissal. In the paragraphs
below, the Parr firm describes (i) the procedural history of this lawsuit; (ii) the facts
relevant to the issues, which stem from execution of the discovery orders in the
underlying lomed lawsuit; and (iii) the procedural history of plaintiffs' federal claims
related to the execution of those discovery orders, a history that includes two federal
lawsuits adjudicating some of the issues now before this court.
II.

Procedural History
A.

The original complaint

On August 1, 2005, Ms. Moss filed her complaint against lomed and the Parr firm
in this lawsuit. (R. 1; Addendum I.) Because the differences between the original
complaint and the amended complaint are important, we summarize them briefly below.
The original complaint focused on Ms. Moss's contention that lomed and its
lawyers defrauded the court in the lomed case. The complaint contained fifteen pages of
allegations that, in support of its motion to obtain the discovery orders, lomed witnesses
submitted false affidavits. (R. 11-25.) The complaint devoted seven pages to allegations
that the Parr firm made numerous material omissions in the papers it submitted in support
of its motion to obtain the discovery orders. (R. 25-32.) Those allegations were removed
from the amended complaint, which does not allege fraud or otherwise that the Parr firm
engaged in misconduct in proceedings leading to the discovery orders. (R. 129-38.)
Instead, the amended complaint's focus is on the Parr firm's execution of those orders.
Attached to the original complaint were the moving papers, affidavits, and complaint in
the lomed lawsuit. (R. 41-114.) Because those papers are referenced in the amended
complaint—the operative complaint—this court should take judicial notice of their
contents. Oakwood Vill. L.L.C. v. Albertsons. Inc., 2004 UT 101, ^ 10, 104 P.3d 1226
("The rules are clear that documents attached to a complaint are incorporated into the
pleadings for purposes of judicial notice and are fair game for this court to consider in
addition to the complaint's averments.")

The original complaint also alleged that the Parr firm improperly failed to seek a
"prompt post-seizure hearing within ten days upon an ex parte seizure," as required in
proceedings to obtain a writ of replevin under Rule 64B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(R. 31.) That allegation, which does not appear in the amended complaint, demonstrates
that Ms. Moss understood that Utah's rules governing writs of replevin authorized the
seizure and provided the opportunity to challenge the discovery orders. Although
plaintiffs' counsel reviewed the seized files for privilege and relevance a week after the
seizure, they never challenged the discovery orders or the scope of the seizure in the
lomed lawsuit. (Docket, lomed v. Yanaki, Dist. No. 020903031, attached at
Addendum A.) The district court entered final judgment in the lomed lawsuit on
November 30, 2005. Plaintiffs thus had more than 3 years to challenge the discovery
orders or to allege their tort claims as part of the lomed lawsuit, yet never did either. (Id.)
The original complaint claimed that obtaining the discovery orders ex parte
violated plaintiffs' due process rights "under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution." (R. 6.) That allegation was removed from the amended
complaint, which does not focus on the procedure for obtaining the orders. (R. 129-45.)
In November 2005, plaintiffs and lomed settled their claims against each other in
both the lomed lawsuit and this lawsuit. (R. 115-19; Add. A.) In their opening brief in
this appeal, plaintiffs claim it was unfair for the court of appeals to expect them to
challenge the legality of the discovery orders in the lomed lawsuit because the lomed
lawsuit "was dismissed with prejudice based on a settlement so any potential for appeal
was mooted." (AOB at 25-26.) In fact, however, the lomed lawsuit was dismissed three
months after Ms. Moss filed this lawsuit. (Compare Add. A with Add. B.)

fs

B.

The amended complaint

On February 7, 2006, Ms. Moss filed her amended complaint, adding Mr. Yanaki
as a plaintiff and removing lomed as a defendant. The amended complaint alleged seven
causes of action. (R. 138-46; Addendum J.) The first cause of action alleged that the
Parr firm orally settled the tort claims and breached that agreement by failing to pay
plaintiffs. (R. 138-39.) In a previous appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's dismissal of that claim because plaintiffs could not lawfully prove the existence of
the settlement. Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 2008 UT App 405, 197
P.3d 659. Plaintiffs did not seek certiorari review, so that claim is no longer at issue.
In the six other causes of action, plaintiffs allege tort claims for (i) abuse of
process, (ii) invasion of privacy, (iii) intentional infliction of emotional distress,
(iv) trespass, (v) conversion, and (vi) civil conspiracy. (R. 139-46.) Missing from the
amended complaint are allegations of fraud in obtaining the discovery orders. (Compare
R. 11-32, with 129-38.) Plaintiffs have never explained how the nature of events
concerning the discovery orders changed once plaintiffs settled their claims against
lomed more than three years after the discovery orders were issued.
The amended complaint does allege that, when lomed instructed "defendants to
cause the complaint [in the lomed case] to be filed," lomed had an ulterior motive of
causing its employees to sign noncompete agreements. (R. 130, 131.) Plaintiffs alleged
that the Parr firm advanced lomed's ulterior motive by obtaining the discovery orders
where the Parr firm "knew the relief they sought was illegal under both the Constitutions
of the State of Utah and the United States of America" because the Parr firm failed to
obtain a search warrant instead of the discovery orders. (R. 131, 132-33.)

C*

The district court's dismissal of the tort claims

The Parr firm moved to dismiss plaintiffs' tort claims on the grounds that the Parr
firm's conduct was protected under the judicial proceedings privilege and the First
Amendment and that the discovery orders were lawful. (R. 167-75.) The Parr firm also
challenged each tort claim as having been inadequately pled. (R. 175-80.) The court
granted the motion to dismiss. (R. 465-68.) In its memorandum decision, the court first
pointed out that, if ex parte discovery orders could not be used to prevent destruction of
sensitive evidence, there could be no real discovery in a case like this: "Iomed would
have to give advance notice of the material to be discovered. If Yanaki had indeed stolen
trade secrets and they were on his computer, he would have ample opportunity to hide the
material or destroy it. There is little reason to suppose that a person who would steal
such things would not hide or destroy them to avoid being found out." (R. 466.)
The district court next ruled that plaintiffs could not challenge the legality of the
discovery orders because Mr. Yanaki "should have objected to the supposed illegality of
the discovery order in the initial Iomed case wherein he was sued. He never pressed an
objection to that order. He settled the case so there was no appeal. It is, therefore,
presumed that the discovery order was valid.... The Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped
from pursuing this claim." (R. 467.)
The court also ruled that the judicial proceedings privilege barred plaintiffs' claims:
"The parties to a lawsuit are subject to the doctrine of judicial privilege. The judicial
proceedings privilege is based upon a public policy of securing to attorneys as officers of
the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients." (R. 467-68
(citation omitted).) Plaintiffs appealed from the order dismissing the tort claims.

R

D.

The court of appeals' affirmance

In the court of appeals, plaintiffs argued that, although the Parr firm's seeking the
discovery orders was protected under the judicial proceedings privilege, the privilege did
not encompass "illegally searching plaintiffs' home and removing plaintiffs' property."
(AOB in Utah Ct. App. No. 20090158 at 29, excerpts attached at Add. C.) Plaintiffs told
the court of appeals that their tort claims were based on the allegation that Mr. Matkin, a
Parr firm lawyer, accompanied deputies on an "illegal home invasion." (Reply Br. in
Utah Ct. App. No. 20090158 at 5, excerpts attached at Add. D.)
The court of appeals affirmed. It first held that the discovery orders were
presumptively valid because they were never challenged in the lomed lawsuit, and,
therefore, "Plaintiffs cannot fault defendants for acting in compliance with the court
orders." Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 2010 UT App 170, % 8, 237
P.3d 899. The court then held that plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from attacking
the validity of the discovery orders because they could have challenged their validity
before they settled claims with lomed and dismissed the lomed lawsuit. Id. ^j 12.
III.

Statement of Facts
In this statement of facts, the Parr firm first sets forth facts relevant to the alleged

tort liability, which (according to plaintiffs' current theory) stems from the Parr firm's
execution of the orders in the lomed lawsuit. Those facts consist of plaintiffs' allegations
and facts of which the Parr firm requests the court take judicial notice. Utah R. Evid.
201(d). The Parr firm next describes two federal lawsuits in which plaintiffs
unsuccessfully prosecuted claims stemming from the same alleged conduct. The first of
those suits was against the Parr firm and lomed, the Judge Benson lawsuit, and the

second was against the law enforcement officers who executed the discovery orders, the
Judge Campbell lawsuit.
A.

The Iomed lawsuit

On April 9, 2002, Iomed retained the Parr firm to file the Iomed lawsuit against its
former employee, Mr. Yanaki, and others. (R. 130; Add. I.) Iomed alleged that
Mr. Yanaki had misappropriated trade secrets and was poised to open a competing
business out of his home office. (R. 41-72.) After filing the complaint, to secure the
return of its trade secrets and preserve critical evidence, the Parr firm obtained an ex parte
discovery order, directing the seizure of certain electronically stored data and other
records maintained at the home office. (R. 106-09, 111-12, 130-31.) The court issued
the discovery order pursuant to lomed's motion, memorandum, and affidavits, all of
which showed that Mr. Yanaki had removed trade secrets from Iomed, intended to use
them to compete with Iomed, and, if alerted, would destroy the evidence on his computer.
(R. 106-09, 130-31, 188-218). lomed's papers cited the following provisions as authority
for its motion: (i) Utah Code section 13-24-3(3) (2001), which provided that "[i]n
appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to protect a trade secret may be compelled by
court order;" (ii) Rules 30, 33, and 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; (iii) Utah
Code section 78-7-5 (2001), which authorized the issuance of orders to conform to law
and justice; and (iv) inherent authority recognized in article VIII, section 5 of the Utah
Constitution, which includes authority "to issue all extraordinary writs." (R. 83, 89.)
As plaintiffs recognized in the original complaint in this lawsuit, an "extraordinary
writ" that authorizes prejudgment seizures was the writ of replevin under the version of
Rule 64B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure then in effect. (R. 31.) Rule 64B
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permitted a plaintiff (in context, lomed) to recover property (trade secrets) by submitting
an affidavit supporting the seizure4 and posting a bond,5 to which the defendant could
object within two days.6 (Add. E.) Most important for this appeal, under the provisions
of Rule 64B then in effect, the sheriff was permitted to seize the described property by
force, if necessary: "If the officer has probable cause to believe that the property or any
part thereof is concealed or withheld in a building or inclosure, the sheriff must publicly
demand its delivery. If it is not delivered, he must cause the building or inclosure to be
broken open and take the property into his possession, and, if necessary, he may call to
his aid the power of the county." Utah R. Civ. P. 54B(h)(l) (2001) (emphasis added).
In the lomed lawsuit, plaintiffs refrained from challenging the discovery orders on
the ground that the orders failed to provide for a prompt hearing or that lomed failed to
post a bond. And in the amended complaint, plaintiffs abandoned their allegation that the
ex parte nature of the discovery orders violated their right to due process. (R. 130-38.)
B.

The discovery orders

The first discovery order issued in the lomed lawsuit order directed sheriffs
deputies, with the assistance of lomed, to take custody of certain electronic files
maintained at plaintiffs' residence. The order authorized lomed to copy the files, to
return copies to Mr. Yanaki, and then to file the originals in court. The order also
allowed Mr. Yanaki's counsel to raise objections before the files were made available to
lomed. (R. 106-09, 111-12; Add I.) The first discovery order provided, in relevant part:
4

The affidavit was required to describe the property, state that the defendant wrongfully
possessed it, and state its value. Utah R. Civ. P. 64B(b) (2001).
5
The bond was "double the value of the property." Utah R. Civ. P. 64B(c) (2001).
"The defendant may, within two days after the service of a copy of the writ, serve and
file a notice that he excepts to the sufficiency of the sureties. If he fails to do so, he is
deemed to have waived all objections to them." Utah R. Civ. P. 64B(d) (2001).

1. Because of the limited relief sought by this motion and the
possibility that evidence may be destroyed or altered upon notice of
this action, it is appropriate for the Court to hear and issue this order
ex parte:

3. The Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office is directed, with the
assistance of Iomed, to execute this Order at the residence [of
Yanaki] and to do the following:
(a) take custody of each of the hard drives in one or more
computers, of other electronic storage media, including specifically
but not limited to ZIP drives and CD ROMS, and of the electronic
day planner (a Palm Pilot) in the possession, custody or control of
Defendant Jamal Yanaki [at Yanaki's residence];
(b) supervise the copying of information from the [above
property] by the computer expert provided by Iomed and to return
such copy to Yanaki;
(c) file the original [property] under seal with the Court until they
can be reviewed for privilege by Yanaki's counsel and analyzed
by computer experts for content and evidence of deleted files; and
(d) recover any Iomed confidential files in Yanaki's possession,
custody or control, including but not limited to files relating to
Ceramatec or Aequitas, and to file those documents under seal
with the Court.
5. Once Yanaki has completed his review for privilege or other nondiscoverable information, Iomed, its counsel, and its experts shall upon
reasonable notice to the Court and Yanaki have access to the Yanaki
Electronic Files and the Iomed files to evaluate whether they provide
evidence relevant to this matter and use in the prosecution of this matter.
(R. 107-08 (emphasis added).)
On April 15, 2002, Mr. Matkin and a deputy from the Salt Lake County Sheriffs
Office rang the doorbell of plaintiffs' home. (R. 133.) Mr. Yanaki was out of town, but
Ms. Moss answered. (R. 133.) The deputy handed her a copy of the first discovery order
authorizing the seizure of computer files and documents related to the misappropriation
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claim. (R. 133.) Ms. Moss declined to allow the deputy in the home. (R. 134.) Rather
than seizing the files over her protest, Mr. Matkin told Ms. Moss he would obtain a
further order authorizing deputies to do just that. (R. 134.) Mr. Matkin then moved for
and obtained a second discovery order titled "Supplemental Order in Aid of
Enforcement," which authorized the deputies to use reasonable force to enter the house
and seize the relevant records. (R. 134-35; Add. I.) It provided:
In furtherance and enforcement of the [first discovery order], the Salt
Lake County Sheriffs Office is hereby directed and authorized to enter
the residence and home address of Defendant Jamal Yanaki and use
reasonable force, if necessary and appropriate under the circumstances,
to execute the [first discovery order], including entering through
unlocked doors, conducting a search of the premises, and detaining any
person who resists enforcement of the [first discovery order].
(R. 11-12.) After reviewing the second order, Ms. Moss allowed the deputies, with the
assistance of an lomed employee, to seize the files. A computer expert retained by lomed
and Mr. Matkin were also present. (R. 29-30, 136-37.) As provided in the first discovery
order, the files were copied and deposited in court, a copy was returned to Mr. Yanaki,
and Mr. Yanaki's counsel reviewed the files to screen them for privileged and other nondiscoverable information. (R. 106-07, 136-37; Add. A.)
C.

Iomed's alleged improper motive

The amended complaint alleges that "lomed desired to misuse a legal process"
with the "ulterior motive" of intimidating its employees into staying with the company.
The allegation is: "lomed desired to misuse a legal process to cause an illegal raid on the
Home as a form of message to its employees that they would be better off signing new
agreements than leaving and risking their own homes being raided." (R. 131.)
Plaintiffs also allege the discovery orders were "solely and strictly for the benefit of an
individual citizen." (R. 135.) In the court of appeals, plaintiffs explained they "pleaded
specifically at least one ulterior purpose of defendants' client that defendants agreed to
fUrther by conducting the illegal search and seizure, namely, chilling employees from
moving to other employment rather than sign noncompete agreements." (Add. C at 25.)

(AOB at 29 (quoting R. 131 (emphasis added)).) Plaintiffs further allege that the Parr
firm "agreed to help their client" in the Iomed lawsuit "to assist Iomed in its ulterior
motivation for misusing the legal processes obtained and resulting in injury to
plaintiffs."8 (R. 131; AOB at 29 (citing R. 134 (emphasis added)).) Plaintiffs allege,
however, that the "illegal search and seizure" was the object of the conspiracy. (R. 137.)
The plaintiffs have not alleged that the Parr firm had its own improper purpose.
Plaintiffs allege that the Parr firm "knew" the discovery orders violated
constitutional search and seizure provisions. (R. 133.) The Parr firm does not accept that
allegation as true because it is nothing more than argument based on a demonstrably
incorrect legal conclusion.9 In a nutshell, the conduct of a private party is not state action
that is necessary to trigger constitutional protections against illegal searches and seizures.
Over the more than three years during which the Iomed lawsuit was pending,
plaintiffs never challenged the discovery orders and never sought to preclude Iomed's use
of the evidence gathered pursuant to the discovery orders. Instead, after the seizure,
plaintiffs allowed the remaining portions of the first discovery order to be enforced:
(i) Mr. Yanaki's counsel reviewed the seized files for privilege a week after the seizure;
The allegation is: "Defendants agreed to help their client, Iomed, place such
exclamation point by seeking legal process purporting to authorize a search and seizure
by the police, and by using the diversionary approach to the state judge of ostensibly
protecting trade secrets and conducting discovery in civil litigation, rather than what they
were really doing, namely, seeking to have the Police conduct an illegal raid." (R. 131.)
9
When considering a Rule 12(c) motion the court must accept the factual allegations of
the complaint, but "[ljegal conclusions, deductions, and opinions couched as facts are . . .
not presumed to be true." Jensen v. Reeves, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1270 (D. Utah 1999);
see also Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1359
(10th Cir. 1989) ("well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, must
be taken as true"); 5C Federal Practice & Procedure § 1368 ("Although the moving party,
for purposes of the Rule 12(c) motion, concedes the accuracy of the factual allegations in
his adversary's pleading, he does not admit other assertions in the opposing party's
pleading that constitute conclusions of law, legally impossible facts, or matters that
would not be admissible in evidence at trial.").
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(ii) an expert identified evidence in the files relevant to misappropriation; (iii) the court
concluded that the evidence in the files was relevant; and (iv) the court provided a copy
of the evidence from the files to Iomed and its expert. (R. 107-08; Add. A.)
D.

Plaintiffs' related lawsuits

The procedural history of two federal cases filed by plaintiffs is important because
those cases involved some of the issues now before this court.10
1.

The Judge Benson lawsuit against Iomed and the Parr firm

In 2003, plaintiffs sued the Parr firm in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah, alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort
claims arising from the seizure of evidence pursuant to the discovery orders. (R. 137-38.)
In granting defendants' motion to dismiss the section 1983 claims, Judge Benson ruled
that neither the Parr firm nor Iomed had acted under "color of state law" because (i) they
were not acting as agents for state actors, and (ii) plaintiffs alleged that Utah law did not
authorize the discovery orders. Yanaki v. Iomed, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1264-65
(D. Utah 2004). The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state
law tort claims that are now at issue here. Id.
In a footnote repeatedly quoted by plaintiffs, Judge Benson stated that "it appears
clear that the conduct complained of in this case would be a violation of the Fourth
Amendment if state action were involved." Id. at 1264 n.7 (emphasis added). In making
10

The two cases described below were filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah. In 2003, plaintiff Yanaki filed another state court case alleging Iomed
had engaged in discriminatory employment practices based upon Mr. Yanaki's Arab
ethnicity. Yanaki v. Iomed, Inc., 2005 UT App 239, % 3, 116 P.3d 962. The district court
dismissed the claims against both Iomed and defendants who were not parties to the
Iomed lawsuit because all claims were compulsory counterclaims in the Iomed lawsuit.
Id. Tf 4. The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that it is "the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the [Iomed lawsuit]." Id.ffl[7, 8.

this statement, Judge Benson merely recognized that the government must satisfy Fourth
Amendment standards to conduct a search and seizure of private property. But, of
course, state action was not involved because the defendants were not state actors and
because plaintiffs alleged that Utah law did not authorize the discovery orders. Id. at
1265 ("The inappropriate use by private litigants of a constitutional statute or rule does
not constitute state actions for purposes of § 1983

Plaintiffs before the Court have

not argued that the [discovery order] in question was issued pursuant to a constitutionally
infirm statute, but rather that the [discovery order] itself was unconstitutional.").
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that neither the Parr firm nor Iomed was
acting under color of state law. Yanaki v. Iomed, Inc., 415 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2005),
cert, denied, 547 U.S. 1111 (2006). The Tenth Circuit recognized that "color of law" was
not "intended to encompass a case such as this one, where the only infirmities are the
excesses of the court order itself, subject to immediate modification by a court having
jurisdiction over the parties, and subject to the normal processes of appeal."11 Id. at
1208-09. Because plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that "there is no allegation in the
complaint that the state laws upon which the Search and Enforcement Orders were based
are facially unconstitutional," the court held that the Parr firm and Iomed were not acting
under color of state law. Id. at 1209 n.8. And because they were not acting on behalf of
the government, neither could violate the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits only
unreasonable government searches and seizures. Id. at 1210.
11

Under section 1983, to be under color of law, "the deprivation of a federal right must
be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of
conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible and the
party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state
actor . . . because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained
significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the
State." Yanaki v. Iomed, Inc., 415 F.3d 1204, 1207-08 (10th Cir. 2005).

2.

The Judge Campbell lawsuit against the deputies

After the Judge Benson lawsuit was dismissed and that dismissal was affirmed,
plaintiffs filed the same section 1983 claims in the United States District Court against
the deputies who executed the discovery orders. Although the deputies were state actors,
they were immune under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. Moss v. Kopp, 505 F.
Supp. 2d 1120, 1129 (D. Utah 2007). Under that doctrine, a person executing an order is
immune as long as (i) the issuing court had jurisdiction; (ii) the order is facially valid;
(iii) the person has authority to execute the order; and (iv) the person does not act outside
the scope of the order. Id. at 1125. In ruling that all four elements were satisfied, Judge
Campbell rejected plaintiffs' argument—repeated in the opening brief here—that "the
orders are facially invalid simply because they are not search warrants." Id. at 1127.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the discovery orders were facially valid
because, "[e]ven if the court orders here are unlawful, several considerations demonstrate
that the orders did not reach the level of illegality necessary to render them facially
invalid for purposes of quasi-judicial immunity and to justify imposing liability on the
deputies." Moss v. Kopp, 559 F.3d 1155, 1164 (10th Cir. 2009). The Tenth Circuit
reached that conclusion for three reasons. First, the deputies were obligated to execute
writs of replevin. Id. Second, there is no law forbidding entry into a dwelling to execute
a writ of replevin.

IdL Third, civil orders authorizing entry into a dwelling need not

satisfy the warrant requirements that apply in criminal cases. Id.
In fact, the Tenth Circuit noted examples of civil writs authorizing such searches and
seizures. Moss, 559 F. 3d at 1164 (citing Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v.
Church of St. Cecilia, 480 N.Y.S.2d 284, 286 (1984) (order of seizure, formerly an order
of replevin, directs the sheriff to seize a chattel and, if necessary, to break into any place
it is kept)); Durgin v. Cohen, 209 N.W. 532 (Minn. 1926) (court officers had a right to
enter a residence and take possession of property described in replevin papers).

Summary of Argument
Plaintiffs' tort claims fail as a matter of law for four independent reasons.
First, the judicial proceedings privilege protects not only the Parr firm's conduct
in obtaining the discovery orders—which plaintiffs concede—but also the firm's conduct
in executing those orders. Although this court has not expressly held that the privilege
extends to the enforcement of a judicial order, the emerging consensus among state courts
is that the privilege encompasses just such conduct, and not just communications. The
West Virginia Supreme Court's often cited sentence best encapsulates the modem trend:
"We see no reason to distinguish between communications made during the litigation
process and conduct occurring during the litigation process." Clark v. Druckman, 624
S.E.2d 864, 870 (W. Va. 2005). The rule is that "a party to a civil action [is] barred, by
virtue of the litigation privilege, from bringing claims for civil damages against the
opposing party's attorney if the alleged act of the attorney in the course of the attorney's
representation of the opposing party is conduct and not a written or oral statement which
arose in the civil action and which has some relationship to the civil action." Id. at 871.
This court should expressly recognize the same rule under Utah's privilege.
Second, the Parr firm's conduct in prosecuting the Iomed lawsuit was protected by
the right to petition government under the First Amendment. That right protects those
petitioning courts from tort liability where the results of their activities—here, the
discovery orders—were objectively reasonable. The best indications that the Iomed
lawsuit and discovery orders were objectively reasonable are that (i) the lawsuit survived
numerous dispositive motions over more than three years and (ii) the discovery orders
were never challenged or quashed.

Third, all of the tort claims are based on the mistaken assumption that the Panfirm acted in bad faith because the discovery orders authorized a "warrantless search and
seizure" in violation of search and seizure provisions in the Utah Constitution and the
United States Constitution. The legal assumption is incorrect because the Parr firm, as
affirmed by the Tenth Circuit, is not a state actor, and, as a result, constitutional search
and seizure provisions are not a limit on its conduct. Moreover, plaintiffs are now
estopped from asserting that the Parr firm was a state actor in executing the discovery
orders because they raised and lost that issue in the Judge Benson lawsuit.
Fourth, the discovery orders were not per se invalid, as plaintiffs contend. Other
than some alleged procedural defects that were never challenged in the Iomed lawsuit—
for example, failure to post a bond—the discovery orders were authorized under the
version of Rule 64B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in effect at the time. Under
Rule 64B, based upon an affidavit, the court could issue an ex parte writ of replevin to
seize property; and if a person refused to deliver the property, a deputy "must cause the
building . . . to be broken open and take the property into his possession, and, if
necessary, he may call to his aid the power of the county." Utah R. Civ. P. 64B(h)(l)
(2001). Thus, the court's rules at the time authorized the very search and seizure at issue
here. To the extent there were defects in the process, plaintiffs abandoned their due
process allegations in this lawsuit and are estopped from raising them here because of
their failure to raise any procedural defects in the Iomed lawsuit.
In addition to all of the foregoing grounds for affirmance, each of plaintiffs' tort
claims was pled inadequately. For all of these reasons, the district court did not err in
dismissing plaintiffs' tort claims. This court should affirm.

Argument
Both the district court and the court of appeals correctly held that plaintiffs' tort
claims fail as a matter of law. The Parr firm's conduct in representing its client in
litigation is shielded from tort liability under the judicial proceedings privilege and
immune under the right to petition protected by the First Amendment. Further,
constitutional restrictions on governmental searches and seizures do not apply to private
actors; this circumstance undermines the allegation that the Parr firm acted in bad faith
because it knew the "warrantless search and seizure" was illegal. Regardless, the district
court in the Iomed lawsuit had authority to issue the discovery orders, and even if it did
not, plaintiffs waived any objection to the orders by failing to challenge them in the
Iomed lawsuit. There can be no tort liability for carrying out the terms of legally valid
orders. Finally, the tort claims fail as a matter of law because they are inadequately pled.
I.

The Judicial Proceedings Privilege Bars Plaintiffs' Tort Claims
All of plaintiffs' tort claims fail because Utah's judicial proceedings privilege

precludes tort liability for the Parr firm's conduct in taking steps to obtain and then carry
out the discovery orders. In the opening brief, plaintiffs concede that the privilege
applies to tort claims other than defamation. (AOB at 40 n.5.) Plaintiffs also concede
that the privilege encompasses the Parr firm's applying for and obtaining the discovery
orders, i.e., "conduct before a court or their filings with a court." (AOB at 23, 46.) But
plaintiffs contend that the privilege does not extend to the Parr firm's conduct in
executing the discovery orders. They allege that "invading the home while Moss was
home alone, illegally, with threats of violence and a show of force, for an illegal purpose,
constitute extreme and outrageous conduct [that precludes] a defense of privilege."

(AOB at 46.) In short, plaintiffs contend that the privilege encompasses only
communications, but not conduct, undertaken by lawyers in litigation. (AOB at 43-45.)
Modern authorities demonstrate, however, that the judicial proceedings privilege
protects attorney conduct undertaken in representing a client in litigation. Although this
court has not specifically upheld the application of the privilege to lawyer conduct in
complying with an order, Utah cases are consistent with the clear trend.
As in other states—many of which label their privilege the "litigation privilege"—
Utah's judicial proceedings privilege applies to statements (i) made in the course of a
judicial proceeding, (ii) that have some reference to the subject matter of the proceeding,
and (iii) are be made by someone acting in the capacity of judge, juror, witness, litigant,
or counsel. Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Utah 1997). The privilege is
"intended to promote the integrity of the adjudicatory proceeding and its truth finding
processes." DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, ^ 10, 992 P.2d 979. To achieve its policy
objections, the judicial proceedings privilege must cover conduct, and not merely
communication. Otherwise, lawyers would be left in the impossible position of having
the duty to represent clients in litigation and yet remain exposed to liability for having
fulfilled their duty by implementing the terms of court orders. For this reason, in Utah,
the privilege applies "to persons whose special position or status requires that they be as
free as possible from fear that their actions in their position might subject them to legal
action." O'Connor v. Burningham, 2007 UT 58, If 29, 165 P.3d 1214 (emphasis added).
Any ambiguity on that point should be resolved in favor of applying the privilege. Pratt
v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41,130, 164 P.3d 366 (any doubt "should be resolved in favor of the
statement having reference to the subject matter of the proceeding").

This court should therefore make it clear that Utah's judicial proceedings privilege,
like the corresponding privilege in other jurisdictions, "shields lawyers' communications
and conduct before, during, and after judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, so long as
the communication or conduct has some relation to the proceedings." Douglas R.
Richmond, The Lawyer's Litigation Privilege, 31 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 281, 327-28 (Fall
2007) (emphasis added). In order to advance the policy behind the privilege, the rule
must be that, "[ajbsent malicious prosecution or similar allegations, a lawyer's bad faith
litigation conduct is remedied by way of sanctions or professional discipline, not the loss
of the litigation privilege with respect to a letter clearly within its scope." Id. at 316.
Every state appellate court to address this issue in recent years has held that the
privilege protects attorney conduct in representing a client.13 Beginning in 1988,
Pennsylvania extended the privilege to attorney conduct. Brown v. Delaware Valley
Transplant Program, 539 A.2d 1372 (Pa. Super. 1988). In Brown, an attorney prepared a
hospital's petition for a court order to remove organs from an unidentified brain dead
person. When the decedent's family filed a lawsuit for "mutilation of a corpse" and
"assault and battery," the court extended the privilege to "intentionally tortious behavior"
and held that the claims failed as a matter of law "in light of the immunity accorded his
activities undertaken in relation to the litigation." Id at 1374-75.
13

In addition to some courts labeling their privilege the "litigation privilege" instead of
the "judicial proceedings privilege," some courts describe it as a "qualified privilege"
instead of an "absolute privilege." As the Idaho Supreme Court recently noted, however,
that is a distinction without a difference: "this is really just a difference in framing the
privilege, not a difference in how the privilege is applied." Taylor v. McNichols, 243
P.3d 642, 657 (Idaho 2010). Under both ways of framing the privilege, it "protects
attorneys from all civil suits which are raised against them by a party adverse to their
clients, as a result of their representation of their clients, provided the attorneys do not act
beyond the scope of that representation of their own purposes." Id,
o^

In 2005, the Texas Court of Appeals held that the privilege shielded attorneys
from liability for allegedly aiding a client in breaching a fiduciary duty with the ulterior
motive to "shakedown" the plaintiffs to pay monies. Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James,
R C , 178 S.W.3d 398, 402-03 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005). In applying the privilege, the court
recognized the following policy: "If an attorney could be held liable to an opposing party
for statements made or actions taken in the course of representing his client, he would be
forced constantly to balance his own potential exposure against his client's best interest."
Id. at 405. Based on that policy, the court adopted the following rule: absent fraud, "an
attorney's conduct, even if frivolous and without merit, is not independently actionable if
the conduct is part of the discharge of the lawyer's duties in representing his or her
client." Id. at 406. In fact, the court considered plaintiffs claims against the attorneys to
be so "clearly barred by existing law" that it upheld an award of sanctions. Id. at 411.
That same year, the West Virginia Supreme Court affirmatively answered the
following certified question: whether "a party to a civil action [is] barred, by virtue of
the litigation privilege, from bringing claims for civil damages against the opposing
party's attorney if the alleged act of the attorney in the course of the attorney's
representation of the opposing party is conduct and not a written or oral statement which
arose in the civil action and which has some relationship to the civil action." Clark v.
Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864, 871 (W.Va. 2005). The court saw "no reason to distinguish
between communications made during the litigation process and conduct occurring
during the litigation process." Id. at 870 (emphasis added). Instead, the rules of civil
procedure, the rules of professionalism, and courts' inherent authority to impose
sanctions "protect against abusive and frivolous litigation tactics." Id.

In 2006, the California Supreme Court applied the same rule in holding that
attorney conduct in executing a judgment, including a "levy on the judgment debtor's
property," was immune from a claim for abuse of process even though the judgment was
legally defective. Rusheen v. Cohen, 128 P.3d 713, 715 (Cal. 2006). The court extended
the privilege to conduct because the conduct stemmed from the filing of the false
affidavit and the levy was an outgrowth of that communication. Id. at 722.
Also in 2006, the Oregon Supreme Court extended the privilege to attorney
conduct, holding that "a lawyer may not be held jointly liable with a client for the client's
breach of fiduciary duty unless the third party shows that the lawyer was acting outside
the scope of the lawyer-client relationship." Reynolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062, 1063
(Ore. 2006). The court reasoned that "safeguarding the lawyer-client relationship
protects more than just an individual or entity in any particular case or transaction; it is
integral to the protection of the legal system itself." Id at 1068. As long as the attorney
acts within the scope of that relationship, he incurs no independent tort liability.
In 2007, the Hawaii Supreme Court also held that the privilege shields attorney
conduct where the attorney acts within the scope of the attorney/client relationship and
has no motivation independent of protecting the client's interests. Kahala Royal Corp. v.
Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel LLC, 151 P.3d 732, 752 (Haw. 2007).
That same year, the New Mexico Court of Appeals adopted the same rule: "an
attorney who is representing a client in an arbitration is not liable for aiding and abetting
a breach of the client's fiduciary duty, unless the attorney acted outside the scope of
representation, acted only in his or her own self-interest and contrary to the client's
interest, or acted in a manner that would fall within the 'crime or fraud' exception to the

attorney-client privilege provided in the rules of professional conduct." Durham v.
Guest, 171 P.3d 756, 759 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007), overruled on other grounds as to one
claim Durham v. Guest, 204 P.3d 19 (N.M. 2009) (addressing only the elements of
malicious abuse of process without disturbing the holding concerning the privilege).
In 2010, the Tennessee Court of Appeals extended the privilege to conduct in
holding that an "attorney is immune under the litigation privilege" from a claim that he
assisted his client in tortious activity where the attorney's conduct was "in good faith for
the benefit of his client and not acting for his own self-interest, the conduct was related to
the subject matter of the contemplated litigation, and there was a real nexus between the
attorney's conduct and the contemplated litigation." Unarco Material Handling, Inc. v.
Liberate, 317 S.W.3d 227, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis added).
Six months ago the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the trend emerging from these
cases: "[T]he common thread found throughout [these cases] is the idea that an attorney
acting within the law, in a legitimate effort to zealously advance the interests of his client,
shall be protected from civil claims arising due to that zealous representation." Taylor v.
McNichols, 243 P.3d 642, 656 (Idaho 2010). The Idaho court held: "where an attorney
is sued by the current or former adversary of his client, as a result of actions or
communications that the attorney has taken or made in the course of his representation of
his client in the course of litigation, the action is presumed to be barred by the litigation
privilege." Id. at 656-57 (emphasis added). Only where the attorney acts from a
"personal desire to harm, separate entirely from his desire to advance his client's
interests," does the privilege not apply. Id While that approach may mean "that a
wronged party may be denied civil relief under the law," it is "better to leave unredressed

the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the
constant dread of retaliation." Id. at 657-58.
Like the courts in the foregoing cases, this court should reject the suggestion that
the judicial proceedings privilege extends only to attorney communication, and not
conduct.

The Parr firm acted within the scope of its representation of Iomed when it

filed and prosecuted the Iomed lawsuit. (R. 130.) Plaintiffs allege that Iomed had an
ulterior motive and the Parr firm "agreed to help their client" by employing the "legal
process." (R. 131.) Plaintiffs removed the fraud allegations from the amended complaint
(R. 11-32, 129-38), and they do not allege that the Parr firm acted outside the scope of its
representation of Iomed. Under those circumstances, the Parr firm's accompanying
deputies in executing the discovery orders fell within the privilege. Forro Precision, Inc.
v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 673 F.2d 1045, 1051-53 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying privilege
where IBM was "a puppeteer directing the actions of the police" to "subject the company
to a 'thunderclap' of adverse publicity" because "communications to the authorities and
participation in the search were privileged") (emphasis added). All of plaintiffs' tort
claims fail because the judicial proceedings privilege shields the Parr firm from liability.
II.

The First Amendment's Right to Petition Bars Plaintiffs' Tort Claims
Plaintiffs' tort claims also fail because the Parr firm's conduct in representing

Iomed was protected under the First Amendment right to petition government. The right
to petition "extends to all departments of the Government" and includes the "right of
access to the courts." California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,
14

Williams v. Carney, 157 F. App'x 103, 107-08 (11th Cir. 2005) (privilege applies to
lawyers who recorded an opposing lawyer's statements at an aborted deposition);
Olszewski v. Scripps Health, 69 P.3d 927, 949-50 (Cal. 2003) (privilege defeated tort
claims related to liens); Nozik v. Sanson, 662 N.E.2d 1134, 1134-35 (Ohio Ct. App.
1995) (judicial privilege barred a slander of title claim related to a judgment lien).

510-11 (1972). It establishes immunity to "use the channels and procedures of state and
federal... courts to advocate their causes and points of view respecting resolution of
their business and economic interests vis-a-vis their competitors." Id. at 510-11;
McDonald v. Smith. 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1985) ("filing a complaint in court is a form of
petitioning activity"). The right to petition "bars any claim, federal or state, common law
or statutory, that has as its gravamen constitutionally-protected petitioning activity."
Gen-Probe. Inc. v. Amoco Corp.. Inc.. 926 F. Supp. 948, 956 (S.D. Cal. 1996). Although
the doctrine initially developed in antitrust cases, "the constitutional protection of the
right to petition is no less compelling in the context of common-law tort claims," like
abuse of process. Cove Rd. Dev. v. W. Cranston Indus. Park Assocs.. 674 A.2d 1234,
1237 (R.I. 1996) (doctrine can bar claims for abuse of process); see also Anderson Dev.
Co. v. Tobias. 2005 UT 36, f 26, 116 P.3d 323 (describing the application of the doctrine
to bar tort claims that interfere with the right to petition).
The underlying policy is that "tort liability for abuse of process . . . would infringe
or chill [the] First Amendment right to petition the courts for redress of grievances."
Scott v. Hern. 216 F.3d 897, 914 (10th Cir. 2000). The protection applies unless the
petition constitutes a "sham." Prof 1 Real Estate Investors. Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Indus.. Inc.. 508 U.S. 49, 57 (1993) (right to petition applies even when the petitioner's
"sole purpose .. . was to destroy [their] competitors"); see also Anderson Dev. Co., 2005
UT 36, % 27 ("[Ujnder the 'sham' exception, an individual will be liable if he uses the
governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—as a weapon"). A
court proceeding is a "sham" if it is "objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits." Prof 1 Real Estate Investors,

Inc., 508 U.S. at 60. The implication is that "a finding that the lawsuit is not objectively
baseless precludes liability regardless of improper motive." Gen-Probe% Inc., 926 F.
Supp. at 957.
Here, plaintiffs do not allege and could not establish that the Iomed lawsuit, which
lasted for more than three years and survived numerous dispositive motions, was
objectively baseless. Cove Rd. Dev., 674 A.2d at 1239 (a court's refusal to dismiss the
defendant's claim was sufficient to show the underlying action was not "objectively
baseless"). Even if Iomed's ulterior motive could lawfully be imputed to the Parr firm—
which, as demonstrated below, it cannot—there was a cognizable basis for Iomed's
misappropriation of trade secrets claim. The discovery orders were reasonably designed
to preserve the evidence needed to adjudicate that claim.
In the opening brief, plaintiffs distinguish these cases on the sole ground that they
do not involve actions that "were illegal," i.e., that "[ijllegal searches and seizures cannot
be characterized as proper, by their very nature." (AOB at 39, 48.) Other than their
groundless constitutional claims concerning the "warrantless search and seizure,"
however, plaintiffs have never identified anything illegal in taking steps to implement a
perfectly lawful order. For that reason, plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish the right to
petition cases fails. The Iomed lawsuit was not per se illegal; and neither were the
discovery orders or the execution of the discovery orders pursuant to their terms.
Because the Iomed lawsuit was not a "sham," the right to petition shields the Parr
firm from tort liability. The court-ordered search of Mr. Yanaki's home arose directly
from constitutionally-protected petitioning activity. This court should affirm.

III.

The Parr Firm Did Not Act in Bad Faith in Executing the Discovery Orders
Because Constitutional Limits on Searches and Seizure Apply to State Actors
Most of the opening brief rests upon the premise that the discovery orders were

facially invalid and that a "warrantless" entry into plaintiffs' home to seize the computer
files was per se illegal. (AOB at 3-12, 16-20, 25-46.) As support, the opening brief cites
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement seven times and the warrant requirement in
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution three times. The amended complaint cites
cases interpreting those constitutional provisions, alleging that the discovery orders here
were "illegal under both the Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States of
America." (R. 131, 130-38; AOB at 6.) The flaw in this argument is that constitutional
search and seizure provisions protect against state action, not private action. Because the
Parr firm was representing a private client, constitutional search and seizure provisions
are inapplicable. This court should reject all of the opening briefs legal conclusions to
the contrary. Jensen v. Reeves, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1270 (D. Utah 1999) ("Legal
conclusions, deductions, and opinions couched as facts are . . . not presumed to be true.").
Absent those legal conclusions, plaintiffs' claim that the Parr firm had "[c]ulpable
knowledge" by knowing it had no search warrant is beside the point. (AOB at 18.)
A.

Constitutional restrictions on searches and seizures apply to government

The Fourth Amendment protects against "unreasonable governmental
intrusion."15 Pavton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (emphasis added). For
15

The common law cited in the opening brief dating back "a quarter of a millennium"
confirms the point. (AOB at 15.) That common law restrained the sovereign in using
general writs of assistance "to search suspected places for smuggled goods," thus putting
"the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer." Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 625, 630 (1885). That law forbade intrusion into a private home by a
government official. (AOB at 15 (citing Wilkes v. Wood Lofft's L 98 Eng. Rep. 489
(1763) (trespass "against an official in the office of the Secretary of State who entered
[plaintiffs] home and seized his papers upon an unlawful general warrant")).)

that reason, two federal courts have held under the facts of this case that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to the Parr firm. Yanaki v. Iomed, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d
1261, 1264 n.7 (D. Utah 2004) ("the Fourth Amendment is only directed at unreasonable
searches and seizures by state actors, and not private parties"); Yanaki v. Iomed, Inc., 415
F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the first part of the color of
law test because the conduct that Plaintiffs complain deprived them of their constitutional
rights was caused by and can only be attributed to the private Defendants").
Even when the Fourth Amendment is applied in the civil context, state action is
an essential element. The state action requirement is satisfied only where the defendant
is (i) a state actor or (ii) a private actor acting under color of state law. Owens v. Swan,
962 F. Supp. 1436 (D. Utah 1997). A private actor does not act under color of state law
"where the only infirmities are the excess of the court orders itself, subject to immediate
modification by a court having jurisdiction over the parties, and subject to the normal
processes of appeal." Torres v. First State Bank of Sierra County, 588 F.2d 1322, 132627 (10th Cir. 1978). The Fourth Amendment has no application here because the Parr
firm was not a state actor in obtaining or carrying out the discovery orders.16 (AOB at 9.)
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution also applies exclusively to state
actors: "unreasonable private searches are not subject to the protection of article I,
16

Moreover, the Parr firm's assistance in executing the discovery orders did not violate
the Fourth Amendment if it had applied. "In the civil context... the standards of
reasonableness are less stringent than in the criminal context." Owens, 962 F. Supp.
1436, 1440 (D. Utah 1997). In Owens, Wells Fargo Bank, as a judgment creditor in a
civil lawsuit, obtained a writ of assistance authorizing its attorneys to enter the judgment
debtors' home to inventory the contents. LI at 1438. After execution of the writ, the
judgment debtors asserted section 1983 and state law claims against the bank and its law
firm for conducting an allegedly unconstitutional search of their home. Id. at 1439. The
district court dismissed the civil rights claims, ruling that the defendants' entry into the
debtors' home satisfied the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard for a civil case.
in

section 14 of the Utah Constitution.55 State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988)
(emphasis added). For that reason, the Utah cases cited in the opening brief involving
illegal searches and seizures are completely beside the point. All of them involved state
action, rather than the conduct of private parties.

(AOB at 17.) Of particular note is

Allen v. Trueman, 110 P.2d 355 (Utah 1941), the case plaintiffs rely upon for the
contention that the Parr firm "knew" the discovery orders violated article I, section 14.
(AOB at 7, 8, 20, 21, 22.) Allen held that state officials may not use search warrants to
protect private interests because their use was "restricted to public prosecutions." 110
P.2d at 360. In Allen, state officials obtained and executed a warrant to seize milk
containers, not because they had probable cause to believe a crime had been committed,
but because they believed the milk containers bore another company's trademark. The
lesson of Allen is that state officials may use search warrants to further only the public
interest, such as investigating crime. That explains why the discovery orders were not
per se invalid, as plaintiffs contend, because the Parr firm did not obtain a "search
warrant" under Utah Code section 77-23-204(2) (2001). (AOB at 7, 23-25.)
Allen did not hold that private discovery and seizure of data are unconstitutional
or otherwise per se illegal. Nor did Allen hold that constitutional warrant requirements
apply to private action or that orders obtained by private parties to seize property—e.g.,
writs of replevin—are invalid under constitutional search and seizure provisions.
17

State v. Tripp, 2010 UT 9,ffl[24, 26, 227 P.3d 1251 (a warrantless blood draw
authorized by state police without probable cause should have been suppressed under the
Fourth Amendment); State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1126-27 (Utah 1977) (refusing to
distinguish between article 1, section 14 and the Fourth Amendment in holding that
police officers did not have to obtain a warrant before entering a hotel room when they
could see the defendant using drugs through a window); State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47,
fflf 3, 20, 164 P.3d 397 (an investigative detention by an off-duty police officer, whom the
defendant knew was a police officer, was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).

Because the Parr firm was not a state actor and constitutional search and seizure
provisions do not apply to the discovery orders, plaintiffs' arguments miss the mark.
B.

Plaintiffs are precluded from attributing state action to the Parr firm
or alleging the Parr firm conspired with deputies

In the Judge Benson lawsuit, both the United States District Court and the Tenth
Circuit rejected the contention that the Parr firm became a state actor when its attorney
accompanied deputies in executing the discovery orders. Yanaki, 319 F. Supp. 2d at
1264; Yanaki, 415 F.3d at 1210. Judge Benson's rulings are binding here because
plaintiffs' allegations are based upon the same events at issue in the Judge Benson
lawsuit. Under Utah law, the doctrine of issue preclusion prevents a party from raising
an issue where four conditions are satisfied: "(i) the party against whom issue preclusion
is asserted . . . [was] a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the prior
adjudication [is] identical to the one presented in the instant action; (iii) the issue in the
first action [was] completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first s u i t . . . resulted
in a final judgment on the merits." Oman v. Davis Sch. DisU 2008 UT 70, ^ 29, 194
P.3d 956. "[W]here two causes of action embody the same dispositive issue, a prior
determination of that issue in the context of one cause of action can have a preclusive
effect in later litigation regarding the other cause of action." Id. ^[31.
In Oman, this court applied the doctrine of issue preclusion in circumstances
similar to those present here. A school district employee challenged his termination in
federal court by asserting a section 1983 claim and various state law claims. Id.fflf2, 10,
11. In dismissing the 1983 claims, the federal court ruled that the employer had "a
sufficient basis for termination for cause." IcL *| 15. The court then "declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over [the plaintiffs] remaining state law claims." Id. H 16.

When the plaintiff refiled his state law claims in state court, the court dismissed those
claims on the ground that it was bound by the federal court's ruling that the termination
was for cause. Id. ^f 30. This court affirmed, holding that, because the dispositive issue
in the 1983 claim was whether the school district fired Oman for cause, the "issue was
squarely before the federal court, was litigated by the parties, and was necessary to the
court's final judgment on the Sec. 1983 claim." Id. ^f 32. Thus, plaintiff was precluded
from asserting otherwise in prosecuting his state law claims.
Here, the same plaintiffs prosecuted two separate federal lawsuits—the Judge
Benson lawsuit and the Judge Campbell lawsuit—that were dismissed with prejudice and
involved the same events and issues presented here. In the second federal lawsuit—the
Judge Campbell lawsuit—Salt Lake County deputies argued that plaintiffs were estopped
from contending that they acted under color of state law because Judge Benson had ruled
that the Parr firm did not act under color of state law. Moss v. Kopp, 559 F.3d 1155,
1162 (10th Cir. 2009). Judge Campbell rejected that argument on the ground that the
issue decided in the Judge Benson lawsuit was not identical—plainly enough, the
deputies were "state officials" whereas the Parr firm was not. Id at 1162. Importantly,
the Tenth Circuit held that the other elements for issue preclusion—that the suit involved
the same plaintiffs, provided a full opportunity to litigate the issue, and was lost on the
merits—were not "reasonably in question." Id. Similarly here, the only question is
whether the issues are identical.18 As shown below, they are.
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McMillan v. Morgan County, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42047, *3, 21 (D. Utah Apr. 29,
2010) (grant of motion to dismiss satisfied the elements of issue preclusion, including the
fully and fairly litigated element); see also Dummar v. Lummis, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1706, at *16 (D. Utah Jan. 8, 2007) (fully and fairly litigated element requires only an
opportunity to present arguments).

In the Judge Benson lawsuit, the Tenth Circuit accepted for purpose of its analysis
plaintiffs' allegation—repeated in the amended complaint here—that the issuance of the
discovery orders "was unlawful under state law." Yanaki, 415 F.3d at 1209. The Tenth
Circuit then concluded that this allegation was fatal to plaintiffs' state action argument.
Because the Parr firm is a private actor, absent "a challenge to the constitutionality of the
state laws underlying the [discovery orders], the conduct of which Plaintiffs complain
cannot be attributed to a decision of the state because [the Parr firm was] acting contrary
to the relevant policy articulated by the State." Id. (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 940 (1982)). After accepting plaintiffs' representation that the discovery
orders were illegal, the Tenth Circuit held that "involvement of the police in executing
the court-ordered search, without more, does not convert Defendants' abuse of state law
into conduct attributable to the state for purposes of § 1983 liability." Id. at 1210.
Plaintiffs are precluded from asserting otherwise in this lawsuit.
Plaintiffs also are precluded from taking the position that the Parr firm conspired
with the Salt Lake County deputies. Although plaintiffs use the word "conspire" in the
amended complaint, in substance they allege only that the deputies were paid to act as the
Parr firm's agents in executing the discovery orders. (AOB at 8, 17 (explaining that
"private counsel [hired] the Police in civil litigation to conduct warrantless searches and
seizures").) And, according to plaintiffs, the only object of the alleged conspiracy
between the Parr firm and deputies was to conduct an allegedly illegal search, which is a
means, not an objective. (AOB at 6, 9.) Regardless, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Judge
Benson's decision, noting that it may have reversed had the deputies conspired with
Iomed, but there was no such allegation. Yanaki, 415 F.3d at 1209-10. Thus, the

1A

conspiracy issue, apart from being inadequately pled, has been decided against plaintiffs
in federal court. Even if plaintiffs had adequately pled that the Parr firm conspired with
deputies, the court should reject such allegations.
Because the Parr firm is not a state actor and plaintiffs are precluded from arguing
otherwise, plaintiffs' allegations concerning constitutional violations fail as a matter of
law.19 Plaintiffs' exclusive basis for tort liability—the contention that the Parr firm knew
its discovery violated constitutional protections—fails as a matter of law. The district
court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' tort claims, and this court should affirm.
C.

Even if the Parr firm were held to be a state actor, it would be entitled
to quasi-judicial immunity

Although the Parr firm believes it is beyond dispute that it was not a state actor in
executing the discovery orders, it anticipates that plaintiffs will maintain otherwise in the
reply brief. For that reason, the Parr firm will demonstrate that even if it had been a state
actor, the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity would preclude any tort liability.
The only allegation that could support the conclusion that the Parr firm acted on
behalf of the state is that the Parr firm carried out the discovery orders of the district
court, a state actor. The first discovery order stated that "[t]he Salt Lake County Sheriffs
Office is directed, with the assistance of Iomed, to execute this Order at the residence [of
Yanaki]." (R. 184-85 (emphasis added).) The Tenth Circuit held that the deputies were
immune from liability for their executing the discovery orders under the doctrine of
quasi-judicial immunity. Moss, 559 F.3d at 1163-65. If the Parr firm is held to have
19

At times, plaintiffs suggest the Parr firm is estopped from arguing the seizure did not
violate the Fourth Amendment because Judge Benson, in a footnote, stated that, had there
been state action, the seizure would have violated the Fourth Amendment. Apart from
the counterfactual not applying, a party need not appeal a favorable ruling. Dunlap v.
Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2005 UT App 279, K 4, 119 P.3d 302.

been a state actor for executing the same orders as the deputies, then it is immune under
the same doctrine that immunized the deputies.
This court has drawn upon federal law when defining Utah's doctrine of quasijudicial immunity.20 Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496, 498 (Utah 1998) (quoting
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988)). The doctrine is designed to protect private
actors who implement court orders: "immunity is justified and defined by the functions it
protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches." Id at 498. As a result,
quasi-judicial immunity applies when the execution of an order is "intimately related and
essential to the judicial decision-making process." Id (quoting Awai v. Kotin, 872 P.2d
1332, 1334-35 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993)). Here, the discovery orders directed Iomed to
recover stolen trade secrets to assist the court in adjudicating Iomed's misappropriation
claim. Under those conditions, "fearless and unhesitating execution of court orders is
essential if the court's authority and ability to function are to remain uncompromised."
Valdez v. City & County of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 1288 (10th Cir. 1989).
Under federal law, where a party procures an order "in bad faith," that party does
not enjoy quasi-judicial immunity in executing the order. Moss, 559 F.3d at 1162 n.10.
In this case, although Iomed is alleged to have had an ulterior motive in asking the Parr
firm to prosecute the Iomed lawsuit, the Parr firm is alleged only to have furthered that
motive by prosecuting the lawsuit. (AOB at 29, R. 131, 134.) Iomed, of course, is no
The federal test has four elements: (i) the judge issuing the order qualifies for judicial
immunity; (ii) the order is facially valid; (iii) the person executing the order has authority
to do so; and (iv) the person does not exceed the scope of the order. Moss v. Kopp, 559
F.3d 1155, 1163-65 (10th Cir. 2009). Applying that test to the facts of this case, the
Tenth Circuit held that (i) the court qualified for immunity because it had subject matter
jurisdiction to issue the discovery orders; (ii) the discovery orders were facially valid,
even if erroneous; (iii) the deputies were authorized under Utah law to execute the orders;
and (iv) the deputies did not exceed the scope of the orders. Id.

longer a party to this lawsuit. As the principal on whose behalf the Parr firm acted,
Iomed directed the Parr firm in its conduct of the litigation. Iomed's motive, however,
cannot automatically be attributed to its lawyers. Millennium Equity Holdings, LLC v.
Mahlowitz, 925 N.E.2d 513, 532 (Mass. 2010) ("unless there is evidence to the contrary,
a client's improper motivation should not be imputed to his attorney"). The amended
complaint does not allege that the Parr firm, as opposed to Iomed, acted in bad faith,
except in conducting an "unlawful" search, which (as shown in Part IV of this brief) is
demonstrably incorrect. For that reason, even if the Parr firm had been a state actor in
executing the discovery orders, plaintiffs' tort claims still fail as a matter of law.
IV.

The District Court Had Authority to Issue the Discovery Orders, and
Plaintiffs Waived Any Procedural Defects in the Issuance of the Orders
Ex parte discovery orders that authorize the seizure of property and information

are not unusual, let alone per se invalid, as plaintiffs contend. According to one
commentator, in the civil context, "[t]here must be literally thousands of actions in which
ex parte seizures have been authorized and have been executed without a hitch." Jules D.
Zaion, Ex Parte Seizure Orders: Don't Kill the Goose That Laid the Golden Egg, 23
Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 181,191 (1999). Seizure orders are particularly necessary to
preserve electronic evidence because, by its nature, such electronic evidence can be
91

readily altered, transferred or eliminated.

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Canstar (U.S.A.)

Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38414, *2-4 (N.D. 111. Aug. 24, 2005) ("Ex parte orders of
very limited scope and brief duration may be justified in order to preserve evidence
where the applicant shows that notice would result in destruction of evidence.").
21

Because "[c]omputer-based records may be deleted quickly and easily," an ex parte
order to seize them is justified where, as here, "a party has a history of concealing
evidence [that] may provide persuasive grounds for issuing an ex parte seizure order."
James Wm. Moore, et al, Moore's Federal Practice § 37A.21[7] (3d ed. 1997).

If the discovery orders were illegal, however, plaintiffs are precluded from raising
that issue here because they did not challenge the orders, or seek sanctions, in the Iomed
lawsuit. Hatch v. Davis, 2006 UT 44, % 40, 147 P.3d 383 (an abuse of process claim can
proceed only if the plaintiffs have no opportunity for redress "within the litigation forum
itself). In the opening brief, plaintiffs contend that the court of appeals unfairly
expected them to challenge the legality of the discovery orders in the Iomed lawsuit
because that lawsuit "was dismissed with prejudice based on a settlement so any potential
for appeal was mooted." (AOB at 25-26.) Yet plaintiffs had more than three years to
challenge the discovery orders, a fact that completely undermines plaintiffs' contention.
Below, the Parr firm demonstrates that (i) the district court had authority to issue
the discovery orders in the Iomed lawsuit, and (ii) to the extent the orders were
procedurally defective, plaintiffs waived their right to challenge the discovery orders.
A.

The district court had authority to issue the discovery orders under the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act

Utah Code section 13-24-3(3) provides that, "[i]n appropriate circumstances,
affirmative acts to protect a trade secret may be compelled by court order." Section 1324-6 provides that "a court shall preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by
reasonable means, which may include granting protective orders in connection with
discovery proceedings, holding in-camera hearings, sealing the records of the action, and
ordering any person involved in the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade secret
without prior court approval." Those provisions authorize ex parte orders to recover
trade secrets. Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 490 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
The federal courts have reached the same conclusion under comparable provisions
in the Lanham Act. Under section 1116(d) of the Lanham Act, courts may issue an '"ex

parte seizure order in civil actions alleging a trademark infringement that involves the
use of a counterfeit mark.'" MRC Golf, Inc. v. Hippo Golf Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15625, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2009) (citing In re Lorillard Tobacco Co., 370 F.3d 982,
984 (9th Cir. 2004)). The purpose of such orders is "to preserve the evidence necessary
to bring trademark counterfeiters to justice" and "protect[] the integrity of evidence in [a]
pending civil action." MRC Golf, Inc., at *2. Congress considered the ex parte
procedure necessary due to the "propensity of 'those who deal in counterfeits . . . to
destroy or transfer counterfeit merchandise when a day in court is on the horizon. The ex
parte seizure procedure is intended to thwart this bad faith tactic, while ensuring ample
procedural protections for persons against whom such orders are issued."' Earth Prods.
Inc., v. Gordo Enters. Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27937, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9,
2005) (citing 130 Cong. Rec. H12076 at 12080 (Oct. 10, 1984)).
Federal courts have approved of ex parte discovery orders in other circumstances.
In AT&T Broadband v. Tech Commc'ns, Inc., for example, AT&T obtained an ex parte
order to seize business records that disclosed the illegal sale of cable descrambling
machines. 381 F.3d 1309, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004). The court allowed AT&T, along with
federal marshals, to enter a home, conduct a search, and remove records relating to
descrambling devices, including information on "hard drives, servers, disks, and tapes."
IdL at 1313. The court upheld the order, stating that the equitable remedy of an "exparte
search and seizure order directed at the defendant's residence" is consistent with the
"district courts' inherent equitable authority." AT&T Broadband, 381 F.3d at 1318-19.22
The district court in the Iomed lawsuit had the same authority under section 13-24-3.
A number of courts have issued similar ex parte seizure orders. Joel v. Various John
Does, 499 F. Supp. 791, 792 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (issuing ex parte order authorizing the
plaintiff to seize unauthorized merchandize, even though the defendants were yet

B.

The district court had authority to issue the discovery orders under the
2001 version of Rules 64A and 64B

The district court also had authority to order the seizure under Rules 64A and 64B
in the 2001 version of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a copy of which is attached at
Addendum E. Whether the district court issued the discovery orders pursuant to those
rules is beside the point. The point is that district courts had authority to do so and
therefore the Parr firm did not act in bad faith merely by requesting that the court in the
Iomed lawsuit do what is functionally equivalent to issuing a writ of replevin.
1.

Writs of replevin could be issued ex parte

Under the 2001 version of Rule 64A, district courts were authorized to issue writs
of replevin ex parte upon a showing by affidavit that prejudice would result if notice were
provided to the other party. Utah R. Civ. P. 64A(2) (2001). The adverse party had two
days after receiving notice to move for its dissolution or modification, during which time
the sheriff would retain possession of the property. Utah R. Civ. P. 64A(6)-(8) (2001).
In the Iomed lawsuit, Iomed submitted affidavits describing why the discovery
orders should be issued ex parte. (R. 93-103.) The court then found: "Because of the
limited relief sought by this motion and the possibility that evidence may be destroyed or
altered upon notice of this action, it is appropriate for the Court to hear and issue this
order ex parte" (R. 107.) The court had authority to issue the discovery orders ex parte.
2.

Writs of replevin could be issued based upon affidavits

Rule 64B(b) specified the content of affidavits used to obtain a writ of replevin:
"(1) a description of the property claimed; (2) that the plaintiff is the owner of the
unnamed); Pepe (U.K.) Ltd. v. Ocean View Factory Outlet Corp., 770 F. Supp. 754, 762
(D.P.R. 1991) (the issuance of the ex parte seizure order justified under federal and state
law, the court's inherent equitable power, and rules of civil procedure).

property or has a special ownership or interest therein, stating the facts in relation thereto,
and that he is entitled to the possession thereof; (3) that the property is wrongfully
detained by the adverse party; (4) the alleged cause of the detention thereof according to
the best knowledge, information and belief of affiant; (5) that it has not been taken for a
tax, assessment or fine pursuant to a statute, or seized under an execution or an
attachment against the property of the plaintiff; or if so seized, that it is by statute exempt
from such seizure; (6) the actual value of the property." Utah R. Civ. P. 64B(b) (2001).
The affidavits submitted in the lomed lawsuit, and attached to the original
complaint in this lawsuit, satisfied all of those requirements other than the one relating to
the value of the property. The affidavits: (i) described the trade secret (R. 102);
(ii) stated that lomed owned the trade secret (R. 102); (iii) explained how Mr. Yanaki had
forwarded the trade secrets to his private email account and how files were missing from
Mr. Yanaki's office (R. 97, 103); (iv) described how Mr. Yanaki was using the trade
secrets to start a competing company run out of his home office (R. 96, 101-02); and
(v) implied that Mr. Yanaki did not possess the trade secrets for tax purposes (R. 95-103).
While plaintiffs arguably could have moved to quash the discovery orders because
the affidavits did not describe property value, Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 581 P.2d 1001,
1002 (Utah 1978), they chose not to do so. That failure waived any defect. Bank of
Pleasant Grove v. Johnson, 552 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1976) (errors in an affidavit to
secure writ of attachment were harmless after the property already had been sold).
3.

A defendant waives any defect in a bond by failing to object

Under Rule 64B(c), the plaintiff in a replevin case must post a bond double the
value of the property to be seized. Utah R. Civ. P. 64B(c) (2001). lomed did not post a

bond in the Iomed lawsuit. But under Rule 64B(d), a defendant "waive[s] all objections"
to the bond unless he objects "\vithin two days after the service of a copy of the writ."
Utah R. Civ. P. 64B(d) (2001). Because plaintiffs never objected to Iomed's failure to
post a bond in the Iomed lawsuit, they waived all defects related to the bond.
4.

Property obtained pursuant to a writ of replevin must be retained by
the court to allow objections

Under Rule 64A(8), when property is seized pursuant to an ex parte writ of
replevin, "such property shall be retained by [the sheriff], subject to the order of the
court." Rule 64B(g) provided that absent an objection to the seizure within two days, the
"property must be delivered to the plaintiff," in context, Iomed. Here the discovery
orders complied with all of those requirements. They required the deputies from the Salt
Lake County Sheriffs office, "with the assistance of Iomed," (i) to execute the seizure of
Mr. Yanaki's computer files, (ii) to supervise the copying of the files, and (iii) to file the
original files under seal with the district court so that Mr. Yanaki's counsel could review
them for privilege and a computer expert could review them for deleted files. (R. 18485.) The discovery orders provided: "Once Yanaki has completed his review for
privilege or other non-discoverable information, Iomed, its counsel, and its experts shall
upon reasonable notice to the Court and Yanaki have access to the Yanaki Electronic
Files and the Iomed files to evaluate whether they provide evidence relevant to this
matter and use in the prosecution of this matter." (R. 185.)
5.

Deputies were authorized to use force to seize the property
pursuant to a writ of replevin

Most important, Utah law provided authority to enter plaintiffs' home to seize
property, the primary focus of plaintiffs' claims as described before this court. Under

Rule 64B(h)(l), the sheriff was authorized to take the property described in a writ of
replevin by force: "If the officer has probable cause to believe that the property or any
part thereof is concealed or withheld in a building or inclosure, the sheriff must publicly
demand its delivery. If it is not delivered, he must cause the building or inclosure to be
broken open and take the property into his possession, and, if necessary, he may call to
his aid the power of the county." Utah R. Civ. P. 64B(h)(l) (2001). The second
discovery order issued in the Iomed lawsuit provided for nothing more: "In furtherance
and enforcement of the [first discovery order], the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office is
hereby directed and authorized to enter the residence and home address of Defendant
Jamal Yanaki and use reasonable force, if necessary and appropriate under the
circumstances, to execute the [first discovery order], including entering through unlocked
doors, conducting a search of the premises, and detaining any person who resists
enforcement of the [first discovery order]." (R. 220-21.) Thus, this court's rules in 2001
authorized the manner in which the seizure took place in the Iomed lawsuit. That fact
undermines every argument in the opening brief.
An analogous case from another jurisdiction, interpreting Federal Rule 65(b),
supports that conclusion. In Fimab-Finanziaria Maglificio Biellese Fratelli Fila S.P.A. v.
Kitchen, 548 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Fla. 1982), the district court issued an ex parte seizure
order upon a sufficient showing that notice "would be likely to result in the disappearance
of the counterfeit FILA goods and related records . . . jeopardizing plaintiffs' ability to
prevent irreparable injury, to stop the distribution of counterfeit FILA products, and to
determine the source and extent of the defendants' dealings in the counterfeit FILA
products." Id. at 249. The court acknowledged the existence of "burgeoning case law

around the country which have recognized and approved as both appropriate and
necessary judicial relief the granting of temporary restraining orders without notice,
expedited discovery, and immediate seizure by the United States Marshal of counterfeit
goods." Id. (collecting cases). Notably, the court's expansive order allowed the
plaintiffs attorneys to accompany the United States Marshal to personal residences "to
identify the counterfeit goods and . . . records" described in the order. IdL at 250-51. This
court should recognize the same authority under the 2001 version of Utah's Rule 64B.
C.

By failing to challenge procedural defects in the discovery orders,
plaintiffs waived any objections

Because the plaintiffs failed to challenge the discovery orders in the lomed lawsuit,
they are now barred from doing so. Under Utah law, writs of replevin must be
challenged in a timely manner so that the district court may promptly correct any errors
in the procedure employed to seize property. Johnson, 552 P.2d at 1277 (any errors in an
affidavit to secure a writ of attachment were harmless post-judgment when the property
already had been sold). The record in the lomed lawsuit discloses that, far from objecting
to the discovery orders, plaintiffs acquiesced in them for years.
Iomed's seizure of the property in Mr. Yanaki's possession occurred on April 15,
2002. By April 23, 2002, Mr. Yanaki's counsel had still not reviewed the seized files for
privilege and relevance. (Add A.) Although plaintiffs' counsel ultimately reviewed the
files, which were then in the district court's possession, they did not object to the seizure
or the process. More than nine months later, defendants in the lomed lawsuit began filing
dispositive motions, including Mr. Yanaki's motion for partial summary judgment on
February 4, 2004. (Add A.) The district court denied all dispositive motions. (Add A.)
On November 30, 2005, the court dismissed all claims based upon a global settlement.
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(Add A.) During the more than three years of the lomed lawsuit, neither Mr. Yanaki nor
Ms. Moss ever moved to quash or challenge the discovery orders, to modify them, or to
preclude the use of the evidence gathered in the seizure.
In analogous cases, courts have held that plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from
prosecuting tort claims based upon discovery orders that were either never challenged or
found to be lawful in the lawsuit in which they were issued. In Buzzanco v. Lord Corp.,
173 F. Supp. 2d 376 (W.D. Perm. 2001), plaintiffs sued the Lord Corporation, its law
firm, and the sheriff for executing an ex parte writ of seizure in a state court trade secrets
case filed by the Lord Corporation. Id. at 378-79. In the federal lawsuit, plaintiffs
claimed that "the search and seizure [were] improper because [they were] conducted
without notice and went beyond [their] intended scope." Id at 384. The court, however,
rejected plaintiffs' claims, among other reasons, on the ground that they were
"collaterally estopped from pursuing this theory." Id The court observed that the
plaintiffs "had a full and fair opportunity to litigate" the legality of the seizure in the state
court case. Id. at 385. The court held that even the family members who were not parties
to the underlying state action were bound by the court's decision because they were in
privity with the parties who participated as parties in the state court case. Id; see also
Watters v. Dinn, 633 N.E.2d 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (abuse of a discovery process
should be addressed in the case in which the discovery took place).
In this case, as in the foregoing cases, plaintiffs had the opportunity to litigate the
propriety of the discovery orders in the lomed lawsuit. Where, as here, a plaintiff fails to
challenge an order in an underlying lawsuit, he is estopped from asserting in a separate
lawsuit that the order's illegality provides a basis for tort liability. This court should

affirm not only because the discovery orders were legal (or at least facially valid), but
also because plaintiffs waived any defect by failing to object in the Iomed lawsuit.
V.

Each of the Tort Claims Fails on the Pleadings
Each of plaintiffs' tort claims also fails on the pleadings for the following reasons:
A.

The abuse of process claim fails because the Parr firm neither had an
ulterior motive nor engaged in an independent, willful act

To assert an abuse of process claim, the plaintiff must allege (i) "an ulterior
purpose" and (ii) "a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct
of the proceeding." Hatch v. Davis, 2006 UT 44, If 36, 147 P.3d 383. Plaintiffs failed
adequately to plead either required element.
First, although plaintiffs have alleged that Iomed had an ulterior purpose in asking
the Parr firm to prosecute the Iomed lawsuit, they did not allege that the Parr firm itself
had an ulterior motive. Rather, plaintiffs alleged the Parr firm acted to advance Iomed's
motive. Because the Parr firm merely acted as counsel to its principal, Iomed's motive
cannot automatically be attributed to the firm. Millennium Equity Holdings, LLC v.
Mahlowitz, 925 N.E.2d 513, 532 (Mass. 2010) ("unless there is evidence to the contrary,
a client's improper motivation should not be imputed to his attorney").
Second, plaintiffs failed to allege a willful act independent of the litigation
process. As this court has explained, the willful act cannot be the "legal process that the
tortfeasor pursues according to his ulterior motive." Hatch, 2006 UT 44,ffl[37, 39. In
the face of that clear principle, "[i]t is easy to slip into the conceptual trap of simply
defining the 'willful act' as the legal process that the tortfeasor pursues according to his
ulterior motive. Such a definition would, however, render the 'willful act' requirement
superfluous." Id. f 37. This describes plaintiffs' mistake here. In the opening brief,
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plaintiffs argue that the "willful act" was the Parr firm "willfully us[ing the discovery]
process in the course of the warrantless search and seizure, a process not proper in the
regular course of proceedings." (AOB at 24.)
Plaintiffs also contend that they pled "conduct even the private search warrant did
not purport to authorize, such as : (1) a physical threat to kick in the door to the Home;
(2) implying to Moss that a warrantless search of her Home could be legitimately
conducted; and (3) seizing property that belonged to Moss and Yanaki, rather than
Iomed." (AOB at 36-37.) Yet both the second discovery order and Rule 64B(h)(l)
authorized the use of force in seizing the computer files. (R. 220-21.) And the discovery
orders authorized a "warrantless" search. (R. 184-85.) The discovery orders also
contemplated that property other than Iomed's property would be seized, which is why
the property was deposited in court to permit Mr. Yanaki's attorney to examine it for
relevance and privilege before copies of the computer files were delivered to Iomed. (R.
184-85.) Therefore, the Parr firm is not alleged to have performed any improper willful
act independent of using the legal process to represent Iomed. Plaintiffs have failed to
allege facts sufficient to satisfy either element for an abuse of process claim.
B.

Plaintiffs' claims for invasion of privacy and trespass fail because the
Parr firm's conduct was undertaken pursuant to a court order

Invasion of privacy and trespass require a wrongful or unreasonable intrusion
upon plaintiffs' privacy or land. The right of privacy is invaded only by an
"unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another." Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563
(Utah 1988). Court-ordered discovery is not an unreasonable intrusion. Big Five Cmty.
Servs. v. Jack, 782 P.2d 412, 414 (Okla. Civ. App. 1989) ("We cannot say the copying of

documents pursuant to court-ordered discovery constitutes an unreasonable intrusion into
the seclusion of another so as to support a cause of action for invasion of privacy.").
Likewise, "trespass is a 'wrongful entry . . . upon the lands of another/" Walker
Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238,1243 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added). The
entry complained of in this case was undertaken on the authority of a court order and
therefore was not "wrongful" as a matter of law.
C.

Plaintiffs' intentional infliction of emotional distress fails because they
have not alleged "extreme and outrageous conduct"

A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires "extreme and
outrageous" conduct. Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, % 38, 56 P.3d
524. Conduct does not fall within that category "simply because it is tortious, injurious,
or malicious, or because it would give rise to punitive damages, or because it is illegal."
Id. "Due to the highly subjective and volatile nature of emotional distress and the
variability of its causations, the courts have historically been wary of dangers in opening
the door to recovery therefor. This is partly because such claims may easily be
fabricated: or as sometimes stated, are easy to assert and hard to defend against."
Bennett v. Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, % 59, 70 P.3d 17. In
Bennett, the allegations of improper use of legal process did not constitute a basis for a
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. TJ 66; see also Anderson Dev.
Co., 2005 UT 36, ^f 56 (improper use of the legal process is insufficient to support a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress therefore fails as a matter of law.23

23

Mr. Yanaki's claim also fails because he was not present for the alleged outrageous
behavior. Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378,fflf51-53, 102 P.3d 774.

D.

Plaintiffs' claim for conversion fails because Mr. Yanakf s computer
files were seized pursuant to court order

Conversion is "an act of willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful
justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession....
It requires such a serious interference with the owner's right that the person interfering
therewith may reasonably be required to buy the goods." Allred v. Hinkley, 328 P.2d
726, 728 (Utah 1958). Here, the property at issue - computer files and documents
relating to Iomed's trade secrets - was taken pursuant to court order, and then maintained
in the custody of the court. Plaintiffs cannot establish that the interference was "without
lawful justification." Pursuant to the discovery orders, plaintiffs' attorneys had an
opportunity to object to any material that was beyond the scope of discovery, but they
made no such objection. Copies of all materials removed from Mr. Yanaki's home were
returned to him the same day with the original copies being retained by the court — not
Iomed or the Parr firm. The claim for conversion therefore fails as a matter of law.
E.

Plaintiffs' conspiracy claim fails because attorneys cannot conspire
with clients while acting as their agents and the underlying torts fail

To recover for civil conspiracy, the alleged conspirators must commit one or more
"unlawful, overt acts." Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2002 UT App 56, Tf 12, 42 P.3d
1253. Otherwise, there can be no conspiracy: "[T]he conspiracy itself is not what gives
rise to the right to action, but the torts committed in the furtherance of the conspiracy."
Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 794 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In this case, the
failure of the other tort claims requires dismissal of the civil conspiracy claim.
In addition, the Parr firm is legally incapable of conspiring with Iomed, its
principal. Taylor, 243 P.3d at 660 ("it is axiomatic that an agent acting within the scope
of his representation cannot conspire with his principal"); Albert v. Crain, Caton &

James, P.C., 178 S.W. 3d 398,408 (Tx. Ct App. 2005) (attorney cannot conspire with
client in representing the client). The conspiracy claim fails as a matter of law.
Conclusion
The most straightforward route to affirming the dismissal of plaintiffs' tort claims
is that judicial proceedings privilege bars them. Plaintiffs' only argument to the contrary
is that the judicial privilege encompasses only attorney communications, not conduct.
Yet modem state appellate courts have overwhelmingly held that the judicial proceedings
privilege—sometimes called the litigation privilege—extends to attorney conduct. This
court should adopt the same rule, which is consistent with Utah law.
In addition, plaintiffs' claims fail because they are premised upon the legal
conclusion that the Parr firm knew the discovery orders were per se invalid in violating
constitutional search and seizure provisions. Yet the Parr firm, as a non-state actor, could
not and did not violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Finally, plaintiffs' claims are
barred under the First Amendment right to petition and because the allegations fail to
state a claim under Utah tort law. For all of these reasons, this court should affirm.
DATED this 17th day of March, 2011.
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.

Troy^ETBooher
Alan L. Sullivan
James D. Gardner
Attorneys for Appellees Parr firm
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Represented by: JOHN P MULLEN
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ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Balance:

237.00
237.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
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Paqo 1

NO AMT S
120.00
120.00
0 .00

Balance:

0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES
Amount Due:
10.00
Amount Paid:
10.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFICATION
Amount Due:
10.00
Amount Paid:
10.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

2.50
2.50
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

8.50
8.50
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.75
1.75
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.50
1.50
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.50
1.50
0.00
0.00
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REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.50
1.50
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.50
1.50
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

58.50
58.50
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

7.25
7.25
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

10.50
10.50
0.00
0.00

CASE NOTE
PROCEEDINGS
04-09-02
04-09-02
04-09-02
04-09-02
04-09-02

Filed: Complaint
No Amount
Case filed
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY assigned.
Fee Account created
Total Due:
120.00
COMPLAINT - NO AMT S
Payment Received:
120.00
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC
04-10-02 Filed: Affidavit of Laura Millar
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04-10-02 Filed: Affidavit of Robert J Lollini
04-10-02 Filed: Memo in Support of Ex Parte Motion for an Order to
Conduct Immediate Discovery to Prevent the Destruction or
Alteration of Evidence
04-10-02 Filed: Ex Parte Motion for Order to Conduce Immediate Discovery
to Prevent the Destruction or Alteration of Evidence

04-12-02
04-12-02
04-12-02
04-12-02
04-12-02

04-15-02
04-15-02

04-15-02
04-17-02
04-18-02

04-18-02

04-19-02

04-22-02

04-23-02
05-03-02
05-03-02
05-10-02
05-28-02

Fee Account created
Total Due:
10.00
Total Due:
10.00
Fee Account created
'ayment Received:
10.00
CERTIFIED COPIES
'ayment Received:
CERTIFICATION
10.00
Filed order: Order Allowing Immediate Discovery to Prevent the
Destruction or Alteration of Evidence
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Signed April 12, 2002
Filed: Exhibit list
Filed order: Supplemental Order in Aid of Enforcement
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Signed April 15, 2002
Filed: 1 box of 12 sealed envelopes
Filed: Certificate of Service (Ex Parte Motion for an Order to
Conduct Immediate Discovery)
Filed return: Summons on Return
Party Served: CERAMATEC INC
Service Type: NonPersonal
Service Date: April 16, 2002
Filed return: Order Allowing Immediate Discovery - ON RETURN
(Jamal Yanaki)
Party Served: Susan (girlfriend)
Service Type: Substitute
Service Date: April 16, 2002
Filed return: Summons on Return
Party Served: JOSHI, ASHOK
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: April 16, 2002
Filed return: Summons on Return (Jamal Yanaki)
Party Served: Susan (girlfriend)
Service Type: Substitute
Service Date: April 16, 2002
Note: Spoke with Justin Matkin consent was given for David
Schofield counsel for the defendant's to review sealed
documents.
Filed: Acceptance of Service of Process
Filed: Summons (NO RETURN)
Filed: Stipulation Enlarging Time to Respond
Filed: Answer of Defendants Jamal Yanaki and Activatek, L.L.C.
ACTIVATEK LLC

05-28-02 Filed: Answer of Defendants Jamal Yanaki and Activatek, L.L.C.
JAMAL YANAKI
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06-13-02 Filed: Attorney's Planning Meeting Report
06-18-02 Filed order: Proposed Scheduling Order
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Signed June 18, 2002
06-25-02 Fee Account created
Total Due:
2.50
06-25-02 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
2.50
06-28-02 Filed: Certificate of Service (First Request for Production of
documents)
06-28-02 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Jamal Yanaki

06-28-02 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Ashok Joshi
07-02-02 Filed: Certificate of Service (Rule 26 (a)1 Initial Disclosures
of Plaintiff Iomed, Inc)
07-15-02 Filed: Certificate of Service Re: Defendants Jamal Yanaki and
Activatek, LLC's Initial Disclosures
07-22-02 Filed: Certificate of Service (Ceramatec, Inc and Ashok Joshi?s
Intitial Disclosure)
07-22-02 Filed: Ceramatec, Inc and Ashok Joshi's Answer to Complaint
CERAMATEC INC
07-22-02 Filed: Ceramatec, Inc and Ashok Joshifs Answer to Complaint
ASHOK JOSHI
07-29-02 Filed order: Stipulated Protective Order
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Signed July 29, 2002
07-30-02 Filed: Certificate of Service Re: Jamal Yanaki and Activatek,
LLC's Response to Plaintiff Iomed, Inc's First Request for
Production of Documents to Defendants Jamal Yanaki and
Activatek, LLC
08-02-02 Filed: Amended Notice of Deposition of Jamal Yanaki
08-07-02 Filed: Affidavit under Stipulated Protective Order (Robert J.
Lollini)
08-07-02 Filed: Affidavit Under Stipulated Protective Order (Greg
Fischer)
08-07-02 Filed: Affidavit Under Stipulated Protective Order (Mary A.
Crowther)
08-13-02 Fee Account created
Total Due:
8.50
08-13-02 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
8.50
08-15-02 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Robert J. Lollini
09-09-02 Filed: Certificate of Service Re: Defendant Jamal Yanaki's
Request for Production of Documents Dated Sept. 4, 2002 to
Plaintiff Iomed, Inc
09-25-02 Filed: Certificate of Service
10-09-02 Filed: Amended Notice of Deposition of Ashok Joshi
10-21-02 Filed: Certificate of Service
10-27-02 Filed: Notice of Rule 30(B)(6) Deposition of Plaintiff, Iomed,
Inc.
10-27-02 Filed: Notice of Depositions
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11-06-02 Filed: Notice of Taking Deposition Pursuant to Utah Rule
30(b)(6) (Iomed)
11-12-02 Filed: Certificate of Service of Ceramatec, Inc's First Set of
Requests for Admission and First Set of Interrogatories to
Iomed, Inc
11-13-02 Filed: Amended Notice of Deposition
11-13-02 Filed: Amended Notice of Rule 30(b) (6) Deposition of Pltf
IOMED INC
11-26-02 Filed: First Amended Complaint
11-27-02 Filed: Stipulation to Allow Plaintiff Iomed, Inc. to File First
Amended Complaint
12-02-02 Filed order: Order Allowing Plaintiff IOMED Inc to File First
Amended Complaint
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY

Signed November 29, 2002
12-04-02 Filed: Notice of Depositions of Tim Lucas, Tim A h s m g and Roger
Anderson
Total Due:
1.75
12-05 02 Fee Account created
Payment Received:
1.75
12-05 02 COPY FEE
12-06 02 Filed: First Amended Complaint
12-10 02 Filed: Certificate of Service
12-12 02 Filed: Amended Notice of Depositions of Tim Lucas, Tim A h s m g ,
John Colt and Roger Anderson
12-19-02 Filed return: Summons on Return
Party Served: EMPI, Inc
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: December 16, 2002
01-07 •03 Filed: Notice of Deposition (Ashok Joshi, Vol. II)
01-07 -03 Filed: Notice of Deposition (Jamal Yanaki, Vol. I)
01-09 •03 Filed: Defendants Cermatec, Inc. and Ashok Joshi's Answer to
the First Amended Complaint
CERAMATEC INC
01-09-03 Filed: Defendants Cermatec, Inc. and Ashok Joshi's Answer to
the First Amended Complaint
ASHOK JOSHI
01-09-03 Filed: Motion for Admission of Randall E. Kahnke, James W.
Poradek and Amy G. Gernon Pro Hac Vice
01-10-03 Filed order: Order Amending Stipulated Protective Order
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Signed January 10, 2003
01-10-03 Filed order: Order Admitting Randall E. Kahnke, James W.
Poradek and Amy M. Gernon Pro Hac Vice
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Signed January 10, 2003
01-13-03 Filed: Defendant Shunt Power Technology, Inc's Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
01-13-03 Filed: Memo m Support of Defendant Shunt Power Technology,
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Inc's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction
01-14-03 Filed return: Summons on Return
Party Served: Shunt Power Technology, LLC
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: December 13, 2002
01-15-03 Filed: Answer of Defendants Jamal Yanaki and Activatek, L.L.C.
to First Amended Complaint and Counterclaim
JAMAL YANAKI
01-15-03 Filed: Answer of Defendants Jamal Yanaki and Activatek, L.L.C.
to First Amended Complaint and Counterclaim
ACTIVATEK LLC
01-16-03 Filed: Amended Certificate of Service
01-17-03 Filed: Affidavit of James W e e r s m g m Support of Defendant
Shunt Power Technology I n c ' s Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

01-27-03 Filed: Plaintiff IOMED's Opposition to Shunt Power's Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
02-03-03 Filed: Answer to Counterclaim
IOMED INC
02-07-03 Filed: Empif Inc's Answer to the First Amended Complaint
EMPI INC
02-18-03 Filed: Reply Memo in Support of Defendant Shunt Power
Technology, Inc's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Lack
of Personal Jurisdiction
02-18-03 Filed: Defendant James Weersing's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
Rule 9(b)
02-18-03 Filed: Defendant James Weersing's Memo in Support of Motion to
Dismiss Second Claim for Relief Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b)
02-18-03 Filed: Defendant James Weersing's Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to State a Claim Upon Which Relief can be Granted
02-18-03 Filed: Memo of James Weersing in Support of His Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief can be
Granted
02-18-03 Filed: Joinder of Shunt Power in Defendant James Weersing1s
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a claim upon Which
Relief can be Granted
02-19-03 Filed: Certificate of Service for Defendant Jamal Yanaki!s Rule
34 Request Dated February 14, 2003 to Plaintiff Iomed, Inc.
02-24-03 Filed: Notice of Continuing Rule 30(B)(6) Deposition of
Plaintiff, Iomed, Inc. and Continuing Deposition of Robert J.
Lollini
02-25-03 Filed: Amended Certificate of Service
02-27-03 Filed: Certificate of Service RE: Deft Activatek LLC's
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02-27-03
03-03-03
03-03-03
03-03-03
03-03-03
03-03-03
03-03-03
03-03-03
03-03-03
03-03-03
03-03-03
03-03-03
03-05-03

03-05-03

February 25 2003 Request for Production of Documents to Pltf
IOMED Inc
Filed: Certificate of Service Re: Activatek LLC February 25
2003 Interrogatory to Pltf IOMED
Filed: Deposition correction notice
Filed: Deposition correction notice
Filed: Deposition correction notice
Filed: Deposition correction notice
Filed: Deposition correction notice
Filed: Deposition correction notice
Filed: Deposition correction notice
Filed: Deposition correction notice
Filed: Deposition correction notice
Filed: Deposition correction notice
Filed: Deposition correction notice
Filed: Ex Parte Application for Leave to File Overlength Memo
in Support of Ceramatec's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
or, in the Alternative, Motion to: (1) Compel Iomed to Identify
the Trade Secrets and Confidential Info, at Issue with...
Filed: Ceramatec's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or, in
the Alternative, Motion to: (1) Compel Iomed to Identify the
Trade Secrets and Confidential Info, at Issue with

03-05-03

03-05-03

03-05-03
03-06-03

03-07-03

03-10-03

Particularly; (2) to Stay Further Discovery by Iomed; and (3)
for Sane.
Filed: Memo in Support of Ceramatec's Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings, or, in the Alternative, Motion to: (1) Compel
Iomed to Identify the Trade Secrets and Confidential Info, at
Issue with Particularly; (2)Stay Further Discovery by Iomed...
Filed: Affidavit of David L. Mortensen in Support of
Ceramatec's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or, in the
Alternative, Motion to: (1) Compel Iomed to Identify the Trade
Secrets & Confidential Info at Issue w/Particularly; (2) to
Stay
Filed: Certificate of Service for Defendant Activatek, L.L.C.'s
March 5, 2003 Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiff
Iomed, Inc.
Filed: Request for Oral Argument on Cermatec's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, or, in the Alternative, Motion to:
1) Compel Iomed to Identify the Trade Secrets & Confidential
Info, at Issue with Particularity; 2) to Stay Further
Discovery...
Filed order: Order Granting Ex Parte Application for Leave to
File Overlength Memo in Support of Ceramatec's Mo. for Judgment
on the Pleadings or in the Alternative Mo. to ICompel Iomed to
Identify the Trade
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Signed March 07, 2003
Filed: Certificate of Service for Defendants Jamal Yanaki and
Activatek, L.L.C's Supplemental Disclosures
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03-14-03 Filed: Plaintiff Iomed's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant
James Weersing's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
Upon Which Relief can be Granted
03-14-03 Filed: Plaintiff Iomed1s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant
James Weersing's Motion to Dismiss Second Claim for Relief
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
03-18-03 Filed: Certificate of Service
03-28-03 Filed: Affidavit of Clark Waddoups in Support of Iomed's
Opposition to Ceramatec's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
or in the Alternative, Motion to 1) Compel Iomed to Identify
the Trade Secrets and Confidential Info at Issue with
Particu....
03-28-03 Filed: Affidavit of Paul C. Oestriech in Support of Iomed*s
Opposition to Ceramatec's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
or in the Alternative, Motion to Compel Iomed to Identify the
Trade Secrets and Confidential Info at Issue with Particul....
03-28-03 Filed: Plaintiff Iomed's Opposition to Ceramatec's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alternative, Motion to
Compel Iomed to Identify the Trade Secrets and Confidential
Info at Issue with Particularity 2 to Stay Further
Discovery....
03-31-03 Filed: **EXHIBITS** Envelope in Evidence Room
04-07-03 Filed: Reply Memo of James Weersing in Support of His Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief can be
Granted
04-07-03 Filed: Defendant James Weersing's Reply Memo in Support of

04-07-03
04-11-03

04-11-03

04-11-03
04-16-03
04-16-03
04-18-03
04-18-03
04-18-03

04-18-03
04-21-03

Motion to Dismiss Second Claim for Relief Pursuant to Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 9(b)
Filed: Certificate of Service
Filed: Notice to Submit Ceramatec's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings, or, in the Alternative, Motion to: 1 Compel Iomed to
Identify the Trade Secrets and Confidential Info at Issue with
Particularity 2) to Stay Further Discovery by Iomed; and
Filed: Reply Memo in Support of Ceramatec's Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, Motion 1) to Compel
Iomed to Identify with Particularity the Trade Secrets and
Confidential Info at Issue 2) to Stay Further Discovery by Iome
Filed: Notice to Submit and Request for Hearing
Note: Submitted file to Judge
Note: Submitted (second NTS) to Judge
Filed: Certificate of Service
Filed: Deft EMPI•s Motion to Compel IOMED to Identify its
Alleged Trade Secrets
Filed: Deft EMPI•s Memo in Suppoprt of Its motion to Compel
IOMED to Identify its Alleged Trade Secrets Affidavit of
Randall E Kahnke Dated April 17 2003 Affidavit of Phili
V i e r l m g Dated April 17,2003
Filed: Notice of Deposition of Philip V i e r l m g
Filed: Certificate of Service of Rule 26(a)(1) Initial
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Disclosures
04-22-03 Filed: Notice of Chnage of Address and Change of Firm Name
04-22-03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020903031 ID 5583933
ORAL ARGUMENT is scheduled.
Date: 05/29/2003
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W48
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: TYRONE E MEDLEY
Oral Argument on Ceramatec's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
or in the Alternative Motion to (1) Compel IOMED to Indentify the
trade Secrets & Confidential Information at issue with
Particularity (2) to Stay Further Discovery by IOMED & (3)
Sanctions
1- Defendant Shunt Power Technology Inc Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 2-Defendant James
Weersmg's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
3-Defendant James W e e r s m g ' s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 9
Oral Argument is set for 2 hours.
04-22-03 ORAL ARGUMENT scheduled on May 29, 2003 at 02:00 PM in Fourth
Floor - W48 with Judge MEDLEY.
04-24-03 Minute Entry - RETURN OF REQUESTED DOCUMENTS
Judge: TYRONE E MEDLEY
Clerk: tracyl
Pursuant to the request of Cathy Murdock on behalf of Counsel, the
document "Defendant Activatek, L.L.C's April 21, 2003 Request for
Production of Documents to Plaintiff Iomed, Inc." is returned to

said Counsel. The document was submitted to the Court
in error; a Certificate of Mailing should have been and will be
filed in itfs stead.
04-25-03 Filed: Certificate of Service Re: Defendant Activatek, LLC's
April 21, 2003 Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiff
lomed, Inc
05-01-03 Minute Entry - MINUTE ENTRY
Judge: TYRONE E MEDLEY
Clerk: tinaa
Counsel stipulated to Defendants EMPI's Motion to Compel IOMED to
Identify its Alleged Trade Secrets to be heard at the Oral Argument
set for 5/29/03. Amy Gernon to send new notice to counsel.
05-07-03 Filed: Notice of Hearing
05-08-03 Filed: Notice of Hearing
05-09-03 Filed: Certificate of Service
05-09-03 Filed: Plaintiff lomedfs Opposition to Empi's Motion to Compel
lomed to Identify its Alleged Trade Secrets (filed under seal)
05-14-03 Filed: Report on Attorneys' Planning Meeting and Request for
Scheduling Conference
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05-16-03 Note: 5/14/03 Request for Scheduling Conference to heard on
5/29/03 with Oral Argument
05-27-03 Filed: Certificate of Service
05-27-03 Filed: Defendant Empi*s Reply Memo in Support of its Motion to
Compel lomed to Identify its Alleged Trade Secrets
05-27-03 Filed: Affidavit of James W. Poradek in Support of Empi's
Motion to Compel lomed to Identify its Alleged Trade Secrets
05-27-03 Filed: Affidavit of Craig J. Lervick in Support of Defendant
Empi, Inc's Reply to its Motion to Compel lomed to Identify its
Alleged Trade Secrets
05-27-03 Filed: ***VOLUME 5 CREATED***
05-27-03 Filed: Lodging of Foreign Court Decisions
05-29-03 Filed return: Subpoena Duces Tecum for Production of Documents
to Yahoo! Inc.
Party Served: Yahoo
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: May 23, 2003
06-03-03 ORAL ARGUMENT scheduled on June 11, 2003 at 02:00 PM in Fourth
Floor - W4 8 with Judge MEDLEY.
06-03-03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020903031 ID 5624958
ORAL ARGUMENT is scheduled.
Date: 06/11/2003
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W4 8
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: TYRONE E MEDLEY
Oral Argument on Defendant Ceramatec's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings or in the Alternative, Motion to (1) Compel lomed to
Identify the Trade Secrets & confidential Information at Issue
w/Particularity (2) to stay Further Disc, by lomed (3) Sanction
2- Defendant Shunt Power Technology Inc's Motion to Dismiss the

Amended Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.
3. Defendant James Weersing's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Statute a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted.
4- Defendant James Weersing's Motion to Dismiss the Second Claim
for Relief Pursuant to Rule 9(b).
5- Defendant Empi Inc's Motion to Compel lomed to Identify its
Alleged Trade Secrets.
06-04-03 Filed: Affidavit of James W. Poradek in Support of Empi's
Motion to Compel lomed to Identify its Alleged Trade Secrets
Dated May 23, 2003 - Affidavit of Craig J. Lervick in Support
of Defendant Empi, Inc's Reply to Its Motion to Compel lomed
to. . .
06-05-03 Filed: Notice of Withdrawal of Motion
06-05-03 Filed: Notice of Withdrawal of Motion
06-12-03 RULING ON ORAL ARGUMENT scheduled on June 13, 2003 at 10:00 AM
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in Fourth Floor - W4 8 with Judge MEDLEY.
06-12-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for ORAL ARGUMENT
Judge:
TYRONE E MEDLEY
Clerk:
tinaa
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): CLARK WADDOUPS
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID L MORTENSEN
DAVID W SCOFIELD
MATTHEW A STEWARD
Video

HEARING
This matter is before the Court for Oral Argument,
shown above.
The Court reserves ruling at this time.
RULING ON ORAL ARGUMENT is scheduled.
Date: 06/13/2003
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W4 8
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge TYRONE E MEDLEY
Minutes for RULING ON ORAL ARGUMENT
06-13-03 Minute Entry
TYRONE E MEDLEY
Judge:
tinaa
Clerk:
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s) CLARK WADDOUPS
Defendant's Attorney(s) DAVID L MORTENSEN
DAVID W SCOFIELD
MATTHEW A STEWARD
RANDLE KAHNKE
Video

Appearances as

HEARING
This matter is before the Court for Ruling on Oral Argument.
Appearances as stated above.
Ceramatec's and EMPI's Motion to Compel is granted.
Defendant James WeersingTs Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State
a Claim is denied.
Defendant James Weersing1s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 9
(b) is dismissed.
Discovery is stayed.
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06-16-03

06-17-03
06-19-03
06-19-03
06-23-03
06-24-03

06-24-03

06-24-03

06-26-03
06-26-03
06-26-03

07-02-03
07-09-03

07-09-03

Issues as to attorney's fees to be filed by affidavit.
Global Order to filed with in 10 days.
Filed return: Subpoena Duces Tecum for Production of Documents
to Yahoo! Inc.
Party Served: Yahoo! Inc.
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: June 06, 2003
Filed: Transcript of telephonic ruling on motions dated June
13, 2003, Jeri Kearbey, CCT
Filed: Transcript Notice
Filed: Transcript Notice
Filed: Notice of Deposition of James Weersing
Filed return: Subpoena Duces Tecum on Return
Party Served: Yahoo! Inc.
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: June 19, 2003
Filed return: Subpoena Duces Tecum on Return
Party Served: America Online, Inc
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: June 19, 2003
Filed return: Subpoena Duces Tecum on Return
Party Served: Qwest Internet Solutions
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: June 19, 2003
Filed: Letter to the Court fron David L. Mortensen dated
7/2/2003
Filed: Letter to the Court from Jonathan O. Hafen dated
7/2/2003
Filed order: Order (hrg 6/11/2003}
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Signed July 03, 2003
Filed: Amended Notice of Deposition of James Weersing
Filed return: Subpoena Duces Tecum for Production of Documents
to Microsoft, Inc.
Party Served: Microsoft Inc
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: July 01, 2003
Filed return: Subpoena Duces Tecum for Production of Documents
to Aciont, Inc
Party Served: Aciont, Inc
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: July 01, 2003

07-10-03 Filed return: Subpoena Duces Tecum for Production of Documents
to Idaho Technology, Inc.
Party Served: Idaho Technology
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: July 07, 2003
07-10-03 Filed: Election of Method to Disclose Trade Secrets and
Confidential Information
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07-10-03 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Jamal Yanaki
07-11-03 Filed: Transcript of motions hearing dated June 11, 2003, J e n
Kearbey, CCT
07-18-03 Filed: Objection to Subpoena Duces Tecum for Production of
Documents to Idaho Technology, Inc.
07-30-03 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE scheduled on August 01, 2003 at 08.15 AM
in Fourth Floor - W48 with Judge MEDLEY.
08-01-03 Filed: Letter from Clark Waddoups
08-01-03 Filed: Letter
08-01-03 Filed: letter
08-01-03 Filed: Letter
08-01-03 Filed: Letter
08-01-03 Filed: Letter
08-01-03 Filed: Letter
08-01-03 Filed: Letter
08-01-03 Filed: Letter
08-01-03 Filed: Letter to Judge RE: 8.1.03 from Randall E Kahnke
08-01-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
Judge:
TYRONE E MEDLEY
Clerk:
tmaa
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): CLARK WADDOUPS
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID L MORTENSEN
DAVID W SCOFIELD
MATTHEW A STEWARD
Video

HEARING
IOMED will have till August 29 2003 to meet requirements to Courts
prior Order.
Clark Waddoups to prepare Order.
08-08-03 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Philip Vierlmg
08-19-03 Filed order: Order RE Timing of Pltf IOMED Incs Disclosure of
Trade secrets
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Signed August 19, 2003
08-26-03 Filed: Motion to Reconsider
08-26-03 Filed: Combined Memo in Support of Motion to Reconsider Award
of Attorneys' Fees and Objection to Proposed Order: on June 11,
2003, Hearing Re: Empi, Inc's Attorney's Fees
08-27-03 Filed: Amended Notice of Deposition of Philip Vierlmg
08-27-03 Filed: Letter to the Court

08-27-03 Note: Order on June 11, 2003 - attached to inside of file
UNSIGNED
09-02-03 Filed: Certificate of Service
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09-03-03
09-10-03
09-10-03
10-01-03

Filed: Rocky Mountain Reporting Cover Letter
Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.00
COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.00
Filed: Cermatec's Memo in Opposition to Iomed's Motion to
Reconsider
10-01-03 Filed: Request for Scheduling Conference
10-03-03 Filed: Notice of Continuation of Deposition of Philip V i e r l m g
10-03-03 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on October 30, 2003 at 08:15 AM
in Fourth Floor - W48 with Judge MEDLEY.
10-03-03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020903031 ID 5743324
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 10/30/2003
Time: 08:15 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W4 8
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: TYRONE E MEDLEY
10-07-03 Filed order: Order on June 11 2003 hearing Re: EMPI Inc's
Attorney Fees
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Signed October 07, 2003
10-07-03 Filed: Letter to Court from Matthew Steward
10-07-03 Filed: Certificate of service
10-08-03 Filed: Second Notice of Continuation of Deposition of Philip
Vierlmg
10-08-03 Filed: Reply Memo m Support of Motion to Reconsider Award of
Attorneys Fees
10-09-03 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Jamal Yanaki
10-14-03 Filed order: Order to Consolidated with Civil No 030904636
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Signed October 14, 2003
10-14-03 Filed: Stipulated Motion to Consolidate with Civil Number
030904636
10-14-03 Filed: Joint Reply Memoarndum in Support of Motion for Order to
Show Cause Regarding Contempt
10-14-03 Filed: Empi f s Memoarndum in Opposition to Iomed's Objection to
Empi's Proposed Order on June 13, 2003 Hearing
10-30-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
TYRONE E MEDLEY
Clerk:
karenos
PRESENT
Defendant's Attorney(s): JENNIFER R ESHELMAN
JOHN P. MULLEN
DAVID W SCOFIELD
RANDY KAHNKE / BY PHONE
Video
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HEARING
Off record
This matter comes now before the Court for a Scheduling
Conference.
Upon the parties extensive witness lists. Court will limit file
time. Each party may file a Motion, listing all of their witnesses
and times for deposition, to give any/all parties time to respond
or object. No trial date set at this time.
11-04-03 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.50
11-04-03 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.50
11-06-03 Filed: Objection to Proposed Form of Amended Scheduling Order
11-07-03 Filed: Answer of JRW Technology Inc to Complaint
11-07-03 Filed: Answer of James Weersing and Shunt Power Technology LLC
to Amended Complaint
11-10-03 Filed: Certificate of Service of Discovery Responses
11-10-03 Filed: Amended Certificate of Service (discoveryO
11-12-03 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.50
11-12-03 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.50
11-24-03 Filed order: Amended Scheduling Order
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Signed November 24, 2003
12-09-03 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.50
12-09-03 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.50
02-04-04 Filed: Defendants Jamal Yanaki and ActivaTek LC's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment
02-04-04 Filed: Defendants jamal Yanaki and ActivaTek LC's Memorandum
Supporting Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (*under
protective order seal*)
02-04-04 Filed: Affidavit of Frank Papaheofanis (*under protective order
seal*)
02-04-04 Filed: Affidavit of John Parsons
02-25-04 Filed: Confidential * Filed Under Seal * Motion to Amend
Counterclaim and Join Parties
02-25-04 Filed: Confidential *Filed Under Seal* Memorandum in Support to
Amend Counterclaim and Joint Parties
02-25-04 Filed: Confidential *Filed Under Seal* Affidavit of Jamal
Yanaki
03-12-04 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.50
03-12-04 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.50
03-25-04 Filed: Iomend's Motion to Strike Pleadings
03-25-04 Filed: IOMED's Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File and Overlength
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Pleadings and in
Opposition to Defendant Jamal Yanaki1s Motion to Amend
Counterclaim and Join Parties
03-25-04 Filed: IOMED'S Memo in Support of Motion to Strike Pleadings
and In Opposition to Deft Jamal Yanakifs Motion to Amend
Counterclaim and Join Parties (Oral Argument Requested) (filed
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under seal)
03-25-04 Filed: Appendix to IOMED'S Memo in Opposition to Defts Jamal
Yanaki and Activatek LLC's Memo of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Vol I (oral argument requested) (filed under seal)
03-25-04 Filed: Appendix to IOMED'S Memo m Opposition to Defts Jamal
Yanaki and Activatek LLC's Memo of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Vol II (oral argument requested) (filed under seal)
03-25-04 Filed: IOMED'S Memo in Opposition to Defts Jamal Yanaki and
Activatek LLC's Memo of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(Oral Argument Requested)
03-25-04 Filed: IOMED'S Memo m Opposition to Defts Jamal Yanaki and
Activatek LLC Memo of Motion tor Partial Summary Judgment (oral
argument requested) (filed under seal)
03-30-04 Filed order. Order Granting Iomed's Ex Parte Motion for leave
to File an Overlength memo
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Signed March 30, 2004
09-17-04 Filed: Affidavit of John P. Mullen
09-17-04 Filed: James Weenng, Shunt Power Technology, LLC and JRW
Technology's Memo in Support of Motion for Enforcement of
Settlement Agreement
10-04-04 Filed: Iomed's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs
10-04-04 Filed: Iomed's Memo in Support of Motion for Atttorneys' Fees
and Costs
10-04-04 Filed: Iomed's Motion for Sanctions to Strike Defendants James
Weersmg, Shunt Power Technology, LLC and JRW Technology's
Motion for Enforcement of Settlement Agreement, Memo m
Support, and the Affidavit of John P Mullen
10-04-04 Filed: Iomed's Combined Memo in Opposition to Defendants James
Weersmg, Shunt Power Technology, LLC and JRW Tech Motion for
Enforcement of Settlement Agreement and m Support of Motion
for Sanctions to Strike Pleadings
10-13-04 Filed order: Order Granting Ex Parte Motion for Order Sealing
the Memo in Support of Motion for Enforcement of Settlement
Agreement and the Affidavit oi John Mullen
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Signed October 13, 2004
10-14-04 Filed: Ex Motion for Order Sealing the Memo in Support of
Motion for Enforcement of Settlement Agreement and the
Affidavit of John Mullen
10-26-04 Filed: Stipulation to Extension of Time for Defts to Respond
etc
10-28-04 Filed order: Order Granting Extension of Time for Defts to
respond etc
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Signed October 28, 2004
03-10-05 Fee Account created
Total Due:
58,50
03-10-05 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
58.50
04-15-05 Fee Account created
Total Due:
7.25
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04-15-05 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
7.25
07-26-05 Filed: Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Overlength Reply Memo
In Further Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
07-26-05 Filed: Deft's Jamal Yanaki and Activa Tek LC Memo Supporting
Their Motion to Strike Iomeds Proffered But Inadmissible
Evidentiary Materials] (FILED UNDER SEAL)
07-26-05 Filed: Defts Jamal Yanaki and Activa Tek Lc's Motion to Strike
Iomed1s Proffered but Inadmissable Evidentiary Materials (FILED
UNDER SEAL)
07-28-05 Filed order: Order Granting Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File
Overlength reply Memo in Further Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Signed July 28, 2005
07-28-05 Filed: Reply Memo in Further Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (FILED UNDER SEAL)
08-09-05 Filed: Plaintiff Iomed Inc's Memo in Opposition to Defendants
Jamal Yanaki and Activatex, L.C.'s Motion to Strike Iomed's
Proferred but Inadmissible Evidentiary Materials
11-21-05 Filed order: Defts Jamal Yanaki and ActivaTek LC's Stipulation
with Pltf Iomed Inc and Non Joined But Named Counterclaim Defts
Robert Lollini Mary Crowther and Brian Mower for Dismissal of
this Action as Beteen them with Prejudice and Order
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Signed November 21, 2005
11-23-05 Filed: Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice
11-28-05 Note: submitted order to Judge
11-30-05 Filed order: Order of Dismissal with Prejudice
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Signed November 30, 2005
11-30-05 Case Disposition is Dismissed
Disposition Judge is TYRONE E. MEDLEY
04-28-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.00
04-28-06 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.00
04-02-09 Fee Account created
Total Due:
10.50
04-02-09 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
10.50
02-10-11 Note: RETENTION MET - TRANSCRIPT DESTROYED
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
APPEALED: CASE #20100595
SUSAN I MOSS vs. IOMED INC
CASE NUMBER 050913371 Miscellaneous

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
JOSEPH C FRATTO
PARTIES
Plaintiff - SUSAN I MOSS
Represented by: DAVID W SCOFIELD
Represented by: RONALD F PRICE
Defendant - ROBERT J LOLLINI - DISMISSED
Defendant - MARY CROWTHER - DISMISSED
Defendant - LAURA MILLAR - DISMISSED
Defendant - PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVE
Represented by: ALAN L SULLIVAN
Defendant - PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVE
Represented by: JAMES D GARDNER
Defendant - CLARK WADDOUPS
Represented by: ALAN L SULLIVAN
Represented by: JAMES D GARDNER
Defendant - JONATHAN O HAFEN
Represented by: ALAN L SULLIVAN
Represented by: JAMES D GARDNER
Defendant - JUSTIN P MATKIN
Represented by: ALAN L SULLIVAN
Represented by: JAMES D GARDNER
Defendant -

OFFICE EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATES - DISMISSED

Defendant -

OFFICEWARE

Defendant - SCOTT L JOHNSON - DISMISSED
Defendant -

IOMED INC - DISMISSED

ACCOUNT SUMMARY
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TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Balance:

BAIL/CASH BONDS

476.75
476.75
0.00
0.00

Posted:
Forfeited:
Refunded:
Balance:

300.00
0.00
0.00
300.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE
Amount Due:
155.00
Amount Paid:
155.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: JURY DEMAND - CIVI:
Amount Due:
75.00
Amount Paid:
75.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

28.50
28.50
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.25
1.25
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO T&PE COPY
Amount Due:
10.00
Amount Paid:
10.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

0.50
0.50
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
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Amount Due:
Amount Paid:

0.75
0.75

0.00
0.00

Amount Credit:
Balance:
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

205.00
205.00
0.00
0.00

0.75
0.75
0.00
0.00

BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Appeals
Posted By: PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE
Posted:
300.00
Forfeited:
0.00
Refunded:
0.00
Balance:
300.00
CASE NOTE
Judge Skanchy notes in file
PROCEEDINGS
08-01-05
08-01-05
08-01-05
08-01-05
08-01-05
08-01-05
08-01-05
08-01-05
09-07-05
09-07-05
12-05-05

12-06-05

Case filed
Judge LESLIE A LEWIS assigned.
Filed: Complaint 10K-MORE
Filed: Demand Civil Jury
Fee Account created
Total Due:
155.00
Fee Account created
Total Due:
75.00
COMPLAINT 10K-MORE
Payment Received:
155.00
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE, JURY DEMAND CIVIL
JURY DEMAND - CIVIL
Payment Received:
75.00
Fee Account created
Total Due:
28.50
COPY FEE
Payment Received:
28.50
Filed order: Signed on 11/21/05, Stipulation and joint motion
for dismissal with prejudice, as against defendants lomed,
Inc., Robert J Lollini, Mary Crowther, Laura Millar, Office
Equipment Associates and Scott L Johnson and order
Judge LESLIE A LEWIS
Signed November 21, 2005
Filed return: Summons. (Jonathan 0. Hafen)
Party Served: HAFEN, JONATHAN 0
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Service Type: Personal
Service Date: November 29, 2005
12-06-05 Filed return: Summons. (Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless)
Party Served: Scott W. Loveless- registered agent
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: November 29, 2005

12-08-05 Filed return: Summons. (Clark Waddoups,)
Party Served: Clark Waddoups
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: December 05, 2005
12-13-05 Fee Account created
Total Due:
12-13-05 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
02-07-06 Filed: First Amended Complaint.
04-26-06 Filed: Acceptance of Service.
05-10-06 Filed: Answer
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVE
CLARK WADDOUPS

1.25
1.25

05-10-06 Filed: Answer
JONATHAN O HAFEN
05-10-06 Filed: Answer
JUSTIN P MATKIN
06-21-06 Filed: Certificate of Service of Susan I Moss* June 20, 2006
Request for Production of Documents
06-28-06 Filed order: Report of Attorneys* Planning Meeting and
Scheduling Order.
Judge LESLIE A LEWIS
Signed June 28, 2006
07-05-06 Filed: Certificate of Service of Defendants' Rule 26(a)
Disclosures
07-06-06 Filed: Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to
Counts II Through VII of the first amended complaint.
07-06-06 Filed: Memorandum in support of defendants' Motion for Judgment
on The Pleadings as to Counts II through VII of The First
Amended Complaint.
07-06-06 Filed: Defendants' Motion for Judgment on The Pleadings as to
Counts II through VII of The First Amended Complaint.
07-06-06 Filed: Memorandum in support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment
on The Pleadings as to Counts EI through VII of The First
Amended Complaint.
07-06-06 Filed: Certificate of Service Re: Plaintiffs' Initial
Disclosures.
07-10-06 Filed: Certificate of Service for Discovery.
07-28-06 Filed: Certificate of Service for Defendants' Responses to
Plaintiffs' Requests for Production of Documents.
08-22-06 Filed: Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Overlength Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the
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Pleadings.
08-22-06 Filed: Plaintiff's Memorandum in opposition to Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings.
09-14-06 Filed: Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss First Amended Complaint Counts Two Through Seven on The
Pleadings.
09-19-06 Filed order: Signed on 9/18/06, Ex parte order granting ex
parte motion for leave to file overlength memorandum in
opposition to defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings
Judge LESLIE A LEWIS

Signed September 18, 2006
09-21-06 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision Re: Defendants' MOton for
judgment on the pleadings as to counts II throught VII of the
first amended complaint.
10-03-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 050913371 ID 6754157
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS is scheduled.
Date: 12/07/2006
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - N44
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
4 50 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: LESLIE A LEWIS
10-03-06 DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS scheduled on December 07, 2006 at
02:00 PM in Fourth Floor - N44 with Judge LEWIS.
12-05-06 Filed: Stipulation to continue oral argument on defendant's
motion to dismiss first amended complaint counts two through
seven on the pleadings
12-07-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
RANDALL SKANCHY
Clerk:
chells
No Parties Present
Video

HEARING
Mr Scofield had a family emergency. The Court therefore strikes
this matter from the courts calendar at this time. The matter will
be rescheduled.
01-23-07 MOTION TO DISMISS scheduled on February 15, 2007 at 11:15 AM in
Third Floor - W35 with Judge LEWIS.
01-23-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 050913371 ID 6857390
MOTION TO DISMISS is scheduled.
Date: 02/15/2007
Time: 11:15 a.m.
Location: Third Floor - W35
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
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01-25-07
01-25-07
01-25-07

02-15-07
02-15-07

4 50 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: LESLIE A LEWIS
Filed: Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for partial
summary judgment as t count of the first amended compalint.
Filed: Defendants' Motion for Parital Summary Judgment as to
Count I of The First Amended Complaint.
Filed: Exhibit to Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment as to Count I of The First Amended
Complaint.
Filed: Notice of Judicial Assignment of a Senior Judge-Judge
Douglas Cornaby
Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION TO DISMISS
Judge:
DOUGLAS L. CORNABY

Clerk:
chells
PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): SUSAN I MOSS
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): DAVID W SCOFIELD
Defendant's Attorney(s): ALAN L SULLIVAN
Video
Tape Number:
11:21:19

HEARING

03-23-07
03-23-07
03-27-07
03-27-07
03-29-07

04-03-07
04-03-07
04-03-07

Counsel argue the motion to dismiss counts 2-7.
Judge Cornaby takes the motion under advisement.
Hearing held in courtroom W35. Hearing end 12:04:13.
Filed: Stipulation and Joint Motion to suspend deadlines m
scheduling order.
Filed: Motion for Entry of Stipulated Protective Order.
Filed by: SULLIVAN, ALAN L
Filed order. Protective order
Judge SANDRA PEULER
Signed March 27, 2007
Filed order: Order suspending deadlines in scheduling order
Judge SANDRA PEULER
Signed March 27, 2007
Filed order: Signed Ruling on motion-def's motion to dismiss
counts two through seven of the amended complaint is granted,
counsel for the def's to draw the formal order
Judge DOUGLAS L. CORNABY
Signed March 29, 2007
Filed: Affidavit of Susan I Moss.
Filed: Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment as to Count I of The First Amended
Complaint.
Filed: Affidavit of Jamal S. Yanaki.
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04-03-07 Filed: Affidavit of John P. Mullen.
04-26-07 Filed: Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavits
of Susan I. Moss, John P. Mollen and James S. Yanaki
Filed by: PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVE,
04-26-07 Filed: Defendant's Reply Memorandum In Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment as to Count 1 of the First Amended
Complaint
04-26-07 Filed: Defendant's Memorandum In Support of Motion to Strike
Affidavits
04-28-07 Judge JOSEPH C FRATTO assigned.
05-10-07 Filed order: Signed on 5/7/07, Judgment on the pleadings as to
counts II through VII of the first amended complaint
Judge DOUGLAS L. CORNABY
Signed May 07, 2007
05-24-07 Filed: Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike
Affidavits
06-25-07 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision
06-25-07 Filed: Defendant's Reply Memorandum In Support of Motion to

Strike Affidavits
07-03-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 050913371 ID 11155624
PENDING MOTIONS is scheduled.
Date: 08/06/2007
Time: 10:30 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - N42
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JOSEPH C. FRATTO
At the direction of the Court, 4 5 minutes is set aside on
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment as to Count I oj
the First Amended Complaint;
and Defendant's mtoion to strike portions of the affidavits of
Susan I Moss, John P Mollen and James S Yanaki
07-03-07 PENDING MOTIONS scheduled on August 06, 2007 at 10:30 AM in
Fourth Floor - N42 with Judge FRATTO.
08-06-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for PENDING MOTIONS
Judge:
JOSEPH C. FRATTO
Clerk:
wendyd
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): DAVID W SCOFIELD
RONALD F PRICE
Defendant's Attorney(s): ALAN L SULLIVAN
JAMES D GARDNER
Video
Tape Number:
Courtrm N4 2
Tape Count: 10:28
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HEARING
Matter is before the Court on Defendant's partial summary judgment
as to count 1 of the first amended complaint and
defendant's motion to strike portions of the affidavits of Susan I
Moss, John P Mollen, and James S Yanaki.
Counsel state their arguments.
The matter is taken under advisment.
08-21-07 Filed: Memorandum Decision (defendant's motino for partial
summary judgment is denied; defendant's motion to strike is
denied) (see file for full decision)
09-17-07 Filed order: Order (deft's motion to strike portions of the
affidavits of Susan I Moss, John P Mullen, & Jamal S Yanaki is
denied; Deft's partial motion for summary judgment is denied)
Judge JOSEPH C FRATTO
Signed September 17, 2007
09-25-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
10.00
09-25-07 AUDIO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
10.00
10-05-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
0.50
10-05-07 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
0.50
Note: 5.00 cash tendered.
4.5 change given.
10-09-07 Filed: Notice of Filing of Petition for Discretionary Order

Pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
10-10-07 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah letter - the Petition for
Interlocutory Appeal in this case was filed with the Utah
Supreme Court on 10-09-07 - 20070826-SC
10-19-07 Filed: Transcript of Proceedings
11-01-07 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah-Order-Case transferred to Utah
Court of Appeals-20070826-SC
11-01-07 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals-Letter to Counsel-Case has been
assigned to Utah Court of Appeals-Case Number to remain the
same with the exception of -CA as the extension
11-06-07 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals- Letter to Counsel- Enclosed is a
copy of the order granting the interlocutory appeal entered by
the Utah Court of Appeals on Nov. 2, 2007. 20070826-CA
11-06-07 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals- Order- The petition for
permission to appeal is granted. 20070826-CA
11-08-07 Filed: Notice of Filing of August 6th 2007 Transcript
11-10-07 Filed: Notice of Filing Of defendants Memorandum In Support of
Motion to Dismiss In The United States District Court for the
District Of Utah Case No 2:03cv0345 DB Which Memorandum In Oral
Argument In Oral Argument This Action on February 15 2007
11-13-07 Filed: Notice of Filing of Defendant's Jamal Yanaki and
ActivaTek, LC's Memorandum Supporting Their Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, From Case No. 020903031 Which Memorandum Was
Referenced and Submitted In Oral Argument In This Action
2/15/07
11-15-07 Filed: Record Index
11-15-07 Note: Cert/Copy of Record Index forwarded to Utah Court of
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Appeals-20070826
01-03-08 Filed: Stipulation and Joint Motion for Stay Pending Appeal
01-08-08 Filed order: (PROPOSED) ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION AND JOINT
MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL
Judge JOSEPH C FRATTO
Signed January 08, 2008
11-07-08 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals-Opinion-Reverse and Remand for
entry of partial summary judgment in favor of Defendants
11-19-08 Dismissed party - CROWTHER, MARY
11-19-08 Dismissed party - IOMED INC
11-19-08 Dismissed party - LOLLINI, ROBERT J
11-19-08 Dismissed party - MILLAR, LAURA
11-19-08 Dismissed party - OFFICE EQUIPMENT ASSOC
11-19-08 Dismissed party - JOHNSON, SCOTT L
01-12-09 Filed: Court of Appeals Remittitur rec'vd & record rec'vd,
files -2 , transcript-1, Reverse and Remand - 20080826 CA
01-22-09 Notice - NOTICE for Case 050913371 ID 11869105
REVIEW REMITTUTUR is scheduled.
Date: 02/05/2009
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - N42
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JOSEPH C. FRATTO

01-22
01-23
02-02
02-02
02-05

Per the court a status review will be heard on the remittitur
09 REVIEW REMITTUTUR scheduled on February 05, 2009 at 01:30 PM in
Fourth Floor - N42 with Judge FRATTO.
09 Filed: Verified Bill of Appellate Costs
09 Filed: Memorandum Supporting Notice Of Objection To Verified
Bill Of Appellate Costs And Motion To Have Costs Taxed By The
Trial Court
09 Filed: Notice Of Objection To Verified Bill Of Appellate Costs
And Motion To Have Costs Taxed By The Trial Court
09 Minute Entry - Minutes for Review Hearing
Judge:
JOSEPH C. FRATTO
Clerk:
lynettm
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): DAVID W SCOFIELD
Defendant's Attorney(s): ALAN L SULLIVAN
Video
Tape Count: 131

HEARING
Review remittiture as to pending action and proposed order signed
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in court
02-05-09 Filed order: (Proposed) Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment
Judge JOSEPH C FRATTO
Signed February 05, 2009
02-05-09 Fee Account created
Total Due:
0.75
02-05-09 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
0.75
02-10-09 Filed: Verified Bill of Costs
02-10-09 Filed: Reply Memorandum In Support of Verified Bill of
Appellate Costs
02-18-09 Filed: Notice of Appeal
02-18-09 Fee Account created
Total Due:
205.00
02-18-09 Bond Account created
Total Due:
300.00
02-18-09 Fee Account created
Total Due:
0.75
02-18-09 APPEAL
Payment Received:
205.00
Note: Code Description: APPEAL
02-18-09 Bond Posted
Payment Received:
300.00
02-18-09 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
0.75
02-19-09 Note: Cert/copy of Notice of Appeal sent to Supreme Court.
02-25-09 Filed: Letter from Supreme Court to Mr. Scofield - appeal has
been filed and may be transferred to COA within twenty days20090158 SC
02-25-09 Filed: Supreme Court - Order - effective in twenty days this
matter will be transferred to the COA 20090158
03-11-09 Filed: Request for Transcript
03-16-09 Filed: Court of Appeals letter to Mr. Scofield - this case has
been assigned to the COA and the case # remains the same.
20090158 CA
04-14-09 Filed: Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment hearing on
2/15/2009 by Jeri Kearbey, CCT.
04-24-09 Note: First Supplemental Record Index

04-24-09 Note: Cert/Copy of First Supplemental Record Index and Record,
Files 3, Transcripts 2 forwarded to Utah Court of Appeals c/o
Celia
04-27-09 Filed: Letter from Court of Appeals with envelope of Judge's
notes.
07-09-09 Filed: Parr Browns Request to Submit for Decision
07-22-09 Filed: Minute Entry
06-28-10 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals-Opinion-Discovery orders are
presumed valid and we Affirm the District Court's Ruling
Dimissing Plaintiff's tort claims-AFFIRMED
08-03-10 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah-Letter to Mr Petters and Mr
Scofield-Petiton for Writ of Certiorari was filed Jule 26,
2010, Case number 20100595-SC should be reflected on any future
filings and correspondence
08-04-10 Note: Appealed: Case #20100595
11-30-10 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah-Order-Petition for Writ of
Certiorari is GRANTED
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SUSAN I. MOSS and JAMAL S. YANA1 "

Appellate Court No. 20090158-CA

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE &
LOVELESS, a Utah Professional
Corporation; CLARK WADDOUPS;
JONATHAN 0. HAFEN; JUSTIN P.
MATKIN; and JOHN DOES I through
UeK.'filjiii

Third District Court Case No. 050913371
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby,
Senior Judge)

XX,

"in' Appellt t„"

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM THE (1) RUUNG ON MOTION, DATED MARCH 29,2007, (2) JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO COUNTS II THROUGH VII OF THE FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT, DATED MAY 10,2007, AND (3) ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, DATED FEBRUARY 5,2009

DAVID W. SCOFIELD - 4140
THOMAS W. PETERS - 8856
PETERS | SCOFIELD
A Professional Corporation

Alan L. Sullivan
James D. Gardner
Katie Carreau

Suite 115 Parleys Corporate Center
2455 East Parleys Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants
Susan I. Moss and Jamal S. Yanaki

15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004
Attorneys for Appellees

SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P

of RobertJ. Lollini. 3/11/03 ("Lollini Dep. II"), at267:2-4, R. 608 (sealed) at 50.
Apparently, the trial court did not wish to convert the motion to one for summary
judgment, but all of the voluminous evidence submitted to the trial court during oral
argument on the motion, which is contained in R. 608, utterly and entirely refutes any
good faith basis for the assertion that Yanaki stole anything at all and demonstrates thai
ail of the sworn statements used to obtain the search order were replete with lies.
B.

JUDICIAL PRIVILEGE CANNOT, ON THE PLEADINGS, PROTECT DEFENDANTS
AGAINST ALL OF PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS

At the outset defendants are not being sued for their conduct before a court or
their filings with a court. They are not being sued for statements they made to a court.
They are not being sued for petitioning a court. They are being sued for misusing court
process for an ulterior motive for which it was not designed, i.e., helping lomed to send
a message to its remaining employees to sign new employment contracts rather than
leave. They are also suedfortheir tortious conduct which violated plaintiffs
fundamental right of privacy. Defendants cannot obtain a shield from their misconduct
by seeking unconstitutional process. Moss was not even a party to the lawsuit from
which their illegal process derived. The process was not designed to allow a search
and seizure, indeed, something outlawed for decades by decree of the Supreme Court
of this state.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Kool v. Lee, 43 Utah 394,143 P. 906 (1913), was
confronted with an appeal of an abuse of process claim concerning an arrest warrant
The Court stated with respect to ulterior purpose: There must, of course, be allegations
and proof of a willful or intentional misuse or abuse of process, a willful and intentional
misuse of it for some wrongful and unlawful object, or ulterior purpose not intended by

23

the law to effect." Id at 909 In response to arguments that 'ttie execution of the arrest
iwfiil piII pose as tl te I l\ ilii ig en i Motioi 11 iei e asserts. 1 <L
**>' -The discovery order was reasonable and necessary to pi eserve evidence "1 here
are very few instances when this kind of discovery would be justified and this is one of
them.*),3 the Utah Supreme Court was unpersuaded:
But here there are averments, and there is evidence to support them, that
the criminal proceedings were instituted and the warrant of arrest
procured and used, or caused to be used, by the defendant, not to
vindicate the law, not to arrest and punish the plaintiff for the charged
offense, but for a wrongful and unlawful purpose and ulterior object, to
evict the plaintiff and her husband from, and to put the defendant in
possession of, the premises-a purpose not intended by the law to effect
by such a process—and by such misuse of the process the defendant ii i
fact did evict and dispossess the plaintiff and her husband and put himself
in possession, and, having accomplished that, the criminal proceedings
ceased and were dismissed. We think that is an abuse of process and is
actionable.
Id at 910.
paifuis, Hit1 ledaal UJUII lidilll llu-il

IntN

the private search warrant was in fact not authorized by any law asserted as authority
by defendants. See Yanafcr v. lomed, 319 F. Supp.2d 1261,1263 n.2 (D. Utal 12004 )
("Because the statutes and constitutional provisions cited in the lomed Memorandum
and the Complaint do not, explicitly or implicitly, provide the state court with the
authority to iss*

t

and cannot establish a claim under § 1983,:! a/fc/415 F 3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2005), cert,
denied sub nom. Yanakiv. Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless,. 126 S.Ct. 1910,
II iirther found that the search and seizure

3

Again, an improper ruling on the merits of the case when the trial court stood in
i ic - position to make such a merits-based ruling on a pleadings motion.
24

were unreasonable. See id. at 1267 n.7 ("The invasion of Plaintiffs home, supported
only by an ex parte submission of Plaintiffs' opponents in a civil lawsuit, appears to be
precisely the type of unreasonable intrusion into a private dwelling that the Fourth
Amendment is designed to prevent Defendants' protestations to the contrary, an ex
parte motion presented to a judge in the course of civil litigation is not the equivalent of
a probable cause search warrant affidavit submitted by an independent law
enforcement officer.*)
Since the ostensible bases for authorization (to conduct discovery and to protect
trade secrets) did not authorize the private search wanrant, it was sought for an ulterior
purpose as a matter of law, viz., to conduct an illegal search and seizure. In addition,
plaintiffs pleaded specifically at least one ulterior purpose of defendants' client that
defendants agreed to further by conducting the illegal search and seizure, namely,
chilling employees from moving to other employment rather than sign non-compete
agreements. See FAC ffi| 8-9, R. 13t.4
The private search warrant was void to begin with. The Utah Supreme Court
expressly outlawed private search warrants over sixty-five years ago, in Allen v.
Trueman, 100 Utah 36; 110 P.2d 355 (1941), (holding unconstitutional under UTAH
CONST, ART.

I, §§ 14, 24, ART. VI, § 26, that portion of the Trade-Marks and Trade

Names Act, REV. STAT. UTAH § 95-2-10 (1933) that authorized searches for, and
seizures of, knockoff products.) The Utah Supreme Court carefully analyzed the

4

It is noteworthy that the trial court found collateral estoppel assertable against
plaintiffs for not challenging the search order before the lomed case judge but the trial
court found no reason to apply collateral estoppel against defendants who were actual
parties to the federal action and did not appeal Jude Benson's express findings that the
search was a constitutional violation, simply not state action
25

interests of the state in such an action as follows:
Moreover, it has generally been recognized that tfie legitimate use of the
search warrant is restricted to public prosecutions, and that in no
event may such proceeding be invoked for the protection of any
mere private right It is a police weapon, and its use constitutes a valid
exercise of the police power
lllnii, 1 Id I . nil ill iUIJ lemphdMs addcdi

NIP I ILillli 'iii|in m< I mill i|iiuli'il tvilh

approval a decision from the New York Coi irt of Appeals:
Search warrants were never recognized by the commoi i law as processes
which might be availed of by individuals in the course of civil proceedings
or for the maintenance of any mere private right; but their use was
confined to cases of public prosecutions, instituted and pursued for the
suppression of crime or the detection and punishment of criminals ..
All searches, therefore, which are instituted and pursued upon the
complaint or suggestion of one party into the house or possessions of
another, in order to secure a personal advantage, and not with any design
to afford aid in the administration of justice in reference to acts or offenses
in violation of penal laws, must be held to be unreasonable, and
consequently under our Constitution unwarrantable, illegal,, and void.
Allen, 110 P.2d at 361 (quoting People v Kem\ <

-1

'

'--;, / » /

(1913)).
Further, specifically discussing the interests served by the Trade-Marks and

' such act

appears h * •- tht »/roK- **< •" ** «t • i.nan< oment of the good-will

connected with the business of the owner of the mark " Ill 10 P 2d at 361 'The Act had
nnecuon to criminal prosecutions and tl ie I Jfal i Supreme Court found that the Act
bore "no actual relationship to the objects sought by the Act in a proper exercise of the
I in IIH.I! ("town" iiiiiid fi mnd that the ^
under UTAH CONST AR i I § 114 J"< i

*
In addition, because the Legislature had granted

"a special privilege to a special group or dass of persons, i e , to those who are owners
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of trademarks or trade names" the court found that the Act violated the constitutional
guarantee against the granting of special privileges and for uniform operation of the
laws, found in UTAH CONST. ART. VI, § 26. See Allen, 110 P.2d at 362.
The Utah Supreme Court agreed with a decision from the Illinois Supreme Court
concerning a similar statute in Illinois, where it concluded: "The Act is wholly for the
benefit for the owners of personal property of this class, and is designed to give to the
owners of personal property of this classrightsand privileges not possessed by the
owners of other classes of other property." 100 Utah at 53,110 P.2d at 363 (quoting
Lippman v. People, 175 III. 101, 51 N.E. 872 (1898). Thus, the Utah Supreme Court
and the framers of the Utah Constitution have already spoken and determined that
there is no public or governmental interest that could be served by a law allowing
private owners of a particular class of property, here, trade secrets, to use the
government to conduct searches for their private interest.5 See also Little v. Sowers,
167 Kan. 72,77, 204 P.2d 605, 608 (1949) (holding that allegations "charging and
disclosing the procurance of void orders in probate court by appellee and the issuance
of process thereon to appellant's injury and damage" "states a cause of action for
abuse of process."
Under the English Common Law, for almost a quarter of a millennium, tort causes
of action for damages resulting from violations of fundamentalrightshave been allowed

5

Where a law does not expressly authorize a search, its illegality is even more
palpable. Even a concern about destruction of records does not justify a court order
when the legislature has not deigned to allow such a remedy. See Shankman v.
Axetrod, 528 N.Y.Supp.2d 37, 38 (App. Div. 1988) (where statute does not allow
expressly examination of records orfiles,it must be assumed that the legislature
intended a subpoena to be adequate, Mrt is for the Legislature, not the courts, to fashion
such an investigative tool, if one is required.").
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where the violation purported to be under the auspices of an illegal court order See
Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hospital Center, 300 Md. 520,479 A.2d 921 (CL App.
1UB4>:

••'

• -

One of the earliest cases to illustrate this point was Wilkes v. Wood,
Lofffs 1, 98 Eng.Rep. 489 (1763). In Wilkes, supra, the plaintiff
recovered damages in a trespass action brought against an official in the
office of the Secretary of State who entered his home and seized his
papers upon an unlawful general warrant Lord Pratt, in his
instructions to the jury, acknowledged that the offidal had acted "contrary
to the fundamental principles of the constitution," id. at 19, [footnote
omittedj and stated thattirejury could consider the illegal conduct in
assessing damages.
Id , 300 Md at 526, 479 A 2d at 924 (emphasis added).6 This precedent was binding
it lip DI i tl le if ral ::: ::« n I: ai id is t >h iclii ig c •

;

- ^ ^ M ^

•*><:•* < t•..•>.

•- —eiared the

English Common law to be binding in its Courts upon statehood. »**e American bush v.
City of South Salt Laket 2006 UT40f50&n.17, 557 Utah Adv. Rep * ^ ' «
("The common Isw of Engl3ndv so far as it is not repugnlant to, on in ronlln I Willi Hie
constitution and laws of the United States, oi the constitution and laws of this state,

2488(1898)].
The conduct of a private search and seizure is "at i act: in the use of the process
notpropm in lllliii ii,H)ii!iii pmsouilum in! Hit! piot entiling

t\nrfi]ru>n IknutopimiiK

2005 UT 36 at U 65, 116 P 3d at 341 I herefore, undei Anderson Development Kool,

6

Th<:. Washington Supreme'Court, in Bosteder v, City of Ronton, 155 Wash.2d
18,117 P.3d 316 (2005)(en banc), recognized a common law trespass action despite
the existence of the illegal order purportedly authorizing the trespass. The claim was
dismissed as against defendants in their offidal capacity, for failure to provide a timely
governmental notice of claim, but the case was remanded to allow the trespass claim to
proceed if it was determined on remand that defendants acted in their individual
capacity. See id., 155 Washed at 35-37, 50-51.117 P.3d at 324-25,332.

Men and Yanaki, the allegations of the FAC plainly state a claim for abuse of process.
Cases cited to the trial court by the defendants compel no different conclusion.
Defendants cited Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9,70
P.3d 17, for the proposition that a[t]he Utah Supreme Court has adopted the rule in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 682 cmt b, that •there is no action for abuse of

process when the process is used for the purpose for which it is intended, but there is
an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant.,n That
may be true, but defendants miss the point that the discovery process in civil litigation
was never intended for the purpose of allowing searches and seizures of homes, which
is the purpose for which defendants used it.
Bennett more correctly stands for the proposition that "[a] plaintiff may state a
cause of action for abuse of process against a person" Swho uses a legal process...
against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed.1"
Bennett, 2003 UT 9 H 47, 70 P.3d at 28. Defendants purported to use the discovery
process, although it does not authorize searches and seizures, for the purpose of
conducting a search and seizure so that their client could intimidate its remaining
employees. That is actionable under Bennett.7
Defendants are not being sued in this case for making any defamatory statement
or, indeed, any statement at all. They are instead being sued for illegally searching
plaintiffs' home and removing plaintiffs' property. Not one of the privilege cases cited

7

Defendants' citation below to Waiters v. Dinn, 633 N.E.2d 280 (Ind. Ct. App.
1994) is also inapposite. The process at issue in that case was a subpoena served to
obtain records in discovery. See id. at 288-89. While the subpoena was defective in its
form, there is no comparison between the use of a recognized and legitimate discovery
tool and an illegal private search warrant and search and seizure.
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by defendants involves suit over a non-consensual-and illegal warrantless entry into a
plaintiffs home and conduct of an illegal search and seizure.
Nevertheless, defendants* argued below: "Coui ts I lave repeatedly held that the
judicial proceedings privilege predudes claims like those presented here hased -..
allegations Hwil .it"

'

s

" "" "

'villi prilit * »vs

Defendants1 Opening Memorandum, at 5 (emphasis

obtained unlawful c< *• ir :.. added), R. 258 However

pmpfM <1IUM voi

*.

•< of defendants1 cited cases even involved a search

and seizure.1 "' Defei idai its expressly represented IIKit hoiio I "IVCISIO/I, Inc v
international Business Machines Corp., 673 F.2d KM' ipith Cir 1982), is "based: on
allegatio -

-

obtained unlawful cnu" of it is

pmp< i IIIM i vni

/titi (iultctj assistance ai id

See Defendants' Opening Memorandum, at 5, R 258.

^ e remaining cases cited by defendants did not come close to mentioning the
issue. Plaintiffs have no quarrel with the general propositions that a privilege exists to
make defamatory statements in litigation, that the privilege is absolute, that it protects
witnesses, lawyers, parties and judges from liabilityformaking defamatory statements
or that the privilege lasts throughout the entire litigation, which are propositions for
which three Utah cases cited by defendants stand, namely, Riddle v. Perry, 2002 UT
10,40 P.3d 1128; DeBryv. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, 992 P.2 979; Beezleyv. Hansen, 4
Utah 2d 64,286 P.2d 1057 (1955). Nor do plaintiffs quarrel with the general proposition
that the privilege bars all claims for injury caused by the defamatory statement, whether
sounding in defamation, intentional interference or otherwise, for which the Utah case
of Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1997), cited by defendants stands. The
unlawful entry into a home, search thereof and seizure of property is not, however, a
"publication" of "defamatory statements" with which the cited cases were concerned.
See Riddle, 2002 UT 10 at fl 4,40 P.3d at 1131 ("TTie defamatory statement at issue
in this case
" Emphasis added.); DeBry, 1999 UT 111 at If 4, 992 P.2d at 982 ("Ms.
DeBry's attorney, Clark Sessions, responded by letter to Judge Wilkinson the following
day, stating that Godbe's letter was an attempt "to demean, libel and defame Ms.
DeBry.m* Emphasis added.); Beezley, 4 Utah 2d at 66, 286 P.2d at 1058 (The
publication of defamatory matter by an attorney is protected
" (stated in context of
lawyer being sued for publishing slanderous statement about opposing party to client));
and Price, 949 P.2d at 1253 ("Price filed a civil complaint based on these comments
in state court on June 18,1996, against Armour and the Union, alleging libel, libel per
se, and intentional interference with business relations.0 [Emphasis added.J) Tramping
through plaintiffs' home illegally is simply not a defamatory statement,
SCI

A reading of the case shows that assertion to be plainly wrong. Forro Precision
(1) did not involve the conduct of "improper discovery," (2) did not involve "unlawful
court orders" and (3) most certainly did not involve a warrantless and illegal search of a
private home by a private attorney. The Court infactapplied a privilege to make
defamatory statements to the police to initiate a criminal investigation, but only as to
statements made to the police. The Court did not apply that privilege to the conduct of
the search and seizure. As to claims based on conduct of the search, the Court
recognized that no California cases had decided the issue and predicted that the
California appellate courts would allow immunity to citizens who assist the police upon
request, in the execution of valid search warrants, derivative to the officer's own
immunity in the execution of valid warrants, not based on any judicial proceedings or
other privilege applicable to statements.
The defendant in Forro Precision, International Business Machines Corporation
("IBM") had uncovered, in a prior lawsuit against Memorex Corporation, certain
evidence of theft of its trade secrets. Forro Precision, 673 F.2d at 1050, IBM went to
the Santa Clara County police and the California Attorney General to have them initiate
a criminal investigation. Id. at 1051. In the prior lawsuit, Forro Precision's president
and its general sales manager had given deposition testimony and produced
documents, subject to a protective order. Id. at 1050-51. The police agreed to
investigate IBM's allegations. See id. IBM provided the police with the Forro
documents and deposition transcriptsfromthe IBM/Memorex litigation, which the police
then used in probable cause affidavits presented to a magistrate by which they
obtained a valid search warrant for Forro Precision's premises and other locations. See
id. Because the police needed the technical assistance of IBM in executing the valid
31

search warrant, the police specifically requested, and IBM provided. IBM employees to
assist the police1 See id at 1053-54.
Neither Forro 1 decision nor any of its employees were iii idicted, bui wraespi .;<;
publicity about the search allegedly caused great damage to the company Id at

\ .

I" I in ni 11 iPrpri'iiiiiHiiiii MII Il II If 1 liiii iiiiilt'iilli'iiiii ill lliiteikiHM v Willi its "i ontiartnal i •• << •• *
on the theories:
[FJirst, that IBM orchestrated and participated in a police investigation of
Forro in order to subject the company to a "thunderclap- of adverse
publicity and thereby disrupt Forro's business relationships, and second,
that IBM used deceitful means to persuade the police to cause the
issuance of the search warrant foi Forro's plant and then participated in
the ensuing search and seizure of Forro's business records,
id, F'he Court quoted the California statute concerning privileged statements: "*A

judicial proceeding, or (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law

Id. at

The Court recognized under the applicable third prong9 that "the privilege

1055

applies to communications designed to pi oi opt officials to initiate proceedings as well
as to communications made during the course of proceedings :" rhe Court concluded
that "all ill llll 1 •• m uiiiiiiniiii afions lo Hit• aiithoiifif "s. wviii11 |iiivilffcqtil" j d at" 1056
Whether IBM's participation in the search and seizure would subject it to liability
was quite a different matter, however, and one the Court expressly recognized had not
- ,,jded unot

-

•

^cognized

that California allows the police to request the aid of citizens in executing search
warrant

t cited a Califomj

9

It is apparent that the Court is discussing the third prong by its statement of the
applicable policy: "Underlying the privilege is the policy of encouraging freedom of
communication between citizens and public authorities charged with investigating
wrongdoing* Id.
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citizen ail of the powers as the supervising police officer delegates. Id. The Court
reviewed California law making an officer "immune from suit arising out of the execution
of a valid warrant" Id. (Emphasis added). The Court then held: "We think that
California Penal Code section 830.6(b) must be understood as according a citizen
immunity that derivesfromthe officer's own immunity." Id.
Thus, the immunity afforded IBM for its participation in the search was in no way
related to the privilege to make defamatory statements to the police, but instead was
strictly derivative of the immunity of the police, themselves. Because there was no
question that the search warrant was valid and the requestfromthe police for
assistance was reasonable, IBM's conduct was privileged.
Therefore, the Forro Precision case, read correctly, actually supports plaintiffs1
claims here. In this case, there was no criminal investigation, no validly issued search
warrant and no request by the police to defendants to aid in the execution of a valid
search warrant In conclusion, there is no privilege to conduct an illegal search of
plaintiffs' home.
The only other case, acting as the "repeated holding" argued below by
defendants, is Brown v. Delaware Valley Transplant Program, 372 Pa. Super. 629, 539
A.2d 1372 (1988).10 In Brown, the judicial proceedings privilege was applied to protect
10

Defendants argued that "[ojther jurisdictions similarly apply the judicial
proceedings privilege to bar a wide range of tort claims[,j Opening Mem. at 4, R. 257,
without specifying that such claims are, in each instance they cited, premised on
defamatory statements. Lambdin Funeral Senrice, Inc. v. Griffith, 559 S.W.2d 791
(Tenn. 1978), stands for the proposition, according to defendants, that no invasion of
privacy action could be brought against them for conducting an illegal search and
seizure. In fact, the Lambdin Funeral Service court expressed that the tort claims
barred by the privilege were alleged to arisefromthe publication of defamatory
statements, not an invasion of privacy by virtue of unlawful entry into a home. See id.
at 792 fin the instant case, each tort charged in the complaint is predicated upon the
publication by the defendant of alleged acts of misconduct by the plaintiff."). In
(continued...)
33

a hospital's lawyer from liability for filing a judicial petition on behalf of the hospital
which sought an order allowing the hospital to extract the organs of a brain-dead man
I ic 1 i l i t had been unalile in nli nlil,/ Inn nee HI tiansplauli.. USU t\A\ a l l li \ A \ I iiiiiii
by the decedents relatives for malicious use of process had been dismissed by the trial
ni i mil mi i |ii li ill in 1". Ili.il il failed tu iate a eliiin because tin process was not used
against any of the plaintiffs. 539 A.2d at 13 7 A
That dismissal was not appealed, so the Court's opinion does not stand for any

Instead, the appeal sought reversal of the dismissal of claims against the lawyer for

10

(...continued)
Middlesex Concrete Prods. & Excav. Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Ass'n, 68 N.J. Supei 85,
172 A.2d 22 (1961), following litigation, a testifying expert was sued for his statements
made to his client while he was merely a consulting expert concerning a dispute
between his client and Middlesex. The Court held that the communications with his
client concerning the dispute but before he knew he would be a testifying expert were
privileged, so could not form the basis of an intentional interference claim. In Silberg v.
Anderson, 50 Cal.3d 205, 786 P.2d 365, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 (Cal. 1990)(en banc), the
Court held only that a divorce attorney's statement "as to [a] psychologists neutrality
and independence were privileged under [the Code]." Id., 50 Cal.3d at 219-20,786
P.2d 374,266 CaL Rptr. at 647-48. This holding was simply consistent with the Court's .
prior statement that the privilege "immunizes] participants from liability for torts arising
n
from communications made during judicial proceedings
Id., 50 Cal.3d at 214,786
P.2d at 370,266 Cal. Rptr. at 643. Finally, the case of Thornton v. Rhoden, 245
Cal.App.2d 80, 53 Cal.Rptr. 706 (1966), did not purport to abolish the tort of abuse of
process because all process is obtained through judicial proceedings. To the contrary,
although California takes an extremely narrow view of the tort, the judicial proceedings
privilege has been declared not to apply to actions where the gravamen of the action is
the conduct of enforcement of an order or judgment, rather than the communications to
procure the order or judgment in the first instance. See Rusheen v Cohen, 37 Cal.4th
1048,1065, 128 P.3d 713,724, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 516, 529 (2006)CHere, because the
execution of the judgment did not provide an independent basis for liability separate
and apart from the filing of the false declarations of service, the gravamen of the action
was the procurement of the judgment, not its enforcement Thus, the enforcement of
the judgment in reliance on the filing of privileged declarations of service was "itself
privileged.") Thus, even under a narrow interpretation never asserted in Utah of the
abuse of process tort, claim over an illegal entry into plaintiffs' home, would survive.
What the defendants communicated to the court in advance of their illegal search and
seizure fe not what plaintiffs here complain about.

mutilation of a corpse, civil conspiracy, and assault and battery, even though the lawyer
had never touched the decedent's body. See id.
In that limited context, the Court ruled that the judicial proceedings privilege
protected the lawyer from liability forfilinga judicial petition, even though there was no
defamatory statement, because preparation and filing of the petition is all the lawyer
did. Id., 539 A.2d at 1374 ("[T]he well-pleaded averments indicate that Attorney Heed's
only involvement in the case was his preparation of the petition pursuant to his client's
instructions, and that all the allegations against Heed are based on his actions in the
course of providing legal representation"). The Court relied on Pennsylvania precedent,
stating: "The immunity bars actions for tortious behavior by an attorney other than
defamation, so long as it was a communication pertinent to any stage of a judicial
proceeding. Thus, the privilege barred claims for intentional interference with
contractual or prospective contractual relations, as well as defamation. 539 A.2d at
1374-75 (emphasis added).
We do not know what holding the Pennsylvania court would have reached on an
abuse of process claim, because it was not before the court. However, even with
Pennsylvania's expansive reading of the privilege, it applies only to communicationbased claims, because the court expressly noted the absence of any conduct by the
attorney beyond filing the petition communicating the plea for relief. Had the lawyer
done more than communicated with the court, as the lawyers in this case conspired to
do and did, there is no indication that a demurrer would have been sustained.
Plaintiffs* allegations of an illegal search and seizure, under threat of kicking in
the door to their home, detaining Moss in the home while Matkin obtained a second
order authorizing force, when the civil litigant Yanaki was not even present, with a show
of force including the police and multiple others present, and in blatant violation of
35

plaintiffs' rights under the state and federal constitutions, raiseissues for a jury to
^u(

u\*
outrageous

-vtr.

new

A

in all the circumstances, is extreme and

/ no County Department of Job and Family Services, 240 "IF

Supp.2d 731 (N.D. Ohio 2003), the plaintiff alleged that an illegal, warrantless search of
i i»iiiyalc» Illinium! l»v A 'XJICI «ic|tjtn y iw-r. iMticmo •"•iiMI oii1iiti|oous i ondiiff sifffickiil lo
pursue a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court, applying Ohio
law that appears substantially identical to Utah law, see id. at 766, denied a motion for
summary judgment, stating: "A reasonable juror, being apprized of the pertinent 11 untti
Amendment legal doctrines, including the basic sanctity of the home and the right to be
ill'io, liOftii iiiii|ii*.iiln;ii intuit'.H i

ii in, .i . wvi Ii, flu • i.OM*itittltiunal |(lf i)e<" fn'iil t iWlP.mhH ijlVf-n

to the family, could view the threats of taking the children away, the arrest, ensuing
entry into the home, and the searches of Mr Walsh and the family home to have been
outrageous

I he pleaded facts here clearly give rise to question-,

to answer about whether the conduct complained of in invading the home while Moss
was homo iilono, illegally, < rilli IIIHN-IIS of violence Hind W S

:e, for an illegal

purpose, constitute extreme and outrageous conduct.
In Bennett, wl[a]ccording to Bennett's own pleadings, the Jones Waldo
defendants Ibai ordui idaled MIIKIIIH I w.i mil intoiiliuii.illy 'iiyayi'il iiii

i J nil In III

purpose of inflicting emotional distress/" 2003 UT 9 If 69, 70 P ,3d at 33. Moreovei , the
Court did not exch ide tl ie possibility that if more occurred 'than simply the filing
• -uiit and use of process, an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim could be
stated. Anderson Development supports this principle in its ruling: "As stated above,
wl^Gi^

more, neither

unpiopei uv

*

^ *

sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress." 2005 UT 36
"II > 1 1 in P "Id *il V) (emphasis fiddiill

lliii Ihis i asiji tin«condim f of m\ illegal SCMIC.II
HI.

and seizure, under the circumstances alleged, is much more, as was recognized by the
Court in Walsh.
Defendants claimed below that Yanaki could not sue under this tort because he
was not present This ignores the substantial emotional distress that defendants knew
they would cause from the fact of the search, itself, let alone when Yanaki found out
how his wife had been mistreated and threatened during the process. In Hatch v.
Davis, 2006 UT 44, 558 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, the Utah Supreme Court, although
recognizing its preference for presence and setting the bar high for a non-present
plaintiff, rejected an absolute requirement that a plaintiff alleging intentional infliction of
emotional distress be present to state a claim. See id 2006 UT 44 fl 32, 558 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 28 fYet the door to recovery remains open for the case where conduct is so
egregious that the plaintiffs circumstances cry out for relief/). Thus, all of the relevant
facts must be placed before the trier of fact, something a pleading motion is not
designed to do.
C.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT CANNOT, ON THE PLEADINGS, PROTECT DEFENDANTS
AGAINST ALL OF PLAINTIFFS* ALLEGATIONS

Again, defendants are not being sued because they petitioned their government
for redress. They are being sued for their conspiracy to abuse judicial process and for
frightening one plaintiff into opening her door, through which they passed without lawful
consent, invaded the home of the plaintiffs and stole plaintiffs' property. The trial court
held that Beezley v. Hansen, 4 Utah 2d 64, 286 P.2d 1057 (1955), authorized this
misconduct. Beezley, however, had nothing to do with the First Amendment. Instead, it
simply recognized that the judicial privilege applies to communications in demand
letters preliminary to litigation. See Beezley, 286 P.2d at 1057-58.
Defendants had in fact cited Scott v. Hem, 216 F.3d 897 (10th Cir. 2000), to
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are not derived from any allegation of a defamatory statement, but instead
from an illegal home invasion, are secured to Moss and Yanaki by statute.2
II.

T H E ORDER PARR WADDOUPS OBTAINED W A S ILLEGAL AND SO
PROVIDES NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THE INTENTIONAL TORTS COMMITTED

AS their principal argument asking this Court to ignore the binding
precedent of M e n v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 49, 110 P.2d 355, 361 (1941),
in which the Utah Supreme Court held private search warrants to be
unconstitutional under both the United States and Utah Constitutions, Parr
Waddoups states: tt[T]he search warrant at issue in Allen improperly
2

Parr Waddoups cites several other cases. Many involve California law,
which, as discussed in Note 1, supra, is grounded on a unique statutory definition
of the judicial privilege in which the California Legislature saw fit to expand the
privilege beyond its historical limits of application to claims grounded upon
defamatory statements. Because the explanatory parenthetical used by Parr
Waddoups on its citation to Lambdin Funeral Service, Inc. v.Gnffith, 559 S.W. 2d
791 (Tenn. 1978) gives the impression that the privilege applies in blanket
fashion to all invasion of privacy claims, see Appellees Brief, at 14, that case
must be addressed. In Lambdin, the underlying conduct upon which the invasion
of privacy claim was based was "the publication by the defendant of alleged acts
of misconduct by the plaintiff." Id., at 792. Thus, again unlike this case, the
claims were grounded in an alleged defamatory statement and it is in that context
that an invasion of privacy claim would be barred by the judicial proceedings
privilege and not by the unauthorized entry into a private home. In fact, none of
the cases cited by Parr Waddoups address the situation of an illegal search and
seizure conducted within a private home. Likewise, Parr Waddoups' citation to
Thornton v. Rhoden, 53 Cal. App. 2d 80, 53 CaL Rptr. 706 (Ct. App. 1966), with
the explanatory parenthetical stating: "abuse of process based on discovery
allegedly conducted for improper purposes[,]M Appellees' Brief, at 14-15, in fact
involved allegedly defamatory statements made in a deposition. See id., 53 Cal.
App. 2d at 82, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 708. So, again, the underlying basis of the
claimed abuse of process related to defamatory statements. That is not the case
here.
5
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action. If the presiding judge is also the assigned judge, the clerk shall
promptly send the notice to the Chief Justice, who shall determine whether the
notice is proper and, if so, shall reassign the action.
(d) Nondisclosure to court No party shall communicate to the court, or
cause another to communicate to the court, the fact of any party's seeking
consent to a notice of change.
(e) Rule 63 unaffected. This rule does not affect any rights under Rule 63.
(Added effective April 15, 1992; amended effective November 1, 1996.)

PART VHL PROVISIONAL AND FINAL
REMEDIES AND SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS
Rule 64A. Prejudgment writs of replevin, attachment and
garnishment*
Prejudgment writs of replevin, attachment and garnishment may be issued
under the following conditions and circumstances:
(1) The writ shall issue only upon written motion and pursuant to a written
order of the court.
(2) The court shall not direct the issuance of the writ without notice to the
adverse party and an opportunity to be heard unless it clearly appears from
specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate
and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the applicant before notice
can be served and a hearing had thereon.
(3) Every order authorizing the issuance of the writ granted without notice
shall be endorsed with the date and hour of issuance and shall be filed
forthwith in the clerk's office and entered of record. It shall define the injury
and state why it is irreparable and why it was granted without notice. Such
order, and any writ issued pursuant thereto, shall expire by its terms within
such time after issuance, not to exceed ten days, as the court fixes, unless
within the time so fixed the court shall, after notice and hearing, order the writ
continued in effect, or unless the adverse party consents that it may be
extended for a longer period. The reasons for the extension shall be entered of
record.
(4) If the writ is issued without notice, a hearing thereon shall be set for the
earliest reasonable time.
(5) At the hearing on the issuance of the writ or its continuance, the
proponent for the writ shall have the burden of establishing the facts justifying
its issuance and continuance.
(6) On two days' notice to the party obtaining the issuance of a writ without
notice, or on such shorter notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the
adverse party may appear and move its dissolution or modification; and in that
event the court shall proceed to hear and determine such motion, as expeditiously as possible.
(7) Any notice required under this rule shall be in such form and served in
such manner as will expeditiously give the adverse party actual notice of the
proceeding, all as directed by the court.
($) In the event that property has been seized by the sheriff pursuant to the
issuance of a writ without notice, such property shall be retained by him,
subject to the order of the court.
(9) Except as herein provided, the provisions of Rules 64B, 64C and 64D
shall continue to be and remain in fall force and effect.
Compiler's Notes, — Former Role 64A,
lfating to arrest procedures against an aabsconding debtor," was repealed by the Supreme
Court, effective November 1,1972.

Present Bole 64A was adopted by the Supreme Court as Rule 64, effective March 11,
1976. It was redesignated as Rule 64A by
amendment, effective May 21,1976.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Purpose.
The obvious purpose of this rule is to provide
procedural due process as required by the
United States Supreme Court in the issuance of

prejudgment writs of replevin, attachment, and
garnishment. Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 581
P.2d 1001 (Utah 1978).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note, Sniadach,
Fuentes and Mitchell: A Confusing Trilogy and
Utah Prejudgment Remedies, 1974 Utah L.
Rev. 536.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 6 Am. Jur. 2d Attachment
and Garnishment §§ 5, 254 et seq., 293, 332 to
334, 344, 345; 66 Am. Jur. 2d Replevin § 55.
CJJS. — 7 C.J.S. Attachment §§ 4, 104 et
seq.; 38 C.J.S. Garnishment §§ 3, 140 to 144,
149 et seq.
AXJL — Modern view as to validity of
statute or contractual provision authorizing
summary repossession of consumer goods sold

under retail installment sales contract, 4&
A.L.R.3d 1233
Post-Sniadach status of banker's right to set
off bank's claim against depositor's funds, 65
A.L.R.3d 1284.
Modern views as to validity, under federal
constitution, of state prejudgment attachment,
garnishment, and replevin procedures, distraint procedures under landlords' or innkeepers'lien statutes, and like procedures authorizing summary seizure of property, 29 A.L.R Fed
418.

Rule 64B. Replevin.
(a) Possession of personal property pending action. Except as provided in
Rule 64A and as authorized and permitted therein, the plaintiff in an action to
recover the possession of personal property may, after the filing of the
complaint and at any time before judgment, claim the delivery of such property
to him as provided in this rule.
(b) Affidavit When delivery is claimed, the plaintiff shall file with the court
an affidavit, showing: (1) a description of the property claimed; (2) that the
plaintiff is the owner of the property or has a special ownership or interest
therein, stating the facts in relation thereto, and that he is entitled to the
possession thereof; (3) that the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse
party; (4) the alleged cause of the detention thereof according to the best
knowledge, information and belief of affiant; (5) that it has not been taken for
a tax, assessment or fine pursuant to a statute, or seized under an execution or
an attachment against the property of the plaintiff; or if so seized, that it is by
statute exempt from such seizure; (6) the actual value of the property.
(c) Undertaking; issuance of writ; service. Upon the filing of the affidavit,
together with an undertaking with sufficient sureties to the effect that they are
bound to the defendant in double the value of the property, as stated in the
affidavit, for the prosecution of the action, for the return of the property to the
defendant, if return thereof be adjudged, and for the payment to him of such
Bum as may from any cause be recovered against the plaintiff, the clerk of the
court shall issue a writ requiring the sheriff or constable forthwith to take the
property described in the affidavit and retain it in his custody until delivery as
hereinafter provided. The sheriff or constable shall forthwith execute the writ
and without delay shall serve on the defendant a copy of the affidavit,
undertaking and writ; provided that if service cannot be made upon the
defendant as provided for the service of process, such service shall be made by
placing a copy of such papers in an envelope postage prepaid and addressed to
the defendant at his last known address, and depositing the same in the
nearest post office.
(d) Exception to sureties; justification. The defendant may, within two days
after the service of a copy of the writ, serve and file a notice that he excepts to
the sufficiency of the sureties. If he fails to do so, he is deemed to have waived
all objections to them. When the defendant excepts, the sureties must justify
on notice to the defendant within five days, in the same manner as upon
imdertaMngs on attachment, and if they fail to justify within such time, the
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property shall be returned to the defendant; provided that the court may allow
the giving of amended or additional undertakings required by this rule. If the
defendant excepts to the sureties, he cannot reclaim the property, as provided
in the next succeeding subdivision.
(e) Redelivery of property; undertaking. At any time before the delivery of
the property to the plaintiff the defendant may, if he does not except to the
sufficiency of plaintiffs sureties, require the return of such property by serving
upon the sheriff and the plaintiff and filing with the court a written undertaking with sufficient sureties to the effect that they are bound in double the
value of the property as stated in the affidavit of the plaintiff, for the delivery
thereof to the plaintiff, if such delivery be adjudged, and for the payment to
him of such sum as may for any cause be recovered against the defendant. The
undertaking, and the undertalring required by Subdivision (c) of this rule,
shall further provide that each surety submits himself to the jurisdiction of the
court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of the court as his agent upon whom
any papers affecting his liability on the undertaking may be served, and that
his liability may be enforced on motion and on such notice as the court may
prescribe without the necessity of an independent action.
(f) Justification of defendant's sureties. The plaintiff may, within two days
after notice of the giving of the undertaking required in the next preceding
subdivision, serve upon the defendant and the sheriff and file with the court a
notice that he excepts to the sufficiency of the sureties. The sheriff shall
thereupon hold the property in Ms possession until action upon such exception
to the sureties. Justification of defendants sureties shall be made in accordance with the provisions of Subdivision (d) of this rule.
(g) Delivery ofproperty. Subject to the provisions of Rule 64A(8), if a return
of the property is not required by the defendant within two days after the
taking and service of the writ upon him, or if redelivery is required but
defendant's sureties fail to justify and no amended or additional undertaking
is given, the property must be delivered to the plaintiff, except as provided in
Subdivision (i). If the defendant requires the redelivery of the property, and the
plaintiff fails to except to defendant's sureties within two days, or upon the
justification of defendant's sureties, the sheriff shall redeliver the property to
the defendant.
(h) Further poioers and duties of sheriff and constable.
(1) Thking of property by force. If the officer has probable cause to believe
that the property or any part thereof is concealed or withheld in a building or
inclosure, the sheriff must publicly demand its delivery. If it is not delivered, he
must cause the building or inclosure to be broken open and take the property
into his possession, and, if necessary, he may call to his aid the power of the
county.
(2) Disposition of property. When the officer has taken the property in
accordance with the provisions of this rule, he shall keep it in a secure place
and deliver it to the party entitled thereto.
(3) Return of the sheriff or constable. The officer must file the writ, together
with a return of his doings in the matter, with the court in which the action is
pending, within twenty days after the original service thereof.
(i) Claim to property by third party. If the property taken is claimed by any
person other than the defendant or his agent, and such person makes affidavit
of his title thereto, or of his right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds
of such title or right, and serves the same upon the officer, such officer is not
bound to keep the property or deliver it to the plaintiff, unless the plaintiff, on
demand made on him, indemnifies the officer against such claim by an
undertaking with sufficient sureties in an amount not less than double the
value of the property.
Compiler's Notes, — This rule has no counterpart in the Federal Rules.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Ipjount of recovery.
Rflect of quashing of writ.
r

Amount of recovery.
,One suing on replevin bond could recover
^ y damages sustained not exceeding face
photint of bond; he could not collect entire
Ifeoant of bond as a penalty. Smith v. Royer, 26
Btah 2d 83, 485 R2d 664 (1971).

Effect of quashing of writ.
Where writ of replevin was quashed without
adjudication, action on replevin bond could not
be sustained since terms of the bond could not
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ adjlldicatl0n for
have ^
^
retum
rf
Smith v ^
26 Utah
^ ^ R2d ^
( m i )

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
j^Utah Law Review. — Note, Sniadach,
mates and Mitchell: A Confusing Trilogy and
B£an Prejudgment Remedies, 1974 Utah L.
t k 536.
IwAm. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am Jur. 2d Replevin
6 t 55, 60 to 70, 72, 73.
EAXJL — Voluntary dismissal of replevin
Ktion by plaintiff as affecting defendant's right
••judgment for the return or value of the
Hoperty, 24 A.LJL3d 768.
raodern view as to validity of statute or
Eatractual provision authorizing summary refitaession of consumer goods sold under retail

installment sales contract, 46 AJLR.3d 1233
Amount of attorneys' compensation m absence of contract or statute fixing amount, 57
AX.R.3d 475.
Specific performance of sale of goods under
UCC § 2-716, 26 A.L.R.4th 294.
Modern views as to validity, under federal
constitution, of state prejudgment attachment,
garnishment, and replevin procedures, distraint procedures under landlords' or mnkeepers' Hen statutes, and like procedures authorizmg summary seizure of property, 29 A.LR Fed.
418.

IF

pile 64C. Attachment.
When attachment may issue; affidavit. Except as provided in Rule 64A
•td as authorized and permitted therein, the plaintiff, at any time after the
•tag of the complaint, in an action upon a judgment, upon any contract
•press or implied, or in an action against a nonresident of this state, may have
Be property of the defendant, not exempt from execution, attached as security
pr the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in such action,
•Bless the defendant gives security to pay such judgment as provided in
pbdivision (f) of this rule, by filing with the court in which the action is
Biding an affidavit setting forth the following: That the defendant is indebted
•the plaintiff, specifying the amount thereof as near as may be over and above
•legal setoffs and the nature of the indebtedness; that the attachment is not
•bght to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the defendant; that the
•yment of the same has not been secured by any mortgage or lien upon real
•personal property, situated or being in this state, or, if originally so secured,
Hfet such security has, without any act of the plaintiff or the person to whom
• t security was given, become impaired; and alleging, but not in the
Bernative, any one or more of the following causes for attachment:
KL) That the defendant is not a resident of this state;
• 2 ) That the defendant is a foreign corporation not qualified to do business
•this state;
• 3 ) That the defendant stands in defiance of an officer or is concealed so that
•pcess cannot be served;
• 4 ) That the defendant has assigned, disposed of or concealed, or is about to
Rtjgn, dispose of or conceal, any property with intent to defraud creditors;
H>) That the defendant has departed or is about to depart from the state to
B injury of creditors;
• 6 ) That the defendant fraudulently contracted the debt or incurred the
Hgation respecting which the action is brought;
» ) Such other additional facts showing probable cause for being, and that
JftntifF is, justly apprehensive of losing the claim unless a writ of attachment
e.
>) Undertaking; issuance of writ. The clerk shall issue the writ of attachit upon the filing by the plaintiff of the affidavit required by Subdivision (a)
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE V I I I . JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
U t a h Const. Art. V I I I , § 5 (2001)
§ 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts — Right of appeal.]

The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this
constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district court shall
have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both
original and appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the
Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
HISTORY: Const. 1896; L 1943, SJ.R. 2 ; 1984 (2nd S.S.), SJ.R. 1.
NOTES: COMPILER'S NOTES. —Provisions similar to those In this section were formerly found in
Art. V I I I , Sees. 7, 8 and 9.
CROSS-REFERENCES. - O r i g i n a l and appellate jurisdiction, § 7 8 - 3 - 4 .
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
I n general.
Appeal by the state in criminal cases.
Appeal from justice court.
Appeal where case originated in circuit court.
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TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PARTL COURTS
CHAPTER 7. GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO COURTS AND JUDGES
Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 - 7 - 5

(2001)

§ 7 8 - 7 - 5 . Powers of every court

Every court has authority t o :
(1) preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence;
(2) enforce order in the proceedings before it, or before a person authorized to conduct a
judicial investigation under its authority;
(3) provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it or its officers;
(4) compel obedience to Its judgments, orders, and process, and to the orders of a judge out
of court, in a pending action or proceeding;
(5) control in furtherance of justice the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other
persons In any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it in every matter;
(6) compel the attendance of persons to testify in a pending action or proceeding, as provided
by law;
(7) administer oaths in a pending action or proceeding, and in all other cases where necessary
in the exercise of its authority and duties;
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(8) amend and control its process and orders to conform to law and justice;
(9) devise and make new process and forms of proceedings, consistent with law, necessary to
carry into effect its authority and jurisdiction; and
(10) enforce rules of the Supreme Court and Judicial Council.
HISTORY: L 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-7-5; L. 1988, ch. 248, § 4 1 .
NOTES: CROSS-REFERENCES. -Acknowledgments, power to take, § 57-2a~3.
Contempt generally, § 78-32-1 et seq.
Power to solemnize marriages, § 30-1-6.
Subpoenas, §§ 78-24-4 to 78-24-6.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Enforcement.
Vacating orders.
Cited.
ENFORCEMENT.
A court's power to enforce its rules implies the existence of a mechanism for enforcement,
one example of which is the assessment of attorney fees. This also comports with the trial
court's statutory authority to control proceedings before it under §§ 78-7-5 and 78-7-17.
Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243 (Utah 1993).
VACATING ORDERS.
Order of district court finding mother in contempt and suspending child support is valid and
cannot be vacated by the order of another district judge nine years later. Peterson v. Peterson,
530 P.2d 821 (Utah 1974).
CITED in K.P.S. v. State, 2000 UT App 182, 4 P.3d 95.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AM. JUR. 2D. - 2 0 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 64 et seq.
CJ.S. - 1 7 CJ.S. Contempt § 43.
A.L.R. —Interference with enforcement of judgment in criminal or juvenile delinquent case as
contempt, 8 A.L.R.3d 657.
Release of information concerning forthcoming or pending trial as ground for contempt
proceedings or other disciplinary measures against member of the bar, 11 A.L.R.3d 1104.
Appealability of acquittal from or dismissal of charge of contempt of court, 24 A.L.R.3d 650.
Appealability of contempt adjudication or conviction, 33 A.L.R.3d 448.
Contempt adjudication or conviction as subject to review other than by appeal or writ of error,
33 A.L.R.3d 589.
Publication or broadcast, during course of trial, of matter prejudicial to criminal defendant as
contempt, 33 A.L.R.3d 1116.
Attack on judiciary as a whole as indirect contempt, 40 A.L.R.3d 1204.
Court's power to order sale of property subject to legal life estate, in order to relieve economic
distress of life tenant, 57 A.L.R.3d 1189.
Picketing court or judge as contempt, 58 A.L.R.3d 1297.
Inherent power of court to compel appropriation or expenditure of funds for judicial purposes,
59 A.L.R.3d 569.
Assault on attorney as contempt, 61 A.L.R.3d 500.
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TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 24. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
Utah Code Ann. § 1 3 - 2 4 - 3

(2001)

§ 1 3 - 2 4 - 3 . Injunctive relief

(1) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. Upon application to the court, an
injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret has ceased t o exist, but the injunction may
be continued for an additional reasonable period of time in order to eliminate commercial
advantage that otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation.
(2) I n exceptional circumstances, an injunction may condition future use upon payment of a
reasonable royalty for no longer than the period of time for which use could have been
prohibited. Exceptional circumstances include, but are not limited to, a material and prejudicial
change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation that
renders a prohibitive injunction inequitable.
(3) I n appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to protect a trade secret may be compelled by
court order.

HISTORY: C. 1953, 13-24-3, enacted by L. 1989, ch. 60, § 3.
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this
article, part, chapter, subtitle, or title.
Source: Utah > Find Statutes, Regulations, Administrative Materials & Court Rules > By
Statutes & Regulations > Legislative Archive > UT - Utah Annotated Code, 2 0 0 1 i
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A Professfanal Corporation
340 Broadway Centre
111 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-2002
Facsimile: (801) 322-2003

?Y

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SUSAN

I. Moss,
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,
-vs-

a publically-hetd Utah
corporation, ROBERT J. LOLUNI, MARY

Case No.

Q5^)7/3

2>^/

IOMED, INC.,

CROWTHER, LAURA MILLAR, PARR,
WADOOUPS, BROWN, GEE & LOVELESS, a
Utah professional corporation, CLARK
WADDOUPS, JONATHAN O. HAFEN, JUSTIN
P. MATKIN, OFFICE EQUIPMENT
ASSOCIATES, a closely-held Utah
corporation dba OfficeWare and SCOTT
L. JOHNSON, and JOHN DOES I THROUGH

Honorable

oLe/nU)
>U)UO

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

XX,
Defendants.
Plaintiff, for her claims against defendants, alleges as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Susan I. Moss ("Moss") is an individual residing in Salt I ake

County, State of Utah, whose home is at 385 North Wall Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
(the1 f lome")

2.

Jamal Yanaki fYanakP) is an individual residing in Salt Lake County,

State of Utah, whose home is at the Home.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND

3.

This case arises out of an illegal invasion of plaintiffs home by the Salt

Lake County Sheriff Office (the "Police") pursuant to a conspiracy. The Police illegally
entered Moss' home and illegally conducted a search of her home and seizure of her
property, without a valid search warrant and with no exception to the requirement of a
valid search warrant. Defendant lomed, Inc. ("lomed") procured the illegal order that
purported to allow the illegal search and seizure by the police, pursuant to which the
police and their co-conspirators, the named defendants herein, committed the torts
alleged herein. The details are set forth below.
PART I - PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF THE ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE

4.

On April 9, 2002, a complaint was filed in the Third District Court, Salt

Lake County, State of Utah in a case captioned lomed, Inc. v. Jamal Yanaki, Activatek,
L.L.C, Ceramatec, Inc., Ashok Joshi and John Does l-X, Defendants. The complaint
was assigned case number 020903031 and was assigned to the Honorable Tyron E.
Medley, Third District Court Judge. A genuine copy of that Complaint is attached
hereto as Exhibit A. Co-conspirator Lollin, who was then the Chief Operating Officer of
lomed, gave the instructions to file the Complaint.
5.

The following day, on April 10, 2002, lomed and its lawyers, defendant

Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, P.C. ("Law Firm"), Clark Waddoups
fWaddoups"), Jonathan O. Hafen ("Hafen") and Justin P. Matkin ("Matkin") (collectively
the "Lawyer Defendants") caused to befiledan Ex Parte Motion for Order to Conduct
2

Immediate Discovery to Prevent the Destruction or Alteration of Evidence ("Search
Motion"), a memorandum in support of that motion ("lomed Mem.*) and the affidavits of
defendant Laura Millar ("Millar") and defendant Robert J. Lollini ("Lolhni1) (affidavits
referenced as "Millar Affidavit0 and "Lollini Affidavit"). A genuine copy of the Search
Motion is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
6.

A genuine copy of the lomed Mem. is attached hereto as Exhibit C A

genuine copy of the Millar Affidavit is attached hereto as Exhibit D. A genuine copy of
the Lollini Affidavit is attached hereto as Exhibit E.
7.

Co-conspirators Lollini, Millar, Law Firm, Waddoups, Hafen and Matkin

each expressly agreed to commit a tram I on the court in order to further the obtaining of
legal process which they intended to use for an improper purpose, namely, to conduct
an illegal search and seizure, and agreed that they would participate in a conspiracy to
conduct an illegal search of Moss' home and seiiiiit ul hu pwpeitv
8

The Search Motion sought relief solely on the part of a private party in civil

litigation. The Search Motion was not filed for the benefit or in furtherance of the
desires of law enforcement pertaining to any criminal action or investigation ur of m/
governmental agency to investigate civil violations of any governmental regulatory
scheme or to pursue any r ivil forfeiture* action of any governmental agency or otherwise
to further any interest of any governmental agency of any kind or nature, but solely and
strictly for the benefit of an individual citizen.
9

Two days later, on April 1/ ;0()2 Waddoup, and I tafen appeared before

the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, Third District Court Judge, ex parte and without notice
to Yanaki ui Moss to arque the Search Motion.
3

10.

The Search Motion specifically requested that the court issue an order.
Directing the Salt Lake County Sheriffs office, or other
appropriate law enforcement agency as specified by the
Court, with the assistance of lomed, to execute this Order at
the residence and home address of Defendant Jamal
Yanaki, 385 North Wall Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103,
or such other addresses as Yanaki may indicate, and to do
the following:
(a) take custody of each of the hard drives in
one or more computers, of other electronic
storage media, including specifically but not
limited to ZIP drives and CD ROMS, and of the
electronic day planner (a Palm Pilot) in the
possession, custody or control of Defendant
Jamal Yanaki (all of the above are herein after
[sic] defined as the "Yanaki Electronic Files") at
the above address or addresses;
(b) supervise the copying of information from
the Yanaki Electronic Files by the computer
expert provided by lomed and to return such
copy to Yanaki;
(c) file the original Yanaki Electronic Files
under seal with the Court until they can be
reviewed for privilege by Yanaki's counsel and
analyzed by computer experts for content and
evidence of deleted files; and
(d) recover any lomed confidential files in
Yanaki's possession, custody or control,
including but not limited to files relating to
Ceramatec and Aequitas, and to file those
documents under seal with the Court.

Search Motion, at U 2.
11.

In the lomed Mem., lomed proffered the following justification for its

motion: "This immediate and expedited discovery order is necessary to preserve
evidence and avoid destruction or alteration of evidence to this case.* lomed Mem.,

4

2. lomed then represented to Judge Medley: "The relief sought by this motion is
necessary to preserve the evidence and avoid questions about the further destruction
or alteration of documents important to this case ' ':" Id at 3. Ion led tl len i epresented to
Judge Medley: "Taking possession of and preservation of lomed's confidential files is
essei itial to stop continued damaging disclosure of lomed's trade secrets and other
proprietary business information." Id. at 3.
12.

lomed specifically invoked, as legal grounds for the order it sought: "The

Uniform Trade Secrets Act codified at I, J i AI i CODE ANN,, § § 13 24, et seq, [,]B ki at 4
and "U. R. Civil P. 34 [,]" lomed Mem. at 10. lomed also invoked the provisions of
"UTAH CODE ANN.
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§ 78-7-5 and Utah Constitution Art. VIII § 5." lomed Mem. at 10.

None of the proffered legal bases for the relief sought incorporate, or even

pretend to incorporate, prescribed statutory or administrative standards, that,
themselves, ai e i easonable in tl leii car eft il balai icing of goven ii i lei ital and private
interests before an order may issue thereunder authorizing a search of a person's
home or seizure of their property.
14

Nor do any of those proffered legal bases mandate a right to a prtor

hearing before any search, contain any standards for determining reasonableness or
even require, as a prerequisite to the relief sought, that a prior request for materials be
made and refused, before invading a private citizen's home. Nor do they provide any
prior opportunity to be heard before a seizure or even any post-seizure right to hearing.
15.

lomed I las coiuxjded that ils piopoued soan Ii <>l Mnss UorviH implicated

rights guaranteed to her under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, by arguing in the memorandum that the proposed search would not violate
5

the Fourth Amendment. See lomed Mem. at 8-9.
16.

lomed has conceded that Moss'rightsto due process of law under the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were implicated by
the order sought by lomed. See id. at 6-8,
17.

In the course of attempting to convince Judge Medley that the rights

guaranteed to Moss under the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution
were not being trampled by the entry of the order proposed by lomed, the Lawyer
Defendants, Lollini and Millar made certain misrepresentations of material fact, or
omitted to set forth materialfactsnecessary to the resolution of those issues, as set
forth with specificity in Part II, below.
18.

Judge Medley granted lomed's motion at that ex parte hearing based on

the evidence and arguments presented to him, and the omissions and
misrepresentations of lomed, Lollini, Millar and the Lawyer Defendants, and executed a
form of Order to the "Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office or other appropriate law
enforcement agency as specified by the Court," directing it, inter alia, to conduct a
search and seizure "with the assistance of lomed," of Moss* Home, "to prevent further
potential for alteration or destruction of evidence" ("Search Order*)- A genuine copy of
the Search Order is attached hereto as Exhibit F.
19.

The Search Order is illegal and unconstitutional under Utah law, and its

illegality was at all times known or should have been known to the co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Search Order is not a search warrant under Utah law. The Search Order
is void, ab initio.
20.

At approximately 8:00 a.m. on Monday morning, April 15,2002, Matkin
6

and Salt Lake County Sheriffs Deputy, Heinz Kopp ("Kopp"), rang the doorbell of the
Home three separate times, awakening Moss. Kopp and the Police agreed to join the
conspiracy and to be paid for their illegal conduct no later than this time.
21.

Yanaki was then in the state of Colorado.
IV'k'ivs, "JIIII HI liei pajamas, looked thi ough the small window in the from

door and saw a police officer, whom she did not then know was Kopp, with another
man, whom she did not then know was Matkin, Only because of the police officer's
presence, Moss answered the door to her Home and was served with a summons,
complaint, copy of the Search Motion, the lomed Mem. and the Search Order.
23.

A1 tei i eadii ig poi tioi is of tl le Search Order ai id seeing that is was directed

to Yanaki, Moss advised Matkin and Kopp that Yanaki was not Home and she would
not allow them in her Home without Yanaki being present.
z'4,

Matkin then said "We can come in now, or we cai i cot i le ii i latei " Kopp,

to support Matkin's statement and to intimidate Moss, said: "We can kick in this door,"
and Matkin advised Moss that 1ie was going to get an additional order to allow them to
do so.
25.

Matkin then left while Kopp remained, surveying the Home and thereby

intimidating Moss,
26

On information and belief, Matkin then, on behalf of lomed and in

furtherance of Kopp's threat to kick down the door to gain entrance to Moss and
Yanaki's Home, made a second, ex parte, approach to Judge Medley the morning of
April 15,2002, requesting some form of writ of assistance for the illegal Search Order.
Neither the stafo court doekel nnr slalt rcuirt file reflect wtnif Judge Medley was told by
7

Matkin when he sought that writ.
27.

Nevertheless, Matkin obtained the relief he sought on lomed's behalf,

and procured Judge Medley's signature on a writ of assistance, captioned:
"Supplemental Order in Aid of Enforcement'1 (hereinafter "Writ of Assistance") and
dated and entered by the Court on April 15,2002. A genuine copy of the Writ of
Assistance is attached hereto as Exhibit G.
28.

The Writ of Assistance expressly directed the Salt Lake County Sheriffs

Office first, "to enter the residence and home address of Defendant Jamal Yanaki, 385
North Wall Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103" and, then, "use reasonable force, if
necessary and appropriate under the circumstances, to execute the Order [Allowing
Immediate Discovery to Prevent the Destruction or Alteration of Evidence], including
entering through unlocked doors, conducting a search of the premises, and detaining
any person who resists enforcement of the Order."
29.

As was the case with the Search Order, the Writ of Assistance was

obtained not at the request of any law enforcement agency or other governmental
agency, but instead solely at the request of a private party in civil litigation.
30.

The Writ of Assistance was not obtained for the benefit or in furtherance

of the desires of law enforcement pertaining to any criminal action or investigation or of
any governmental agency to investigate civil violations of any governmental regulatory
scheme or to pursue any civil forfeiture action of any governmental agency or othenAfise
to further any interest of any governmental agency of any kind or nature, but solely and
strictly for the benefit of an individual citizen.
31.

Because there is no record currently available to plaintiff showing the
8

grounds presented to Judge Medley to obtain the Writ of Assistance, plaintiff infers the
same bases were proffered as for the Search Order, which do not incorporate any
prescribed statutory or administrative standards, that, themselves, are reasonable in
their careful balancing of governmental and private interests before an order may issue
thereunder at ithorizii ig a sear ch of a persoi i;"s t 101 ne by 1 ise of for ce, seizi ire of theii
property, or arrest of the person of anyone interfering with the foregoing activities.
32.

Nor did any proffered legal basis for the Writ of Assistance mandate a

right to a prior hearing before any search, contain any standards for determining
reasonableness or even require, as a prerequisite to the relief sought, that a prior
request for materials be made and refused, before invading a private citizen's home or
arresting any citizen. Nor did any proffered legal basis for the Writ of Assistance
provide any prior opportunity to be heard before a seizure or even any post-seizure right
to hearing.
33.

Matkin returned to Moss' Home with the Writ of Assistance, and Matkin,

Kopp, Crowther and defendant Scott L. Johnson ("Johnson"), who, on information and
belief, owns and controls defendant Office Equipment Associates, a closely-held Utah
corporation dba OfficeWare ("OfFiceWare") all, in a deliberate show of force, came to
the door of Moss1 Home while the Wr it of Assistance was served on Moss.
34.

Moss, under threat of having the door to her Home kicked in and under

threat of arrest, had no voluntary alternative and stepped aside as Matkin, Kopp,
Crowther and Inlmsoii eiiteitjd hci Home .mil i;ommen<\Hl Ihe »e 111,h and sei/urt
35

Shortly thereafter, another Salt Lake County Sheriffs Deputy, Sergeant

Kendra L. Herlin, also arrived to reinforce the threat to arrest Moss if she did not

9

cooperate under the Writ of Assistance with the Search Order.
36.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Specht v.

Jensen, 832 F.2d 1516 (1 Oth Cir. 1987) has stated that a writ of assistance is not the
equivalent of a search warrant for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 1525 ("Even
though Jacobs told Owens that the writ of assistance was equivalent to a warrant, the
writ on its face was not a search warrant")
37.

Kopp, pursuant to the Search Order and Writ of Assistance, and without

the presence of Yanaki, executed and allowed Matkin, Crowther and Johnson to search
Moss' Home, while preventing Moss from interfering under the Writ of Assistance's
threat of arrest.
38.

When advised by Matkin that he, Crowther and Johnson had determined

what they wanted to seize, Kopp executed the Search Order and allowed the seizure of
Moss and Yanaki's computer, containing private and confidential financial information
and other materials belonging both to Moss and Yanaki, the seizure of Yanaki's written
University of Utah Executive MBA Program materials, the seizure of papers and effect
from the boxes that had been packed when Yanaki left lomed and that had remained
unpacked since that time, and the seizure of a CD-ROM belonging to, and clearly
marked as the property of, Ceramatec, Inc., a client of Yanaki's consulting business,
which CD contained confidential information belonging to Ceramatec.
39.

The property of Yanaki and Moss was then taken, without the consent of

either, to, on information and belief, Johnson's place of business, OfficeWare.
40.

Johnson handled the computer, including without limitation the hard drive,

purporting to copy it without Moss or Yanaki's knowledge, consent or oversight, and
10

purported to copy zip disks found in the unpacked boxes, as well as the CD-ROM that
belonged to Ceramatec, lncM all without Moss and Yanaki's consent, approval of
method or oversight.
41

The Lawyer Defendants then caused what they purported to be the

unaltered original seized property to be: d*?livoK*d to Hie; ILiifJ Distnct Court, and Kopp
prepared and the Lawyer Defendants caused to be filed a return on the Writ of
Assistance, asserting that the execution of the Writ of Assistance had occurred on April
16, 2002, when in truth and in fact, the search and seizure occurred on April 15,2002,
entirely while Yanaki was out of Salt Lake City, Utah. A genuine copy of the return is
attact ied as Exhibit H.
PART II - THE IOMED DEFENDANTS AND THE LAWYER DEFENDANTS CONSPIRED TO
COMMIT FRAUD O N THE COURT AND TO PROVIDE FALSE AND MISLEADING
INFORMATION, AND TO OMIT TO PROVIDE MATERIAL INFORMATION, TO
JUDGE MEDLEY IN PROCURING THE SEARCH ORDER

42.

I he Lawyer Defendants each had a role in the drafting and/or submission

of papers to Judge Medley, intending him to rely upon those papers in making his
decision to execute the Search Order and the Writ of Assistance.
43.

Lollini, Millai ai id Iomed eacl 11 lad a i ole in tl ne draftir ig and execution of

the Lollini and Millar affidavits, that they intended the Lawyer Defendants to submit to
Judge Medley to induce him to execute the Search Order and Writ of Assistance.
44

The papers drafted and submitted by the Lawyer Defendants and the

affidavits of Lollini and Millar contained materially false and misleading information, and
omitted to set forth n i latei ial truthful information necessai y to make other information
not misleading to Judge Medley.
11

45.

The Lawyer Defendants, Lollini and Millar each agreed to participate in a

conspiracy to commit a fraud upon the Court, to induce Judge Medley to execute the
Search Order, by providing him with such false and misleading statements, and by
omitting to provide material, truthful statements to him that were necessary to make
other statements not misleading.
46.

Crowther was a knowing and active participant in the conspiracy, in that

she knew about the creation of the false papers when they were created, ratified their
use to seek the Search Order and the Writ of Assistance, and agreed to and did
personally conduct the resulting illegal search and seizure described above.
47.

Johnson and OfficeWare each joined the conspiracy no later than April

15, 2002, when they agreed to participate, and actively participated, in the illegal
search of Moss and Yanaki's Home, and seizure of Moss, Yanaki and Ceramatec's
property.
48.

At least one object of the conspiracy was to procure a search order and to

search Yanaki's (and Moss') Home and seize their property. At least one of several
motivations that lomed had to procure such an order for search and seizure was to
send a message to its remaining employees, whom it was then demanding sign noncompetition agreements, of the consequences of leaving without signing new
agreements, i.e. "Well break into your home just like we did to Yanaki if you don't sign."
Thefactof the search and seizure at Yanaki and Moss1 Home was deliberately, and
widely, disseminated at lomed, after the fact Comments made by lomed officers after
the illegal search and seizure included: "We got him!"; "Jamal is going to lose a few
nights of sleep."; and "defending against lomed's lawsuit will force Jamal into
12

bankmptcy so he cannot compete." This is one reason why, on information and belief,
the search and seizure idea was presented to and approved by one or more of the
members of lomed's Board of Directors, who also agreed to participate in and join the
conspiracy, and who in fact took overt acts in furtherance thereof, but whose identity is
currently unknown. The members of lomed's Board of Directors, and other
conspirators, are pleaded for purposes of this complaint as John Does I through XX.
Plaintiff will seek leave to amend and add these parties as their true identities and
conspiratorial participation and agreement are discovered.
49.

A selection of the particular false and misleading statements and material

omissions is set forth below:
FRAUD O N THE COURT IN T H E L O L U N I AFFIDAVIT

50.

LolIinPs first false statement under oath is found in the very first paragraph

of the Lollini Affidavit, where he falsely states that he ttha[s] personal knowledge of all
matters stated herein, and [is] in all respects competent to make this Affidavit."
51.

Lollini made that false statement for the purpose of making the remainder

of his affidavit seem credible to the Court.
52.

In truth and in fact, Lollini did not have personal knowledge of all matters

set forth in his affidavit.
53.

Lollini then proceeded to describe Yanaki's position at lomed in broad and

sweeping terms of responsibility.
54.

Lollini and the Lawyer Defendants crafted the Lollini Affidavit to create the

false impression that Yanaki held a higher position at lomed than he did.
55.

The Lawyer Defendants in the lomed Mem. falsely stated that Yanaki was
13

named "the General Manager of lomed in February 2000," lomed Mem. at 2. In truth
and in fad, Yanaki was named General Manager of the Commercial Division of lomed,
which produces and markets its existing commercial products.
56.

In truth and in fact, but which Lollini omitted from his affidavit, the

Commercial Division conducted a very limited amount of new product development,
since its focus was on generating revenues for the company through manufacture and
sales, to spend on the opthalmic and pharmaceutical product development in which the
Commercial Division was not involved.
57.

Lollini omitted to include the fact that, James Weersing ("Weersing"), the

recently terminated Chief Executive Officer, President and member of the lomed Board
of Directors, often referenced the Commercial Division as a "yawn" and a "mangy dog"
with respect to future product development, and, overall lomed's strategic direction, and
that it was good for nothing but being a cash cow.
58.

Lollini omitted to state that the focus of the company and the expenditure

of the vast bulk of the company's money for research and development ("R&Dn), from
before the time Yanaki was ever made General Manager of the Commercial Division
was in its subsidiary, Dermion, Inc. (later merged into lomed and referred to as the
Opthalmic Division), and a proposed new pharmaceutical product under the
Inflammation Division, overseen by Tim Miller but unrelated to the existing business of
the Commercial Division and over neither of which Yanaki had oversight or control and
as to which he had only limited knowledge.
59.

The Lollini Affidavit also omitted the fact that the General Manager was

not even the head of the Commercial Division. To the contrary, until only months
14

before his resignation, Yanaki reported to Tim Milter ("Miller*), the lomed executive
officer who was responsible for the Commercial Division. After Miller left, Yanaki was
not promoted to that position.
60.

The Loliini Affidavit's statement that Yanaki was "intimately familiar with

many if not all of lomed's most sensitive and confidential business information" is
designed to mislead the Court as well.
61.

Loliini omitted to advise Judge Medley that lomed, as a publically-traded

company, reveals much detail about its business plan and strategic direction in its
annual report each year, required by the Securities and Exchange Commission to be
filed publically on form 10K, and on its website, www.iomed.com.
62.

Loliini omitted the facts that Miller was more familiar than Yanaki with

more confidential information, yet Loliini was aware that Miller was working with
Weersing and Ceramatec, both while Miller was at lomed, and after Miller left lomed,
and lomed had no concern in that regard, despite Lollini's knowledge that Weersing
intended to compete with lomed.
63.

Loliini also omitted the fact that Weersing also had far more and greater

knowledge of lomed information than Yanaki, but had never even been required to
execute a confidentiality agreement and had speafically advised Loliini that he intended
to compete with lomed after his termination.
64.

The Loliini Affidavit discusses a confidential e-mail, addressed to Yanaki,

but erroneously sent to lomed by Aequitas Consulting Group ("ACG"). This e-mail was
used as the pretense to attain the object of the conspiracy. Loliini asserts in paragraph
7 of his affidavit that "based upon my knowledge of the [sicj lomed's new product
15

developments, the product described in that e-mail is essentially the same as a new
confidential product lomed is developing (the "Confidential New Product"). The e-mail
was sent from Aequitas Consulting Group-a company engaged by lomed to provide
sensitive consulting and business development services."
65.

Lollini in that paragraph misleads Judge Medley to believe that lomed has

been developing a "Confidential New Product" In truth and in fact, that paragraph is
false.
66.

lomed had not been developing a Confidential New Product at the time

Yanaki left lomed.
67.

In truth and in fact, even as of the date Lollini executed his affidavit

neither Lollini, nor any technical person at lomed, nor any other lomed employee, nor
any of lomed's patent attorneys, corporate attorneys or any one of the Lawyer
Defendants, could so much as draw a pictorial representation of any such "Confidential
New Produce say what it looked like, describe its components, list specifications for
manufacture or name any vendor or supplier providing materials for any such product.
68.

Further, ACG had been retained not by lomed, to do work for lomed, but

rather, jointly by lomed and its largest competitor, Empi, Inc., and not to consult on
lomed business development, but rather, to assist in reversing a negative technical
assessment of traditional iontophoresis treatment as a medical procedure by Blue
Cross Blue Shield fBC/BS w ), that adversely affected the entire traditional iontophoresis
industry, because it meant BC/BS would not reimburse patients under health plans who
underwent the procedure.
69.

The ACG consulting engagement was "sensitive" only in the sense that
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the entire traditional iontophoresis industry would lose money if the BC/BS negative
technical assessment were not reversed-it was not "sensitive" to lomed.
70.

There was no "business developmenf that ACG was engaged to provide

to lomed and, as to the services ACG in fact provided, no lomed confidential
information was used in, or even necessary to, ACG's work with BC/BS.
71.

Lollini omits the fact that the "product" ACG referenced in the errant

confidential e-mail that Lollini references was not anything like traditional iontophoresis
products that lomed currently marketed or had under development.
72.

Lollini omits to advise Judge Medley that the product referenced in the

ACG e-mail was a proposed knock-off of a product that an lomed competitor, Birch
Point Medical, Inc. ("Birch Point") had recently brought to market, called the
"lontoPatch," which was an iontophoresis patch with an electrode and power source
integrated into the patch-a remarkable departure from traditional iontophoresis, which
has an independent power source, and a product nothing like anything lomed had
under development.
73.

Lollini omitted to advise Judge Medley that, in truth and in fact, the idea

had been promoted by Weersing while Yanaki was at lomed that lomed might want to
investigate whether it should develop a Birch Point knockoff.
74.

Lollini omitted that Yanaki had set up two short meetings, at Weersing's

direction, between lomed and Ceramatec, another company that had Weersing on its
Board of Directors, and that Weersing advised Yanaki that Ceramatec held rights in its
own existing technology that might assist lomed to investigate whether to pursue a
Birch Point knock-off.
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75.

Lollini omitted to advise Judge Medley that the purpose of the meetings

was strictly to investigate whether some form of joint venture utilizing the Ceramatec
technology could be possible.
76.

Lollini omitted to advise Judge Medley that lomed disclosed no

information in those meetings that was confidential or protected.
77.

Lollini omitted to advise Judge Medley that, after the termination of

Weersing, who had spearheaded the investigation into whether Ceramatec technology
could be made available to lomed to assist in determining whether a joint venture to
pursue a Birch Point knock-off could be pursued, Yanaki spoke to Lollini about a
proposed agreement to begin such a joint venture with Ceramatec, but Lollini expressly
rejected the idea in early November, 2002.
78.

Lollini omitted to tell Judge Medley that, through the time Yanaki left

lomed, lomed had made no decision to pursue a Birch Point knock-off.
79.

Lollini omitted to tell Judge Medley that the only monies lomed had spent

relating to the Birch Point lontoPatch product coming into the market had been to test,
in non-scientific protocols and at minimal expense, at the direction of the marketing
department, the lontoPatch product, for the purpose of publishing a competitive
counterpoint as to why traditional iontophoresis products, such as lomed products, were
superior to Birch Point's lontoPatch, which used lower voltage, had a decaying current,
required longer treatment times but had the convenience of a self-integrated electrode
with battery in the patch.
80.

Lollini omitted to tell Judge Medley that the results of that authorized

testing had been published publically, at trade shows and directly to customers and
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even competitors in the industry, in an effort to undermine the Birch Point product.
81.

Lollini deliberately withheld the foregoing factual context from his affidavit

to mislead Judge Medley into believing that an lomed product existed, when in fact it
did not, and even the idea to examine whether a Birch Point knock-off feasibly could be
done through an agreement with Ceramatec had been rejected by Lollini, himself.
82.

Further Lollini and the Lawyer Defendants deliberately misrepresented the

role of ACG to mislead Judge Medley into believing that ACG had something to do with
such a product, a complete falsehood.
83.

Lollini testified under oath that "lomed has invested significant resources

in developing the Confidential Product" Lollini Affidavit at H 8.
84.

Lollini omitted the fact that neither Lollini or any other person at lomed

could have told Judge Medley a specific figure lomed had spent on development as of
the date of Lollini's affidavit, because no such development had occurred and no
budget had been set for any such development
85.

The Lollini Affidavit If 8 further states that "Mr. Yanaki had direct

knowledge of and involvement in the design, specifications, product market, vendors,
suppliers and other confidential information related to the Confidential Product" That
statement is a misrepresentation.
86.

Lollini omits to state the facts that there existed no design, specifications,

vendors, suppliers or other confidential information for a Birch Point knock-off product
at lomed, because none had been developed and none existed.
87.

Lollini omits to tell Judge Medley that Yanaki did know the Birch Point

market, but only because every other person in the industry, at lomed and every
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competitor, also knew it.
88.

The Lollini Affidavit states that the content of the ACG e-mail "provided

evidence that Mr. Yanaki was in fact disclosing lomed's confidential information and
was involved with Activatek, a business recently formed to directly compete with lomed
and develop a product nearly identical to lomed's Confidential Product." This statement
is a misrepresentation.
89.

Lollini omits to state the fact that no lomed Birch Point knock-off product

existed to which any other product could be "nearly identical."
90.

Lollini omits to explain to Judge Medley that the ACG e-mail itself

referenced the Birch Point 51 OK, which describes the lontoPatch product and which is
publically available from the Food and Drug Administration, because the 51 OK
document is the one under which that agency gave its required approval to market the
lontoPatch as a medical device.
91.

Lollini omits to tell Judge Medley that Yanaki was free under his lomed

contract to compete with lomed with such public information, as he could obtain in the
Birch Point 51 OK, and that Yanaki had, when he left, specifically advised Crowther, the
Vice-President and head of lomed's Human Resources department, that he intended to
compete with lomed as allowed in his contract with lomed.
92.

Lollini further omitted to tell Judge Medley that Lollini had telephoned

Yanaki no later than February 5, 2002, about the ACG e-mail, very upset and
demanding to know what Yanaki was doing, and that Yanaki told Lollini that he was
consulting- not that he was, as Lollini asserted, developing a product.
93.

Lollini omitted to advise Judge Medley of Lollini's knowledge that Yanaki
20

did not have the capability, on his own, to develop a product.
94.

The Lollini Affidavit fl 11 states: M[lomedJ discovered that all of the emails

had been deleted from the "out box" on Mr. Yanaki's office computer for a critical twoweek [sic] from January 4,2002 to January 16, 2002 (the "Missing Emails"). The
existence of certain Missing Emails during that time period was evidenced by reference
to or attachments to other emails found in Mr. Yanaki's I n box* on his office computer.
In addition, Mr. Mower discovered numerous emails dated prior to January 4, 2002
which contained confidential information of lomed and which had been forwarded from
Mr. Yanaki's office computer to his personal email account at [redacted for privacy]."
95.

Lollini tells Judge Medley that Yanaki's "office computer3 had been

deleted, suggesting (albeit without supporting evidence) that Yanaki had made such
deletions.
96.

Lollini omitted to tell Judge Medley that it was lomed's own IT department

that had reformatted the hard drive on Yanaki's office computer, prior to giving it to
another lomed employee, and thereby destroying all information that existed on
Yanaki's office computer.
97.

Lollini omitted the fact that, in fact, all lomed e-mails pass through a

separate, stand-alone server, and are backed-up on a daily and a weekly basis.
98.

Lollini omitted to tell Judge Medley that lomed in fact destroyed all of its

regular daily back-ups during the time period in question for its e-mail server that would
have contained any e-mails sent or received each day*
99.

Lollini omitted to tell Judge Medley that weekly back-ups existed as of the

date of his affidavit (although, on information and belief, they, too, have now been
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destroyed by lomed or at its direction).
100.

Lollini omitted to tell Judge Medley that neither of the so-called "deleted e-

mails" had anything to do with a Birch Point knockoff product by lomed.
101.

Lollini omitted to tell Judge Medley that one of the "deleted e-mails" was a

completely personal e-mail, and that the other "deleted e-mail* was to another lomed
employee which evidenced no motivation of any kind for any deletion by Yanaki.
102.

Lollini further omitted to disclose (1) that lomed had absolutely no

evidence that Yanaki did any deleting, (2) that others at lomed had access to Yanaki's
e-mait account and would have accessed the account as part of their ordinary duties
during that two week period, and (3) that lomed had undertaken absolutely no
investigation of potential e-mail redpients, internally at lomed or externally, to determine
whether they had copies of e-mails they received from Yanaki during this time period.
103.

Lollini further omitted to disclose his knowledge that Yanaki was

exceedingly busy during his last two weeks at lomed on two major contracts that would
provide a significant portion of lomed's revenue for 2002 and 2003, and prevent
competitors from entering certain distribution channels during that time, and that most
e-mails Yanaki had sent in that time period would have related to those two contracts,
completely unrelated to any Birch Point knockoff.
104.

Finally, Lollini characterizes the two week period as "critical" but omits to

disclose why it was "critical."
FRAUD ON THE COURT IN THE MILLAR AFFIDAVIT

105.

Millar testified that she had access to YanakPs e-mail account as "part of

[her] responsibilities to coordinate schedules and follow up on assignments for Mr.
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Yanaki." Millar Affidavit fl 5.
106.

Yet while Lollini, who has no idea what e-mails were in Yanaki's account

during the so-called "critical* two week period prior to Yanaki's departure, suggests in
the Lollini Affidavit that nefarious e-mailing and/or e-mail deleting was afoot, Millar, who
as a regular part of her job was accessing Yanakfs account, notably stayed away from
this topic entirely.
107.

Millar omitted to tell Judge Medley that there was in fact no unusual

absence of e-mail activity she noticed when she accessed Yanaki's e-mail account
during this two week period and omitted to testify that she saw no unusual e-mails
received, despite the fact that she would have, if there were any, given her description
of her responsibilities.
108.

Millar testified that Yanaki "became increasingly withdrawn" and began "to

work with his door closed" and "whenever" Yanaki talked on the phone in those two
week, "he would talk with the door closed." Millar Affidavit H 8.
109.

Millar omitted the fact that, if she were sitting at her desk, she could not,

when Yanaki's door was closed, see whether Yanaki was using the phone in his office.
110.

Millar omitted the fact that Yanaki was working very hard on two major

contracts that would generate a significant percentage of lomed's 2002 income.
111.

Millar thus omitted that she thus had no basis to conclude that Yanaki was

'increasingly withdrawn" as opposed to exceedingly busy wrapping up important work
before he left.
112.

The Millar Affidavit states that, after she reviewed the errant confidential

ACG e-mail briefly, "it was apparent to [her] that Activate was being formed to develop a
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product very similar to those produced or under development by lomed." Millar
Affidavit U 12.
113.

Millar's affidavit was false, and in truth and in fact she did not recognize a

description of any lomed product in the e-mail.
114.

Millar omitted to tell Judge Medley that, in fact, all she was able to do

upon review of the e-mail was recognize select words and phrases common in the
iontophoresis industry, specifically: "patch," "iontophoretic delivery," Iontophoresis,"
"reimbursement," and "CPT codes."
115.

Millar omitted to advise Judge Medley that she had no technical

background or expertise of any kind and no clear knowledge of what any lomed trade
secret would be.
116.

Millar omitted to tell Judge Medley that her testimony that she felt Yanaki

may be breaching his confidentiality agreement was premised entirely on her
recognition of the words and phrases above and not her knowledge of any products.
117.

The Millar Affidavit contains testimony about two files, one named

"Aequitas" and one named "Ceramatec," allegedly missing from Yanaki's lomed office.
118.

Despite the fact that the Lawyer Defendants cite her affidavit as support

for the contention that °[t]hose files contained confidential and important information
about the product and lomed's business relationships^]" lomed Mem. at 5, Millar
omitted to tell Judge Medley that she had no knowledge of whether those files
contained any confidential information belonging to lomed.
119.

Millar further omitted to tell Judge Medley that neither anyone at lomed or

from the Lawyer Defendants ever even asked her if she knew whether those files
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contained any confidential information of any kind.
120.

Millar further omitted to tell Judge Medley that no person at lomed had

even ever asked to see those files or have them retrieved at any time after Yanaki left.
121.

Millar further omitted to tell Judge Medley that no one had even asked her

to search for the files.
122.

Millar further omitted to tell Judge Medley that another file named

"Ceramatec" was also missing from the office of Steven Hamilton ("Hamilton"), a former
lomed executive officer.
123.

Millar further omitted to tell Judge Medley that no one at lomed seemed to

care about that "missing file" whatsoever, even though Hamilton was then competing
with lomed.
FRAUD ON THE COURT I N T H E MOVING PAPERS

124.

The lomed Mem. told Judge Medley that an "immediate and expedited

discovery order is necessary to preserve evidence and avoid destruction or alteration of
evidence critical to this case." lomed Mem. at 2.
125.

The Lawyer Defendants omitted to advise Judge Medley that they had no

evidence that Yanaki had in fact destroyed, or was about to destroy, evidence.
126.

Indeed, the Lawyer Defendants omitted to advise Judge Medley of the fact

that it was their own client, not Yanaki, that had destroyed e-mail back-ups and
reformatted Yanaki's hard drive on his office computer.
127.

The Lawyer Defendants omitted to advise Judge Medley of the fact that

lomed, in its exit interview with Yanaki, did not remind him to return any lomed
documents or suggest to him in any way that he should review any materials he had at
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his home with the consent and permission of lomed and determine whether they needed
to be returned, and that, at no time after the exit interview had any person made such a
request of YanakL
128.

The Lawyer Defendants failed to notify Judge Medley that, based on their

theory of the case, evidence of any misappropriation of lomed confidential information by
Yanaki would necessarily exist not only at Yanaki's and Moss1 Home, but also in other
locations and could be obtained from sources other than Yanaki, such as from the
recipients of any such information and in the form of any products actually derived from
any lomed confidential information.
129.

The Lawyer Defendants omitted to advise Judge Medley that they had

made no effort, prior to seeking the Search Order, formally or informally, to discover such
information from any outside source, including ACG or Ceramatec, such that their need
to "preserve evidence" was in fact not critical, but fabricated.
130.

The Lawyer Defendants omitted to advise Judge Medley that Yanaki had

been made aware of lomed's concern over his activities no later than February 5,2002,
by virtue of a telephone call from Lollini, such that Yanaki would have had ample prior
opportunity to destroy evidence if he were going to do so, and that there was no reason
the Court should believe he would, some two and one-half months later, not respond as
every other litigant does under the discovery rules, by producing requested documents
and information.
131.

The Lawyer Defendants omitted to advise Judge Medley that they had no

evidence and no reason of any kind to believe that Moss might destroy evidence.
132.

The Lawyer Defendants omitted to advise Judge Medley that, despite their
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identical allegations against Ceramatec and Joshi, and the knowledge that Ceramatec
and Joshi would have whatever evidence they sought to protect under their theory of the
case, neither the Lawyer Defendants nor lomed had made any request of Ceramatec,
Joshi or any other person for documents or other information, nor were they seeking a
search order for Ceramatec premises.
133.

The Lawyer Defendants, referring to the Millar Affidavit, represented to

Judge Medley that "confidential files are missing." lomed Mem. at 4, but they omitted to
tell Judge Medley that neither they, Millar nor any other person at lomed had knowledge
or evidence that any files contained confidential information, or that Yanaki took them.
134.

The Lawyer Defendants, while attempting to make Yanaki's weekend

entrance to lomed and transport of confidential information to his home seem sinister,
omitted to advise Judge Medley that no lomed policy existed against Yanaki working at
home or at the lomed offices on the weekends, and that he, for ten years, and other
lomed employees, often worked at home and on the weekends.
135.

The Lawyer Defendants further omitted to advise Judge Medley that no

policy existed against transporting confidential lomed information to any employee's
home, and that many lomed employees often did so to facilitate their working at home.
136.

The Lawyer Defendants omitted to advise Judge Medley that, when

lomed's own IT Department representative, John Colt f Colt*) set up Yanaki's home
computer, that Colt, with full authority from lomed, installed Groupwise Remote thereon,
specifically to allow Yanaki unfettered access to the lomed e-mail server from his home,
with all of the confidential information in his e-mail account that might be on it, and that all
existing e-mails in Yanaki's lomed account on the e-mail server on that day were
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embedded in his home computer hard drive as the result of that installation by Colt.
137.

The Lawyer Defendants falsely represented to Judge Medley that

constitutional safeguards would be observed to preserve Yanaki's rights: "lomed
anticipates that the copy can be made at the location of the computer expert or at
Yanaki's location if he so requests. Only if Yanaki refuses to immediately turn over these
items, will the Order require a search of Yanaki's personal residence." lomed Mem. at 8.
138.

The Lawyer Defendant omitted to point out to Judge Medley that the Search

Order they submitted and had Judge Medley sign did not in fact proscribe a search
without those requisites being met
139.

In truth and in fact, when the Search Order was served, Yanaki was not

even in the state of Utah, so he could not be given the choice the Lawyer Defendants
themselves represented to Judge Medley would be mandatory.
140.

Nor, when the illegal search was conducted, was Moss even given the

option of producing requested items prior to an entry into and search of her Home.
Instead, she was told only that, if she did not provide entry for a search, her door would
be broken in, despite her protests that Yanaki was not present.
141.

Although the procedures of

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 65A were available to use to

obtain an order, ex parte, prohibiting the destruction of evidence and affirmatively
requiring the delivery of materials to the Court for that purpose, which procedures
mandate a hearing within only ten days, those procedures were not invoked.
142.

The Lawyer Defendants made a conscious decision not to invoke that

procedure, on information and belief, because they believed they would run a risk of not
convincing Judge Medley that lomed had met its burden under that rule.
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143.

The Lawyer Defendants represented to Judge Medley that "the proposed

order is limited to taking possession of lomed's company files that were illegally removed
from its premises without its kndwledge or consent." lomed Mem. at 8.
144.

The Lawyer Defendant omitted to point out to Judge Medley that the

Search Order they submitted and had Judge Medley sign did not in fact contain such a
limitation.
145.

In truth and in fact, the search authorized by the Writ of Assistance was

completely unlimited, and was directed to the entire premises, not just Yanaki's home
office.
146.

In truth and in fact, the search that was conducted led to the illegal seizure

of files, effects and information that do not belong to lomed, and that belong to Moss,
Yanaki and Ceramatec.
147.

Some of this illegally seized information from Moss and Yanaki's home

computer, seized by Johnson and OfficeWare, is private, confidential financial
information of Moss and Yanaki.
148.

The CD seized by Matkin contained confidential and proprietary information

belonging to Ceramatec.
149.

Although labeled "Ceramatec Confidential," Matkin did not even look at the

CD's contents to see whether it contained information belonging to lomed, or Ceramatec,
before seizing it.
150.

Matkin found two unlabeled zip disks in one of the boxes that was still

unpacked from when Yanaki had left lomed on January 17,2002. On that date, an
lomed employee, Ralph Koschinsky ("Koschinsky-) was helping pack Yanaki's personal
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items to take home. Yanaki, who habitually stored most documents on his office
computer hard drive instead of the lomed server, had spent a weekend organizing his
computer files and backing his office computer files on to zip disks, that he had told Colt
he would leave behind. Koschinsky saw two of those disks and, because they were
unlabeled, believed they were Yanaki's personal property, and loaded them into one of
the boxes of Yanaki's personal belongings, without telling Yanaki.
151.

During the search, Matkin took those unlabeled zip disks, even though they

were unlabeled and he could not have known they were the office computer files Yanaki
had told Colt he was preparing for Colt.
152.

Indeed, Matkin could not have determined what was on those disks prior to

seizure, because Yanaki had no zip drive with which they could be read.
153.

It is clear that Johnson and OfficeWare made no effort to determine

whether the computer files they were seizing contained lomed confidential information.
154.

In addition to confidential financial information of Yanaki and Moss, the

computer files contained private health information of Yanaki.
155.

The Lawyer Defendants also misrepresented to Judge Medley that "the

order sought by lomed would grant Yanaki every procedural protection- Yanaki has a
right to a prompt post-seizure hearing, and the right to seek damages or compensation
for any wrongful taking." lomed Mem. at 7.
156.

The Lawyer Defendant omitted to point out to Judge Medley that the

Search Order they submitted and had him sign did not in fact contain any procedure for a
prompt post-seizure hearing.
157.

Nor did any rule, legislative enactment or administrative scheme exist,
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pursuant to which the Search Order was obtained, that allowed a prompt post-seizure
hearing or constituted any legislative or administrative determination of reasonableness
for any search.
158.

Procedures were available under

UTAH

R.

CIV.

P. 64B for replevin of

lomed's property, that do require a prompt post-seizure hearing within ten days upon an
ex parte seizure.
159.

The Lawyer Defendants made a conscious decision not to invoke that

procedure, on information and belief, because they believed they would run a risk of not
convincing Judge Medley that lomed had met its burden under that rule.
160.

The Lawyer Defendants misrepresented to Judge Medley that "the

impoundment is limited so as to allow Yanaki to remain at all times present while the
electronic copying is taking place
161.

" lomed Mem. at 9.

The Lawyer Defendant omitted to point out to Judge Medley that the Search

Order they submitted and had him sign did not in fact contain such protection, and Yanaki
was not allowed the opportunity to be present before his and Moss' computer and
electronic storage media were removed from the Home, accessed by lomed's computer
expert and "copies" were made.
162.

The Lawyer Defendants omitted to advise Judge Medley that the Search

Order did not even serve the purpose of preservation of evidence, because it allowed a
computer expert provided and paid for by a single, private party to the litigation, lomed, to
access, and therefore have the ability to alter, by deliberate tampering or negligence, all
of the electronic storage media, without mandating that either a neutral expert alone
would have such access or that all procedures would be conducted with a computer
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expert of YanakPs choosing present, overseeing and participating. Yanaki believes that
Johnson and OfficeWare did in fact alter the original electronic storage media after the
illegal seizure.
PART II! - T H E CONSPIRATORS* SUCCEED IN THE OBJECT OF THE CONSPIRACY

163.

The object of the conspiracy was to unlawfully invade Moss* home, so as to

conduct an illegal search and seizure. That object was successfully carried out on April
15,2002, when the Police, Matkin, as the agent of Law Firm, Crowther, as the agent of
lomed and Johnson as the agent of Office Equipment Associates, each illegally entered
into Moss* home, through the illegal threat offeree and detention, and conducted an
illegal search.
164.

Each of the defendants and the Police agreed to commit, and did commit,

one or more acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, in order to allow the conspiracy to
obtain its object successfully.
PART IV - T H E SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

165.

Moss entered into a settlement agreement with all defendants on

December 12,2003.
166.

Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the defendants were to pay

to Jamal S. Yanaki the settlement sum, in exchange for a full release by Moss.
167.

Moss has stood at all times ready, willing and able to provide defendants

with such release upon Yanaki's receipt of the settlement sum.
168.

Defendants breached the settlement agreement by failing to pay the

settlement sum.
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COUNT I
(BREACH OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT)

169.

Moss incorporates paragraphs 1 through 168. above.

170.

Defendants have materially breached the settlement agreement.

171.

No adequate remedy at law exists to afford relief to Moss.

172.

Moss is therefore entitled to a decree of specific performance, ordering the

defendants to pay to Jamal S. Yanaki the settlement sum, together with all accrued
interest at 10 % per annum, from and after December 12. 2003. If such relief is not
granted to Moss, then, in the alternative, she asserts the claims below.
COUNT II
(ABUSE OF PROCESS)

173.

Moss incorporates paragraphs 1 through 172, above.

174. As pleaded above, in paragraph 48, an ulterior motive existed that was
served by the object of the conspiracy, such that the process was sought for an improper
purpose.
175.

In addition, the process sought was. itself, illegal, and therefore not sought

for a proper purpose in any circumstances,
176.

Further, the search and seizure are acts, in the use of the process

obtained, that are not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings. Indeed, Utah
law prohibits the use of such private search warrants.
177. The actions of the defendants described above constitute an actionable
abuse of process, and such abuse has been the cause-in-fact and legal cause of injury to
Moss, and damages in the sum of not less than $15,000,000.00, or such other and
greater sum as may be proven at trial.
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178.

The abuse of process represents a wilful disregard for the rights of Moss,

entitling her to a punitive damages award in conformity with the prindples of State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
COUNT III
(INVASION OF PRIVACY)

179.

Moss incorporates paragraphs 1 through 178, above.

180.

The invasion of Moss1 home by Matkin, as an agent of Law Firm, Crowther,

as an agent of lomed, and Johnson, as an agent of Office Equipmernt Associates, and
their seizure of her private financial records and property, constitutes an actionable
intrusion upon Moss' seclusion.
181.

The intrusion described would be highly offensive to any reasonable

person.
182.

The intrusion took place in the respective course and scope of employment

of Crowther with lomed, Matkin with Law Firm and Johnson with OfficeWare. and each of
their employers is liable under respondeat superior.
183.

Further, the intrusion on seclusion was part and parcel of the pleaded

conspiracy, making all conspirators liable.
184.

The intrusion on seclusion is the cause-in-fact and legal cause of damages

to Moss, in the sum of not less than $15,000,000.00, or such other and greater sum as
may be proven at trial.
185.

The intrusion on seclusion represents a wilful disregard for the rights of

Moss, entitling her to a punitive damages award in conformity with the principles of State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
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COUNT IV
(INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS)

186.

Moss incorporates paragraphs 1 through 185, above.

187.

The invasion of Moss* home by Matkin, as an agent of Law Firm, Crowther,

as an agent of lomed, and Johnson, as an agent of Office Equipment Associates, and
their seizure of her private financial records and property, was outrageous and intolerable
in that it offended generally accepted standards of decency and morality.
188.

Defendants intended to cause or acted with reckless disregard of the

likelihood of causing emotional distress to Moss.
189.

The defendants1 extreme and outrageous conduct was the cause-in-fact

and legal cause of Moss* severe emotional distress.
190.

The extreme and outrageous conduct of defendants took place in the

respective course and scope of employment of Crowther with lomed, Matkin with Law
Firm and Johnson with OfficeWare, and each of their employers is liable under
respondeat superior.
191.

Further, the extreme and outrageous conduct was part and parcel of the

pleaded conspiracy, making all conspirators liable.
192.

The extreme and outrageous conduct is the cause-in-fact and legal cause

of damages to Moss, in the sum of not less than $15,000,000.00, or such other and
greater sum as may be proven at trial.
193.

The extreme and outrageous conduct represents a wilful disregard for the

rights of Moss, entitling her to a punitive damages award in conformity with the principles
of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
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COUNTV
(TRESPASS TO LAND AND CHATTELS)

194.

Moss incorporates paragraphs 1 through 193, above.

195.

Moss was, at all times material hereto, lawfully in possession of the Home

and its contents.
196.

The invasion of Moss' home by Matkin, as an agent of Law Firm, Crowther,

as an agent of lomed, and Johnson, as an agent of Office Equipmernt Associates, and
their seizure of her private financial records and property, was a trespass to her land and
chattels.
197.

The trespasses described are the cause-in-fact and legal cause of

damages to Moss, specially for the value of the chattels and generally for the trespass,
and its reasonably foreseeable consequences in the sum of not less than
$15,000,000.00, or such other and greater sum as may be proven at trial.
198.

The trespasses of defendants took place in the respective course and

scope of employment of Crowther with lomed, Matkin with Law Firm and Johnson with
OfficeWare, and each of their employers is liable under respondeat superior.
199.

Further, the trespasses were part and parcel of the pleaded conspiracy,

making all conspirators liable
200.

The trespasses each represents a wilful disregard for the rights and

interests of Moss, entitling her to a punitive damages award in conformity with the
principles of Sfate Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003).
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COUNT VI
(CONVERSION)

201.

Moss incorporates paragraphs 1 through 200, above.

202.

Moss, at all times material hereto, was in lawful possession of the chattels

seized and removed from her Home.
203.

The invasion of Moss* home by Matkin, as an agent of Law Firm, Crowther,

as an agent of lomed, and Johnson, as an agent of Office Equipmernt Associates, and
the seizure of her private financial records and property, was a willful interference with
Moss1 rights of use and possession of those chattels, without justification, and a
conversion thereof.
204.

The conversion described is the cause-in-fact and legal cause of damages

to Moss, for the value of the chattels, and its reasonably foreseeable consequences, in
the sum of not less than $15,000,000.00, or such other and greater sum as may be
proven at trial.
205.

The conversion by defendants took place in the respective course and

scope of employment of Crowther with lomed, Matkin with Law Firm and Johnson with
OfficeWare, and each of their employers is liable under respondeat superior.
206.

Further, the conversion was part and parcel of the pleaded conspiracy,

making all conspirators liable.
207.

Each conversion represents a wilful disregard for the rights and interests of

Moss, entitling her to a punitive damages award in conformity with the principles of State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
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COUNT VII
(CIVIL CONSPIRACY)

208.

Moss incorporates paragraphs 1 through 207, above.

209.

Each of the defendants acted in concert, by way of a combination of two or

more persons.
210.

The conspiracy had one or more objects, as described above, in fflf 48,

211.

There was a meeting of the minds between each combination of two or

163.

more conspirators as to the object of the conspiracy and/or the courses of action by
which it would be carried forward.
212.

Each of the conspirators undertook one or more unlawful, overt acts in

furtherance of the conspiracy.
213. The acts of one or more conspirators in furtherance of the object of the
conspiracy have been the cause-irvfact and legal cause of damages to Moss, in the sum
of not less than $15,000,000.00, or such other and greater sum as may be proven at trial.
214. The acts of the conspirators were undertaken with a wilful disregard for the
rights and interests of Moss, entitling her to a punitive damages award in conformity with
the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003).

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Moss hereby demands trial by jury of all issues triable by a jury herein.
WHEREFORE, Moss demands judgment in her favor, and against defendants,
jointly and severally, as follows:
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A.

On Count I, for a decree of specific performance of the settlement

agreement, requiring defendants to pay the settlement sum, together with interest
at 10 % per annum, from and after December 12,2003, to Jamal S. Yanaki.
B.

On Counts ll-VI!, for damages, against each defendant, jointly and
severally, in the sum of not less than $15,000,000.00, or in such
other and greater sum as may be proven at trial, and all of her
attorneys' fees.

C.

On Counts ll-VII, for punitive damages against each defendant,

awarded in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
D.

For all of plaintiffs reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses

as allowed at law, in equity, by statute, rule, inherent power of the Court or
otherwise.
E.

For all such other and further relief of any kind or nature to which

plaintiff may show entitlement by proof and as the Court deems just, proper and
equitable in the premises.
DATED this _ l

day of August, 2005.
PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE
A Professional Corporation

D A V I D W. S C O F I E L D

Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiffs Address:
385 North Wall Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IOMED, INC., a Utah corporation,

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMAL YANAKI, ACIWATEK, LJLG, a
Utah limited liability corporation,
CERAMATEC, INC., a Utah corporation,
ASHOK JOSHI, and JOHN DOES I-X

civil No.
Honorable

Defendants.

£>^bqp?>63i

m&j.U

r

Plaintiff lomed, a Utah corporation flomed"), hereby complains of Defendants Jamal
Yanaki, ActivaTek, ULC. ("ActivaTek"), Ceramatec, L.L.C. ("Ceramatec"), and Ashok Joshi
("Joshi"), ^ d for Iomed's claims for relief alleges as follows:

PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
1.

lomed, is a Utah corporation. Iomed's principal office is located in Salt Lake County,

Utah, lomed is authorized to do business in Utah.
2.

Yanaki is a resident of Salt Lake County, does business in Salt Lake County and is

a former employee of lomed, having voluntarily terminated his employment with lomed on
January 17,2002.
3.

ActivaTek, LLC is a Utah Limited Liability Company, doing business in Salt Lake

County, Utah. Yanaki is the president of ActivaTek and ActivaTek is owned, created, or controlled,
at least in part, by Yanaki and Joshi. Joshi is the managing partner of ActivaTek.
4.

Ceramatec is a Utah corporation doing business in Salt Lake County, Utah.

Ceramatec has had discussions with lomed regarding a business relationship, which included an
executed Confidentiality Agreement Ceramatec is owned, created, or controlled, in whole orinpart,
by Joshi. Joshi is a resident of Salt l^ake County and does business in Salt Lake County.
5.

John Does I - X are individuals or entities unknown to lomed at this time that have

acted together with the Defendants herein to deprive lomed of its confidential information and/or
tortiously interfere with Iomed's business relationships, including its relationships with professional
consultants, suppliers, and actual and prospective distributors and customers,
6.

The claims for relief alleged herein arose in Salt Lake County.

7.

This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-3-

8.

Venue is proper in this Court under Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-13-4 and 78-13-7.

4.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
9.

Iomed is, and at ail relevant times was, in the business of research, development,

manufacture and sale ofiontophoretic drug aenvery systems. Iomed currently markets two products;
the Phoresor® System, which represents over 98% of the Company's product sales, and Numby
Stuff. The Phoresor® System consists of a reusable battery powered dose controller and single use
disposable iontophoretic drug delivery electrode kits. The system is sold primarily to physical and
occupational therapists and sports and occupational medicine clinics and is used to deliver
dexamethasone sodium phosphate for the treatment of acute local inflammatory conditions. The
Company's second product, Numby Stuff®, is an iontophoretic drug delivery system sold for the
delivery of Iontocaine® for the administration of local dermal anesthesia,
10.

lamed is a publicly traded company. It has invested a substantial amount ofits capital

in the research and development of its existing products and new confidential products.
11.

Yanaki began his employment with Iomed on or about September 1, 1992. On

September 2, 1992, Yanaki executed an Intellectual Property and Invention Agreement (*TP
Agreement"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
12.

In the IP Agreement Yanaki expressly acknowledges that in the course of his

employment with Iomed, he will have access to Iomed's business plans, projections and financial
information, and other intellectual property, and that Iomed wanted assurance from Yanaki that he
would not disclose such confidential information during his employment or thereafter. See IP
Agreement at page 1.
13.

In consideration for and a condition ofhis employment, Yanaki promised as follows:
3

1. Non Disclosure - During the term of employment, and at all times thereafter,
[Yanaki] will not, except in promoting the business of IOMED and performing the
duties of [his] employment, directly or indirectly, use or disclose any of IOMED's
Intellectual Property without IOMED's written consent As used in this Agreement,
Intellectual Property includes information disclosed to or known by [Yanaki} as a
consequence of his employment by IOMED which is not generally known to the
public or in the industry in which IOMED is, or may become engaged, concerning
IOMED's products, processes, formulas, designs, plans, projections, financial
position, business plans, customer list and services, including, but not limited to,
information relating to research, development, inventions, manufacturing>
purchasing, engineering, and marketing.
Upon termination of employment, [Yanaki] will return to IOMED all
documents, records, data sheets, computer disks, notebooks and other repositories of
Intellectual Property, including copies thereof, whether prepared by him...or others.
2L Inventions. [Yanaki] hereby agrees to keep IOMED informed of any and all
inventions, designs, formulas, works of authorship, compositions of matter and
discoveries (the "Inventions") made, conceived of or developed by [Yanaki], alone
or with others, which result from any work [Yanaki] may do during and for six (6)
monthsfollowingtermination of employment with IOMED, and which may or may
not relate to IOMED's activities or to those of affiliated companies. All such
Inventions shall be submitted on IOMED's standard Invention Disclosure form for
review by IOMED's Patent Committee. It shall be IOMED's policy to release to
[Yanaki] the Inventions determined by the Patent Committee not to be conceived of
or developed on IOMED time, using IOMED resources, or related to IOMED's
activities. The Inventions determined by the Patent Committee to be conceived of
or developed on IOMED time, using IOMED resources, or related to IOMED's
activities shall be and shall remain the property of IOMED or its nominees, whether
patented, copyrighted or not, and [Yanaki] shall, without charge to IOMED, assign
(and does hereby agree to assign) to IOMED allright,title, and interest in and to such
Inventions and copyrights. Upon request, [Yanaki] will immediately execute,
acknowledgexand deliver any instruments confirming IOMED's complete ownership
of the Inventions.
[Yanaki] will keep and maintain adequate and current written records of all
the Inventions, in the form of notes, sketches, drawings, and reports relating thereto,
which records shall be and remain the property o£ and shall not be removed from the
premises of IOMED without permission, and shall be made available at all times to
IOMED.
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3. Agreement Not to Compete.
a) During [Yanaki's] employment with IOMED, [Yanaki] will not participate
directly or indirectly, as owner, agent or employee of a business engaged in activities
that are in direct competition with the activities of IOMED.
b) After termination of employment with IOMED, [Yanaki] may associate with a
competitive business and make use of [his] genera] knowledge and experience, but
[Yanaki] shall not use any Intellectual Property nor approach current employees of
IOMED concerning their rendition of services for a competitive business.
The parties hereto acknowledge that this Agreement not to compete is
reasonable and necessary to protect the Intellectual Property and goodwill oflOMED.
IP Agreement at f[[ 1-3.
14.

lomed required Yanaki to execute the IP Agreement because, during the course of

his employment with lomed, Yanaki was hired with the intent and understanding, both by himself
and by lomed that he would receive training and exposure to numerous confidential projects and
information belonging to lomed.
15.

On February 9, 2000, Yanaki received a promotion to General Manager, Clinical

Systems. His annual salary at that time was $150,000.00, with an annual bonus not to exceed
$30,000.00, a stock incentive plan, educational benefits, and health benefits.
16.

As part of the educational benefit, lomed advanced $ 18,170.00 toward educational

costs for Yanaki to enroll and attend an Executive MBA Program at the University of Utah. Not
only did lomed pay the educational costs for Yanaki to obtain an advanced degree, including
providing tuition reimbursement above and beyond its standard practice, lomed also allowed Yanaki
to take off work every other Friday (with pay) over a two year period and made other
accommodations to allow him to pursue this degree.
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17.

Pursuant to (he terms of the agreement between Iomed and Yanaki under which

Yanaki was permitted to pursue an MBA, if Yanaki were to terminate his employment during the
Executive MBA program or within 12 months after graduation ("Education Agreement*'), Yanaki
was required to return 100% of the educational costs in excess of $3,000.00 paid by Iomed. Yanaki
graduated in May 2001. Yanaki has not reimbursed this amount to Iomed, despite a demand that he
do so. Indeed, Yanaki has asserted that no repayment is required.
18.

During his employment with Iomed, Yanaki became one of the most critical Iomed

employees, serving as a Vice President and General Manager of lomed's commercial business
operations. Indeed, in that capacity, among other things, Yanaki had supervisory responsibility over
the following critical areas of lomed's commercial business operations: (1) Manufacturing, Quality
Control, Design and Engineering; (2) Customer Relations, Marketing andNational Sales; (3) Product
Management and Product Development; (4) Regulatory Affairs; and (5) Reimbursement In his
position, Yanaki attended executive meetings in which he participated in regular discussions
involving Iomed*s most confidential information, including business strategies, research and
development plans, the status of ongoing research, confidential communications with lomed's
intellectual property advisors, including legal counsel, sales, marketing and financial information.
Few, if any Iomed employees had more intimate knowledge of the company's confidential
infonnation than Yanaki. Moreover, Yanaki developed this infonnation over nearly ten years as a
crucial Iomed employee.
19.

The Confidential Information entrusted to Yanaki was not generally known outside

of Iomed, has been developed by Iomed as a result of the investment of its employees' time and
6

effort and Iomed's money, is subject to substantial efforts by Iomed to ensure that the Confidential
Information is safeguarded, is not easily discoverable by other means, would take others not privy
to such information by virtue of their positions at Iomed significant time, effort, and money to
duplicate, has been the subject of reasonable secrecy and confidentiality measures taken by Iomed,
would be highly valuable to its existing competitorsand invaluable to potential new competitors, and
would, if used or disclosed in competition with Iomed, cause Iomed considerable damage.
20.

Ironically, one of Yanaki's important responsibilities was to protect Iomed's trade

secrets and other proprietary information. In fulfilling that responsibility, Yanaki negotiated and
executed on behalf of Iomed, confidentiality agreements with prospective business partners,
requiring that they not disclose or use for their own purposes Iomed's confidential information that
was to be disclosed to them. -For example, on My 30, 2001, in his capacity as Iomed's Vice
President/General Manager, Yanaki executed an Agreement for Mutual Exchange of Confidential
Information with the Aequitas Consulting Group.
21.

Defendant Ceramatec is engaged in the business o£ among other things, developing

power sources for various applications. As mentioned above, Ceramatec is owned or controlled, in
whole or in part, by Defendant Joshi.
22.

In furtherance of its confidential research and development of new products, Iomed

sought the specific expertise and experience of Ceramatec to provide support for the development
of various key components of certain uew products. To that end,, Iomed contacted Joshi at
Ceramatec in or about June 2000. As a condition ofproceeding with discussions for an agreement
that would allow Ceramatec to participate in such a project and to protect its confidential
7*

information, Iomed required Ceramatec to execute a Confidentiality Agreement prior to disclosing
any confidential information about the new products. On June 14,2000, Ceramatec executed the
Confidentiality Agreement, which is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
23.

The Confidentiality Agreement defines "Confidential Information" as proprietary

and confidential information relating to a party's products or business, including but not limited to
patented and unpatented technology, trade secrets, methods and techniques, research, projects,
business and marketing plans, customer names and lists." Confidentiality Agreement at page 1.
24

By executing the Confidentiality Agreement, Ceramatec promised "not to disclose

to any third party or use in any way for its own or another's benefit any Confidential Information of
the disclosing party." Confidentiality Agreement at ^ 2.
25. -

Defendant Joshi executed the Confidentiality Agreement on behalf of Ceramatec and

was personally familiar with its terms and covenants.
2$.

Yanaki and others, on behalf of Iomed, and Joshi, on behalf of Ceramatec, met and

communicated regularly regarding development of the confidential new products. Pursuant to the
Confidentiality Agreement, Iomed provided highly confidential information to Ceramatec.
27.

On at least two occasions in October 2001, Iomed met with Ceramatec to discuss the

confidential project During these meetings, additional trade secrets were disclosed by Iomed
representatives to Ceramatec, including clinical effectiveness of the potential new product,
technology developments to improve the quality and efficacy of that product, the manufacturing of
prototypes, and so forth.
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28.

Present at these meetings were Bob Hause, Jim Weersing (then President ,and CEO

of Iomed and a member of the Board of Directors of Ceramatec), and Yanaki for Iomed, and Joshi
for Ceramatec.
29.

While events occurred during 2001 which affected the timing of some of the

development activities with Ceramatec, other activities continued, including meetings and
discussions relating to an expansion of the business relationship for the development of a
confidential product.
30.

Further, in November 2001, Iomed terminated its CEO, Jim Weersing (<cWeersing").

Weersing had worked closely with Yanaki and Joshi while an Iomed employee. like Yanaki,
Weersing had access to the highest levels of confidential information and participated in critical
decisions and strategy sessions. On information and belief, Weersing is a member of the Board of
Directors of Ceramatec and has other formal and informal relationships with Joshi and Ceramatec.
31.

Following Weersing's departure from Iomed, Yanaki met with Robert J. Lollini, the

Chief Operating Officer of Iomed, on at least two occasions to report on the development program
with Ceramatec. During these discussions, Yanaki presented outlines of the terms of a development
and license agreement between Iomed and Ceramatec, which he represented had been discussed with
both Weersing and. Joshi. Mr. Lollini advised Yanaki that although the development of the
confidential product would remain a critical development program for Iomed, he was not prepared
to enter into a.license agreement for approximately six months or until such time as the Company's
operatmg and financial condition had stabilized and he had an opportunity to evaluate die maiket
opportunity and estimated development costs of the program.
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32.

Also in November 2001, Yanaki told Bob Hause, who was a key lomed employee

working on the confidential project involving Ceramatec and others, to stop all work on thatproject
Yanaki specified that Mr. Hause was to cease all technical work, correspondence, and any other
activity relating to the project. When Mr. Hause inquired why the sudden change in direction,
Yanaki told him that this was "my project" Because Yanaki was Mr. Hause's superior, Mr. Hause
did m fact cease work on the confidential project.
33.

On or about January 17,2002, Yanaki quit At his formal exit interview with lomed

Human Resource Specialist Wendy E. Hanson, Yanaki said that he was resigning for <4health
reasons." He also told her that he intended to 'take some time off, aud do some consulting or start
a business" or words to that effect.
34.

During the interview, Ms. Hanson reminded Yanaki ^>f his important obligations

under the IP Agreement In response, he declared that the IP Agreement was "a worthless piece of
paper and wouldn't hold up in a court of law/* or words to that effect. Nevertheless, Yanaki
represented that he would abide by the IP Agreement
35.

At about the time ofhis resignation, Yanaki told another lomed employee that he had

friends who had started companies and become millionaires, and that he wanted to do the same
thing.
36.

On Sunday, January 6,2002, shortly after he gave notice of his resignation, Yanaki

used his access card to gain entrance to the lomed offices. At least one lomed employee saw him
on that day, but left the building before Yanaki, leaving Yanaki alone at lomed After YanakPs
employment terminated on January 17,2002, it was discovered that numerous corporate records and
10

confidential information belonging to lomed are missingfromfilesthat were in his custody, perhaps
having been removed on the Sunday shortly before his last day at lomed.
37

lomed's written employeepolicy expressly allows it to access employee's e-mails sent

or received on lomed computers. Among other things, that Electronic Mail (E-Mail) And On-line
Services Policy expressly provides that "AH messages composed sent^ or received on the
electronic mail system are and remain the property of IOMED, NOT the private property of
an employee." See Electronic Mail (E-Mail and On-Line Services Policy at 1.1 (emphasis in
original) (attached hereto as Exhibit C).
38.

Subsequent to YanakTs departure from the company, lomed discovered that

numerous e-mails had been deleted from YanakTs computer files on the system, including all emails for about a two-week period in January 2002.
39.

In early 2002, shortly after Yanaki left lomed, Yanaki's e-mail address at lomed

received an e-mail from lomed's business partner, Aequitas Consulting, the same consulting finn
Yanaki had hired on behalf of lomed and required to execute a confidentiality agreement This email contained a 'Treliminary Market Review/Preliminary Reimbursement Analysis'* essentially
relating to the same confidential product development programs and reimbursement strategies
on which Yanaki had worked with Joshi, Ceramatec, and Aequitas Consulting while Yanaki
was with lomed.
40.

To lomed's surprise, this e-mail was addressed to "Jamal Yanaki, President,

ActivaTek LC, Salt Lake City, UT."
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41.

Further investigation has revealed that ActivaTek was created by Yanaki and/or Joshi

in January 2002, at about the same time as Yanaki's departure from lomed.
42.

The consulting report makes clear that Joshi, Ceramatec, and Yanaki have breached

duties of non-disclosure and are actively using Iomed's confidential information to evaluate the
market and to develop the ActiPatch System, a "self contained, self powered electrode" for sale or
distribution into the physical therapy market, in direct competition with lomed. In pursuit of their
own self-interest and in violation of duties owed to lomed, Defendants have stolen valuable trade
secretsfromlomed, which cost lomed millions of dollars and years of time to acquire and develop,
and are trying to beat lomed to market with a confidential project using Iomed's inventions, trade
secrets and other confidential information.
43.

As an executive level employee of lomed, Yanaki owed fiduciary duties to lomed,

including duties of undivided loyalty not to compete with lomed while so employed, to devote his
full-time efforts to performing his duties during business hours, and to use Iomed's assets and
resources for the benefit of and in a manner consistent with the best interests of lomed, including
keeping secret Iomed's Confidential Information.
44.

Iomed's business goodwill is substantially vested in the employees of lomed.

45.

lomed invested significant resources in training Yanaki.

46.

lomed is informed and believes and therefore alleges that during late 2001 and early

2002, while still an employee of lomed, Yanaki began to plan and to undertake affirmative actions
to systematically undermine Iomed's business interests. On information and belief, those actions
include, but are not limited to:
12

Engaging or preparing to engage in business as ActivaTek in competition
with lomed;
Contacting and planning contact with Iomed's actual and potential customers
and business partners in an effort to steal business from lomed and obtain it
for ActivaTek;
Disclosing and using Iomed's Confidential Information in violation of
applicable law and the IP Agreement;
Retaining an lomed consultant to perform tasks that required both Yanaki and .
the consultant to breach duties of confidentiality;
Entering into relationships with lomed bnsinesspartners in knowing violation
of contractual and statutory duties of confidentiality; •
Identifying lomed's current and potential customers, consultants andbusiness
partners, developing a business plan containing a strategy to steal business
from lomed, and contacting Iomed's customers and potential customers for
that purpose, all based on and using lomed's Confidential Infonnation;
Using Iomed's equipment in connection with the business of ActivaTek;
Including Iomed's confidential infonnation as a part of an ActivaTek product
development plan;
Directing lomed employees to cease working on confidential projects to gain
a competitive advantage against lomed; and
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x.

Misrepresenting his post-employment intentions to lomed, by stating contrary
to fact that he did not intend to compete with lomed for at least one year, that
he would abide by the IP Agreement, and that he was resigning from lomed
for health reasons in order to keep lomed from learning of his true, unlawiul
intentions.

The foregoing acts of Yanaki and ActivaTek are collectively referred to herein as the "Violations."
47.

In addition to the Violations, his actions confirm that Yanaki has and intends to

further breach the IP Agreement. The IP Agreement precludes Yanaki from using Iomed's
Confidential Information.

See Exhibit A. The e-mail mistakenly sent to lomed by Aequitas

Consulting makes clear that ActivaTek's business relies exclusively on a product being developed
by lomed, using Iomed-s Confidential Information and equipment That same e-mail also reveals that Defendants intend to enter into Iomed's business markets using Iomed's Confidential
Information.
48.

As an lomed employee, Yanaki participated in confidential research and development

projects. lomed has invested significant financial and human capital into the development of several
such projects. Despite his contractual and legal obligations, Yanaki and ActivaTek have used
Iomed's Confidential Information in an effort to make Iomed's confidential projects part of their
competitive business.
49.

lomed is informed and Relieves and therefore alleges that, among other things,

ActivaTek*s actual and potential sources of supply, clientele, customer lists and consultants is
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substantially composed of individuals, businesses, and business contacts that are current or potential
vendors, customers and consultants of lomei
50.

The IP Agreement with Yanaki, and the Confidentiality Agreement with Ceramatec

provide for injunctive relief These documents also mandate that the prevailing party shall recover
its attorneys' fees and costs incurred in protecting its rights under those agreements.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
( Misappropriation of Trade Secrets)
(All Defendants)
51.

Iomed realleges and incoiporates herein all of the allegations set forth elsewhere in

this Complaint as though ftdly set forth herein.
52.

During Yanaki's employment by Iomed, Yanaki had access to, became familiar with,

and gained intimate knowledge of Iomed's Trade.Secrets (as4efined.by Utah law) and Iomed's
proprietary and Confidential Information, which Yanaki would not have gained but for the capacities
in which he served while employed with Iomed Similarly, Joshi and Ceramatec gained access to
those same Trade Secrets only after executing the Confidentiality Agreement attached hereto.
53.

Iomed's Trade Secrets constitute information that derives independent economic

value, actual and potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
through proper means by other persons who can obtain economic value from disclosure or use of the
information. Iomed has taken reasonable steps to maintain the secrecy of its Trade Secrets and
Confidential Information.
54.

Iomed is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges that Yanaki, Joshi, and

Ceramatec each has disclosed to third parties, including ActivaTek and Aequitas Consulting, and/or
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used, and intend to disclose to third parties and/or use Iomed's Trade Secrets, without Iomed's
express or implied consent, in violation of hisfiduciaryduties of loyalty and good faith, in violation
of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and to Iomed's detriment
55.

Defendants* improper disclosure and/or use of Iomed's Trade Secrets and other

activities have resulted in and will result in immediate, great, and irreparable injury and damage to
lomed and to its existing and future business unless Defendants are immediately and permanently
restrained by this Court from said improper use and/or-disclosure.
56.

Defendants' improper disclosure and/or use of the Trade Secrets and other activities

will in the future also cause lomed immediate, great, and irreparable damage, including
misappropriation of Iomed's goodwill and interference with its business relationships.
57.-

Under Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-3, lomed is therefore entitled to an-immediate Order

of this Court permanently enjoining Defendants from engaging in said improper use and disclosure
of Iomed's Trade Secrets, including, without limitation, contacting actual or prospective clients of
lomed or otherwise using Iomed's Trade Secrets to engage in competition with lomed.
58.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-1, lomed is additionally entitled to recover from

Defendants damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
59.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-4(2), because Defendants' conduct was intentional,

willful, and malicious and manifested a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of
the rights of lomed, it is entitled to recover from Defendants exemplary damages in an amount not
less than twice the amount of its damages awarded under Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-4(1), the exact
amount of which will be proven at triaL
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60.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-5, because Defendants3 conduct was intentional,

willful, and malicious, lomed is additionally entitled to recoverfromDefendants attorneys1 fees and
costs in an amount to be proven at trial.
61.

Because Defendants possess Iomed's Trade Secrets and Confidential Information, and

such information presents a risk of future harm by further misuse ofthe same, under Utah Code Ann.
§ 13-24-3(3), lomed is entitled to injunctive relief requiring Defendants to return any and all of
Iomed's customer lists, routings, market penetration strategies, files, clinical information, records,
documents, back up CDs, e-mails, back up files, drawings, specifications, equipment and similar
items relating to the business of lomed.
62.

The continuing nature of Defendants5

improper activities will necessitate a

multiplicity of suits to repair the injuriesfeatlomed will sustain unless the injunction sought herein
is granted
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Fraud)
(Against Yanaki)
63.

lomed realleges and incorporates herein all of the allegations set forth elsewhere in

this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
64.

Yanaki failed to disclose to lomed (collectively, the "Omissions")* (1) that Yanaki

was planning to and in fact was competing directly with lomed and systematically planning and
taking affirmative actions to misappropriate its customers and business goodwill while still
employed by lomed; and (2) that Yanaki was systematically planning and taking affirmative actions
to misappropriate Iomed's customers and business goodwill.
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65.

Yanaki's failure to disclose the Omissions to lomed was material to Iomed's

decisions to allow Yanaki to continue as an employee of lomed, to receive compensation as an
employee, and not to replace the position possessed by Yanaki at lomed and/or take other measures
to protect and defend the business goodwill and interests of lomed from dissipation by Yanaki.
66.

Yanaki intentionally failed to disclose the Omissions with the purpose of inducing

Iomed's reliance.
67.

Yanaki wholly failed to disclose or reveal to lomed the material Omissions.

68.

The Omissions constitute an artifice or a scheme to defraud lomed.

69.

Yanaki knew that the Omissions were material, that they were false, inaccurate and

misleading, and that the failure to disclose them to lomed was misleading.
7&

Pursuantto contract and becauseofhis fiduciary duties owed to lomed* Yanaki owed

a duty to lomed to disclose, supplement and correct the Omissions.
71.

Had Yanaki disclosed his true intentions, andhis actions to plan and start a competing

business, using lomed's Confidential Information, contacts, practices and procedures, lomed could
have taken preventative actions to preclude Yanaki from causing harm to lomed.
72.

Iomed's inaction and reliance was in fact induced by the Omissions.

73.

lomed's reliance was reasonable and in ignorance of the Omissions.

74.

As a direct and proximate result of Yanaki's fraud, lomed has suffered, and will

continue to suffer, direct and consequential damages in an amount to be proven at trial and for which
Yanaki is liable.
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75.

Because Yanaki's conduct was intentional, willful, and malicious and manifested a

knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of the rights o£ Iomed, Iomed is entitled
to recover from YanaJri exemplary damages in amounts to be established at trial.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Intentional Interference with Economic Relations)
(All Defendants)
76.

Iomed realleges and incoiporates herein all of the allegations set forth elsewhere in

this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
77.

Iomed is informed and believes and therefore alleges that YanaM and Joshi,

individually and through ActivaTek and Ceramatec, intentionally engaged in conduct intended to
damage or interfere with the relationship between Iomed and then-current and potential vendors,
customers and consultants of Iomed, thereby interfering with Iomed*s economic and business
relations and potential economic and business relations with such vendors, customers and
consultants, all for the sole benefit of Defendants and to the detriment of Iomed.
78.

Defendants' interference with Iomed's actual and prospective business relationships

is without justification and is for an improper purpose and/or by improper means.
79.

The improper means by which Defendants interfered with Iomed's economic and

business relations include, but are not limited to:fraud,wrongful use of Iomed's Trade Secrets and
other confidential and proprietary information to solicit and/or consummate transactions with
Iomed's actual and prospective customers; wrongful use of Iomed's Trade Secrets and other
confidential and proprietary infonnation in breach of YanaM' fiduciary duties owed to Iomed and
Ceramatec's contractual duties to Iomed; wrongful use ofIomed's Trade Secrets in violation of the
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Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act; wrongful use of Iomed's Trade Secrets and other confidential
information in breach of the Yanaki's IP Agreement and Ceramatec's Confidentiality Agreement;
and breaches of YanakTs fiduciary duties and duties of loyalty owed to lomed.
80.

Defendants' interference has caused, is causing and will continue to cause injury to

Iomed's business.
81.

By reason ofDefendants* improper interference, lomed has suffered and will continue

to suffer actual and consequential damages in amounts to be proven at trial for which Defendants
are jointly and severally liable.
82.

Because Defendants* conduct was intentional, willful, malicious and manifested a

knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of the rights oflomed, lomed is entitled to
recoverfromDefendants exemplary damages 4n amounts to be proven at trial.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty and of Duty of Loyalty)
(Against Yanaki)
83.

lomed realleges and incorporates herein all of the allegations set forth elsewhere in

this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
84.

By virtue of his position with lomed, Yanaki owed fiduciary duties to lomed

including a duty of undivided loyalty and utmost candor in his dealings with lomed and a duty to
place Iomed's interests above his own.
85.

lomed is informed arid believes and on that basis alleges that while employed as 3.

full-time employee by lomed, Yanaki fidled to devote his fiill-time efforts to lomed and for its
benefit.
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86.

lomed is informed and believes and on that basis alleges that, rather than devoting

his full-time efforts on behalf of lomed, Yanaki failed to disclose the Omissions, committed the
Violations, and otherwise acted in direct competition with lomed's business.
87.

lomed is informed and believes and on that basis alleges that Yanaki has profited and

will continue to profitfromhis misappropriation of lomed's corporate opportunities, Trade Secrets,
and other confidential information which constitute a breach of his fiduciary duties and the duty of
loyalty he owed to lomed.
88.

As a result of Yanaki's breaches of hisfiduciaryduties and duty of loyalty owed to

lomed, lomed is entitled to recover damages from Yanaki in an amount to be proven at trial.
89.

Because Yanaki's conduct was intentional, willful, and malicious and manifested a

knowing and reckless mdifference toward, and disregard of therightsof lomed, lorned is entitled to
recover from Yanaki exemplary damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Civil Conspiracy)
(All Defendants)
90.

lomed realleges and incorporates herein all of the allegations set forth elsewhere in

this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
91.

The Defendants comprise a combination of two or more persons.

92.

lomed is informed and believes, and therefore alleges that Defendants Yanaki,

ActivaTek, Ceramatec, Joshi and possibly others had a meeting of the minds on a course of action,
to engage in the Violations the purpose ofwhich was to undennine lomed's business and usurp that
business for their own benefit
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93.

Iomed is informed and believes, and therefore alleges that Defendants have

undertaken numerous unlawful acts, including but not limited to the Violations, fraud, interference
with economic relations, misappropriation of Trade Secrets, breach of fiduciary duty, and
conversion, in furtherance of their conspiracy to usurp the business of Iomed for their own benefit.
94.

Pursuant to the conspiracy and if furtherance thereof Defendants interfered with

Iomed's actual and potential business relationships, misappropriated proprietary and Confidential
Information and trade secrets through the actions of the co-conspirators as set forth in this
Complaint, the alleging paragraphs of which are incorporated in this Count by reference as if set
forth fully herein.
95.

As a result of the unlawful acts of Defendants, Iomed has been damaged in amounts

to be proven at trial.
96.

Because the acts of Defendants were intentional, willful, malicious and manifested

a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of the rights of Iomed, Iomed is entitled
to recover from Defendants exemplary damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
97.

Defendants are jointly and severally liable to Iomed for all of Iomed's direct,,

consequential, and exemplary damages caused by the unlawful acts in furtherance of the conspiracy
in amounts to be proven at trial. Moreover, Iomed is entitled to an accounting of the benefits
Defendants received from the unlawful acts complained of herein.
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SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breaches of Contract and Covenant of Good and Fair Dealing)
(Against Yanaki)
98.

lomed realleges and incorporates herein the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1

through 97 above as if fully set forth herein.
99.

Pursuant to the terms of the IP Agreement, Yanaki agreed not to use or disclose

Iomed's Confidential Information and not to compete with lomed while employed by lomed.
100.

lomed is informed and believes and therefore alleges that Yanaki breached his IP

Agreement by using Iomed's Confidential Information in competition with lomed and by assisting
ActivaTek and other entities in competition with lomed during his employment and after his
employment with lomed.
101.

Moreover, under Utah law, there is implied in the BP Agreement with lomed a duty

of good faith and fair dealing.
102.

Under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Yanaki must not engage

in activities that destroy or impair Iomed'srightsto receive the fruits of the IP Agreement
103.

It was the common purpose and justified expectations of lomed that Yanaki would

devote his efforts to work for lomed and would not engage in business in competition with lomed.
104.

lomed is informed and believes and therefore alleges that Yanaki breached the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the BP Agreement with lomed in that, among other
things, he failed to devote his services to lomed but instead engaged in business competing with
lomed while employed by lomed.
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105.

As alleged above, Yanaki also entered into the Education Agreement with Iomed

Pursuant to the terms ofthat Agreement, Yanaki owes Iomedin excess of$ 15,000.00, which remains
unpaid.
106.

Iomed has performed all of its obligations under the IP Agreement and the Education

Agreement
107.

As a direct and proximate result of Yanaki's breaches of the IP Agreement and the

Education Agreement, and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied therein, Iomed has
been damaged and has suffered direct and consequential damages in amounts to be proven at trial.

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Injunctive Relief)
(All Defendants)
108.

Iomed realleges ^nd incorporates herein the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1

through 107 above as if fully set forth herein.
109.

During Yanaki's employment with Iomed he had access to, became familiar with, and

gained intimate knowledge of lomed's Trade Secrets and other confidential and proprietary
information, which he would not have gained but for the capacities in which he served while
employed with Iomed Ceramatec and Joshi gained access to these Trade Secrets by virtue of the
Confidentiality Agreement
110.

Iomed is informed and believes, and therefore alleges that Defendants have used

and/or disclosed to third parties, and intend to use and/or disclose to third parties lomed's Trade
Secrets and other confidential and proprietary information in violation of Yanaki's fiduciary duties
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of loyalty and good faith, in violation of the IP Agreement, in violation of Ceramatec's
Confidentiality Agreement, and in violation of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act
111.

lomed is informed and believes, and therefore alleges that during the time he was

employed with lomed, Yanaki was, through his direct contacts with lomed *s customers and business
partners, a key employee in establishing the good will associated with lomed 's business and
products.
112.

lomed is informed and believes, and therefore alleges that Yanaki and/or Joshi

established ActivaTek, which competes with lomed's business in violation of the covenant not to
compete contained in Yanaki *s IP Agreement with lomed.
113.

Defendants* improper use and/or disclosure of lomed's Trade Secrets, violation of

YanakTs IP Agreement, violation of Ceramatec's Confidentiality Agreement and other activities will
result in immediate, great and irreparable injury and damage to lomed and to its existing and future
business unless Defendants are immediately and permanently restrained by this Court from such
improper activities.
114.

Defendants' improper use and7or disclosure of the Trade Secrets, violation of

Yanaki's IP Agreement, violation ofCeramatec's Confidentiality Agreement and other activities will
in the future also cause lomed immediate, great and irreparable damage, including misappropriation
of lomed's goodwill.
115.

Unless Defendants are immediately and permanently restrained by this Court, the

threatened injury to lomed outweighs whatever damage theproposed order and injunction may cause
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Defendants. Indeed, both the IP Agreement and the Confidentiality Agreement provide for
injunctive relief under precisely these circumstances.
116.

Immediately and permanently restraining Defendants will not be adverse to the public

117

There is a substantial likelihood that lomed will prevail on the merits ofits underlying

interest

claims and this case presents serious issues on the merits which should be the subject of further
litigation.
118.

lomed has no adequate remedy at law with respect to future damages caused by

Defendants' improper disclosure and use of UCC's Trade Secrets and Confidential Information,
violation of YanakTs IP Agreement, and violation of Ceramatec's Confidentiality Agreement.
Therefore, lomed is entitled to an immediate Ordear of this Court permanently enjoining Defendants
from engaging in such improper activities.
119.

The continuing nature of Defendants* improper activities will also necessitate a

multiplicity of suits to repair the injuries that lomed will sustain unless the injunction sought herein
is granted.
120.

Finally, lomed seeks to enforce the contractualrightto an injunction contained in the

IP Agreement and Confidentiality Agreement, including the right to recover its attorneys' fees and
costs.

26

EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breaches of Contract and Covenant of Good and Fair Dealing)
(Against Ceramatec)"
lomed realleges and incorporates herein all of the allegations set forth elsewhere in this
Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
121.

Pursuant to the terms of the Confidentiality Agreement, Ceramatec agreed not to use

or disclose lomed's Confidential Information.
122.

lomed is informed and believes and therefore alleges that Ceramatec breached the

Confidentiality Agreement by using lomed's Confidential Information in competition with lomed
and by assisting ActivaTek and other entities in competition with lomed.
123.

Moreover, under Utah law, there is implied in the Confidentiality Agreement with

lomed a duty of good faith and fair dealing?
124.

Under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Ceramatec must not

engage in activities that destroy or impair lomed's rights to receive the fruits of the Confidentiality
Agreement.
125.

It was the common purpose and justified expectations oflomed that Ceramatec would

not use or disclose lomed's Trade Secrets or other Confidential Information.
126.

lomed is informed and believes and therefore alleges that Ceramatec breached the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the Confidentiality Agreement with lomed in that,
among other things, Ceramatec disclosed and used lomed's Trade Secrets and Confidential
Information in a prohibited manner.
127.

lomed performed all of its obligations under the Confidentiality Agreement
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128.

As a direct and proximate result of Ceramatec's breaches of the Confidentiality

Agreement, and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied therein, Iomed has been damaged
and has suffered direct and consequential damages in amounts to be proven at trial.
NINTH CLAIM FOR RET JKF
(Conversion and Unjust Enrichment)
(All Defendants)
129.

Iomed realleges and incorporates herein all of the allegations set forth elsewhere m

this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
130.

As alleged herein, Defendants improperly converted to their own use Iomed's Trade

Secrets, Confidential Information, and corporate records. Such actions have unjustly enriched
Defendants.
131.

Therefore, Iomed is entitled to damages in an amount to be proven at trial and a return

of all property wrongfully taken by Defendants.
TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Unfair Competition and Unfair Trade Practices)
(All Defendants)
132.

Iomed realleges and incorporates herein all of the allegations set forth elsewhere in

this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
133.

Defendants actions, as alleged herein, in misappropriating Iomed's trade secrets and

confidential information, in violating the IP Agreement and the Confidentiality Agreement, and in
undertaking the other misconduct described herein, all forthe purpose ofharminglomed and thereby
unfairly competing with Iomed, constitute unfair competition and unfair trade practices under Utah
law.
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134.

lomed has been damaged by Defendants' unfair competitive conduct and is entitled

to damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
WHEREFORE, lomed prays for relief as follows:
1.

ON IOMED'S FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: for judgment against Defendants and

in favor of lomed holding Defendants jointly and severally liable for all of Iomed's direct damages,
consequential damages and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys' fees and costs, in amounts to
be proven at trial. lomed also is entitled to a preliminary and permanent injunction from this Court
immediately and permanently restraining Defendants from disclosing and/or using Iomed's Trade
Secrets including, without limitation, contacting actual orprospective clients of lomed or otherwise
using Iomed's Trade Secrets to engage in competition with lomed, and requiring Defendants to
return^ any-and ail- of lomed ?s customer lists, routings, market research, files, records, emedia,
documents, drawings, specifications, equipment, product, product samples, and similar items relating
to the business of lomed;
2.

ON IOMED'S SECOND CLAM FOR RELIEF: for judgment against Yanaki and

in favor of lomed holding Yanafa' liable for all of Iomed's direct damages, consequential damages
and exemplary damages in amounts to be proven at trial;
3.

ON IOMED'S THIRD CLAIM FORRELEEF: for judgment against Defendants and

in favor of lomed holding Defendants jointly and severally liable for all of Iomed's direct damages,
consequential damages and exemplary damages in amounts to be proven at trial;
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4.

ON IOMED'S FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: for judgment against Yanaki and

in favor of lomed holding Yanaki jointly and severally liable for all of Iomed's direct damages,
consequential damages and exemplary damages in amounts to be proven at trial;
5.

ON IOMED'S FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: for judgment against Defendants and

in favor of lomed holding Defendants jointly and severally liable for all of Iomed's direct damages,
consequential damages and exemplary damages in amounts to be proven at trial, as well as a
judgment that Defendants are jointly and severally liable to lomed for all of Iomed's direct,
consequential, and exemplary damages caused by the unlawful acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Moreover, lomed is entitled to an accounting of the benefits Defendants received from the unlawful
acts complained of herein;
6.

ON IOMED'S SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: for judgment against Yanaki and in

favor of lomed in the amount of Iomed's direct damages and consequential damages in amounts to
be proven at trial;
7.

ON IOMED'S SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: for a preliminary and permanent

injunction from this Court immediately and permanently restraining all Defendants from disclosing
and/or using lomed's Trade Secrets and/or other confidential and proprietary information including,
without limitation, contacting actual or prospective clients of lomed or otherwise using Iomed's
Trade Secrets and/or other confidential and proprietary information to engage in competition with
lomed and to prevent Yanaki from violating the covenant not to compete contained in the IP
Agreement;
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8.

ONIOMED'S EIGHTH CLMMFORRELBEF: forjudgment against Ceramatec and

m favor of lomed in the amount of Iomed's direct damages and consequential damages in amounts
to be proven at trial;
9.

ONIOMED'S NINTH CLAIM FORRELEEF: forjudgment against Defendants and

in favor of lomed in the amount that Defendants have been unjustly enriched, as well as an order
compellmg Defendants to return to lomed all of Iomed's property wrongfully taken and retained by
Defendants;
10.

ONIOMED'S TENTH CLAIM FORRF.T.TFF: forjudgment against Defendants and

in favor of lomed in the amount of Iomed's direct damages and consequential damages in amounts
to be proven at trial;
M.

ON ALL OF IOMED 'S CLAIMS FORRELEEF: for pre-judgment and post-judgment

interest at the maximum rates allowed by law;
12.

ON ALL OF IOMED'S CLAIMS FORRELIEF: for such costs and attorneys' fees

incurred herein, the exact amount of which will be proven at trial; and
13.

ON ALL OF IOMED'S CLAIMS FOR RELIEF: for such other and further relief as

is deemed proper by this Court under the circumstances.
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DATED this

I ^ d a y of April, 2002,
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

Clark Widdoups
Jonathan (X Hafen
Justin P. Matkin
Attorneys for lomed, Inc,
Plaintiffs Address:
2441 South 3850 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84120

1*567
9M20-1

32

~ll

EXHIBIT B

15

Clark Waddoups (3975)
Jonathan O. Hafen (6096)
Justin P. Matkin (8847)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IOMED, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

EX PARTE MOTION FOR ORDER
TO CONDUCT IMMEDIATE
DISCOVERY TO PREVENT THE
DESTRUCTION OR ALTERATION
OF EVIDENCE

JAMAL YANAKI, ACTCVATEK, L.L.C., a
Utah limited liability corporation,
CERAMATEC, INC., a Utah corporation,
ASHOKJOSHL and JOHN DOES I-X
j
Civil No. 020903031
Defendants.
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

Plaintiff Iomed, Inc. ("Iomed"), through counsel, moves this Court ex parte for an Order
to Conduct Immediate Discovery to Prevent the Destruction or Alteration of Evidence.
Defendant Jamal Yanaki ("Yanaki"). The grounds for the motion, as set forth in more detail in
the supporting memorandum, are as follows: lomed's former General Manager and employee of
nearly ten years, is in possession of critical evidence relating to the wrongdoing alleged in the

Complaint filed on or about April 9,2002. After YanakTs resignation from Iomed effective
January 17, 2002, Iomed learned by means of an inadvertently sent email, addressed to Yanaki as
"President" of ActivaTek, LC, that Yanaki planned to develop a product that was identical to a
confidential product under development at Iomed. Upon further investigation, Iomed discovered
emails for a critical two week period immediately prior to Yanaki's departure had been deleted
from lomed's back-up electronic storage system. Furthennore, Iomed discovered that several
confidential files containing important trade secrets are missing from Yanaki's Iomed office.
By this motion, Iomed seeks an order:
1.

Directing Defendant Jamal Yanaki to preserve and maintain without alteration all

documents, including electronic media, in his possession or control relating to Iomed or to any
proposed product that is similar in concept to products offered by Iomed or being developed by
Iomed;
2.

Directing the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, or other appropriate law

enforcement agency as specified by the Court, with the assistance of Iomed, to execute this Order
at the residence and home address of Defendant Jamal Yanaki, 385 North Wall Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84103, or such other address as Yanaki may indicate, and to do the following:
(a)

take custody of each of the hard drives in one or more computers, of other

electronic storage media, including specifically but not limited to ZIP drives and CD ROMS, and
of the electronic day planner (a Palm Pilot) in the possession, custody or control of Defendant
Jamal Yanaki (all of the above are herein after defined as the "Yanaki Electronic Files") at the
above address or addresses;
2

(b)

supervise the copying of information from the Yanaki Electronic Files by the

computer expert provided by Iomed and to return such copy to Yanaki;
(c) file the original Yanaki Electronic Files under seal with the Court until they can
be reviewed for privilege by Yanaki5s counsel and analyzed by computer experts for content and
evidence of deleted files; and
(d)

recover any Iomed confidential files in YanaJri's possession, custody or control,

including but not limited to files relating to Ceramatec and Aequitas, and to file those documents
under seal with the Court.
3,

Providing that Yanaki or his counsel shall be allowed to review the Yanaki

Electronic Files and the Iomed files upon reasonable notice to the Court and Iomed for the
purpose of determining if Yanaki has objections that such files contain privileged, confidential or
other information that would not be discoverable in this action. Except for good cause shown,
such review shall be completed no later than 20 days from the date the Yanaki Electronic Files
and the Iomed files are filed with the Court.
4*

Providing that once Yanaki has completed his review for privilege or other non-

discoverable information, Iomed, its counsel, and its experts shall upon reasonable notice to the
Court and Yanaki have access to the Yanaki Electronic Files and the Iomed files to evaluate
whether they provide evidence relevant to this matter and use in the prosecution of this matter.
Directing Defendant Jamal Yanaki to preserve and maintain without alteration all documents,
including electronic media, in his possession or control relating to Iomed or to any proposed
product that is similar in concept to products offered by Iomed or being developed by Iomed.
3

The purpose for seeking this Order is to prevent further alteration or destruction of
evidence. This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Motion for an Order to
Conduct Discover/ to Prevent the Destruction or Alteration of Evidence, the Affidavit of Laura
Millar, dated April 10,2002, the Affidavit of Robert J. Lollini, dated April 10, 2002, both of
which are filed herewith, and the Complaint on file in this matter.
DATED this/ft-day of April 2002.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

Clark Waddoups
Jonathan O. Hafen
Justin P. Matkin
Attorneys for Plaintiff

4

EXHIBIT C

if

Clark Waddoups (3975)
Jonathan O Hafen (6096)
Justin P. Matkm (8847)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City.UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IOMED, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
1

JAMAL YANAKI, ACTTVATEK, L L C , a
Utah limited liability corporation,
CERAMATEC, Inc., a Utah corporation,
ASHOK JOSHI, and JOHN DOES I-X
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
EX PARTE MOTION FOR AN
ORDER TO CONDUCT
IMMEDIATE DISCOVERY TO
PREVENT THE DESTRUCTION OR
ALTERATION OF EVIDENCE

Civil No. 020903031
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

Plaintiff lomed, Inc. ("Iomed") respectfully submits this Memorandum in Support of Ex Parte
Motion for an Order to Conduct Immediate Discovery to Prevent Destruction or Alteration of
Evidence from Defendant Jamal Yanaki ('Tanaki").
L

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
By this ex parte motion, lomed seeks expedited, but limited relief granting an order (a)

directing Yanaki to preserve and maintain, without alteration, all documents, including electronic
media, in his possession or under his control relating to lomed or products that are similar in concept to
products being developed by lomed; and (b) directing the Sheriffs Office or other appropriate law
enforcement agency, with the assistance of lomed: (1) to take custody of each of the hard drives in one
or more computers, of other electronic storage media, including specifically but not limited to ZIP
drives and CD ROMS, and of the electronic day planner (a Palm Pilot) in the possession or control of
Defendant Jamal Yanaki ( hereinafter the "Yanaki Electronic Files"), (2) to supervise the copying of
the Yanaki Electronic Files by the computer expert provided by lomed and tovreturn the copy to
Yanaki, (3) to file the original Yanaki Electronic Files under seal with the Court until they can be
reviewed for privilege by YanakPs counsel and analyzed by computer experts for content and evidence
of deleted files, and (4) to recover any lomed confidential files in Yanaki's possession, including but
not limited to files relating to Ceramatec and Aequitas, and to file those documents under seal with the
Court
lomed seeks to file the Yanaki Electronic Files and the lomed files under seal, without lomed
keeping a copy or otherwise reviewing the information, to allow Mr. Yanaki to obtain counsel to
review the files for information that may be privileged, confidential, or otherwise not discoverable and
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to make any appropriate objections. At the time the order is executed, lomed will cause copies of the
Yanaki Electronic Files to be made and given to Yanaki so that there will be no impact on his ability to
continue to conduct his affairs and have access to necessary information. This immediate and
expedited discovery order is necessary to preserve evidence and avoid destruction or alteration of
evidence critical to this case.
Yanaki was named the General Manager of lomed in February 2000 and had been an employee
for nearly ten years. As the General Manager, Yanaki was responsible for and supervised key areas of
lomed's business, including manufacturing, customer service, national sales, projects and new
products. One of the products for which Yanaki had responsibilities was a new, confidential product
which is presently under development (the "Confidential Product"). [Affidavit of Robert J. Lollini
dated April 10,2002 ("Lollini Aff") at ff 5, 8-9]. In that position, Yanaki had confidential
information about the Confidential Product's design, specifications, intended market, projected costs
and critical vendors and suppliers. Yanaki resigned his position at lomed, effective January 17,2002,
.to pursue other opportunities. Within weeks of his departure, lomed learned from an inadvertently sent
email that Yanaki is involved in a recently formed company, ActivaTek, LC, ("ActivaTek") that
purports to be developing a product that as described would be identical to lomed*s Confidential
Product [Lollini Aff. at fl 6-7]. Investigation has also confirmed that lorried files in YanakTs
possession relating to the Confidential Product disappeared" at the time of his departure. [Affidavit of
Laura Millar dated April 10,2002 ("Millar Aff.") at f| 16-19]. In addition, emails sent by Yanaki
have been inexplicably deleted from Iomed's computer backup system for a two-week period
immediately prior to his departure. [Lollini Aff at fl 11-13]. Finally, YanakPs practice was to
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maintain an electronic calendar of his appointments, contacts and other confidential information on his
computer and Palm Pilot lomed no longer has copies of any of Yanaki 5s calendar for the period just
prior to his resignation. The relief sought by this motion is necessary to preserve the evidence and
avoid questions about the further destruction or alteration of documents important to this case.
lomed is a publicly traded company that is engaged in the business of developing and selling
innovative products using the principle of iontophoresis to deliver drugs through a patient's skin.
Iomed's principal products are used to numb the skin of children prior to painful medical procedures
and by physical therapists to delivery anti-inflammatory drugs locally. The Confidential Product is
designed to expand markets and improve upon the present technology. The inadvertently sent email
identifies Yanaki as the president of ActrvaTekand involves a discussion of research and marketing of
a new product that appears to be identical in concept to the Confidential Product Yanaki is barred by
his confidentiality agreement with lomed and by Utah's Uniform Trade Secrets Act from using or
disclosing Iomed's confidential information. The evidence lomed seeks to preserve is important and
relevant to these issues. A true and correct copy of the Intellectual Property and Invention Agreement
("Confidentiality Agreement35) between lomed and Yanaki dated September 2, 1992 is attached hereto
as Ex. A.
EL

IOMED IS ENTITLED TO AN EX PARTE ORDER ALLOWING IT TO
IMMEDIATELY RECOVER ITS CONFIDENTIAL FILES AND TO HAVE FILED
WITH THE COURT YANAKTS HARD DRIVE AND PALM PILOT:
Taking possession of and preservation of Iomed's confidential files is essential to stop

continued damaging disclosure of lomed's trade secrets and other proprietary business information.
Further, the preservation of Yanaki's computer hard drives, storage media, and Palm Pilot is critical to
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document Yanaki *s actions just prior to his leaving Iomed and to determine whether he has possession
of confidential information on his computers, such as product design, vendors, critical contacts and
other confidential information. The information is relevant to assess the extent to which Yanaki is
illegally using Iomed's trade secrets and other proprietary and confidential information. The Uniform
Trade Secrets Act codified as Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-24-1 etseq. provides Utah Courts with broad
authority to protect the secrecy of alleged trade secrets byany reasonable means and issue orders
appropriate under the circumstances.
As a practical matter, only an ex parte order can protect crucial evidence of Yanaki *s
wrongdoing including his misappropriation and continued dissemination of Iomed's trade secrets, his
breach of fiduciary duty and loyalty, breach of the Confidentiality Agreement, and numerous wrongful
acts in establishing a competing business by use of Iomed's trade secrets and confidential information.
Yanaki is weir aware of his unlawful activities, and he has clear incentive to destroy the electronic and
physical evidence documenting his wrongdoing. Indeed, the fact that confidential files are missing and
that the email backup for a critical period has been deleted demonstrate-that there is a realistic and
immediate concern that mandates that the evidence be preserved.
The deleted emails were sent during a period from January 4 through 16,2002, the period
immediately prior to Yanaki's departure from Iomed and a period in which Yanaki was likely making
contacts and plans to use Iomed confidential information upon his departure. [Lollini Aff. at ^ 11].
The Iomed backup system contains emails that were received by Yanaki during the same period,
confirming that Yanaki sent emails that are now missing. [Lollini Aff. at % 11]. Moreover, the
missing Iomed files relate to contacts with Ceramatec and Aequitas, both suppliers of services to
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Iomed in connection with the development of its Confidential Product Those files contained
confidential and important information about the product and lomed's business relationships, [Millar
Aff. at ^f 17-19]. These files are the property of Iomed and contain important non-public information
including trade secrets and other confidential and proprietary information regarding business
relationships, product development, and business strategy. Further, the missing files contain critical
information about Yanaki *s business relationship and product development with Ceramatec and
Aequitas, two companies that were directly involved with Iomed in developing the Confidential
Product. As alleged in the Complaint, Ceramatec is owned and controlled by Defendant Ashok Joshi
("Joshi")- Joshi is also the managing partner of ActivaTek- the same company that Yanaki created to
develop and market a product that is identical to Iomed's Confidential Product. Aequitas is a
consulting company engaged by Iomed for several confidential business development and marketing
projects. Both the Ceramatec and Aequitas files contain crucial trade secrets that are the property of
Iomed. There may be other Iomed files in Yanaki's possession that were improperly removed by him
which also contain confidential and proprietary information. Iomed is entitled to their immediate
return.
YanakTs suspicious activities immediately prior to his departure also support the need for an ex
parte order. [Millar Aff. at ^ 8]. For instance, Iomed's electronic key system as well as eye witnesses
place Yanaki at Iomed on a Sunday shortly after he tendered his resignation. During this time Yanaki
was free to electronically copy and/or remove other trade secrets as well as information relating to
lomed's customer lists, business partners, vendors and suppliers. Finally,* YanakPs Palm Pilot is
believed to contain business contact numbers and information relating to Iomed's customers, vendors,
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suppliers, business partners, and other critical confidential information. The Palm Pilot likely also
contains evidence of Yanaki's meetings and communications in preparation for his competing business
while employed at loraed. Given the evidence of Yanaki's intent to develop a product identical to that
currently under research and development at lomed, access to Yanaki's laptop hard drive and his Palm
Pilot is critical to preserving Iomed's trade secrets and preventing further dissemination. Access to
Yanaki's electronic storage media may also allow recover}' of the deleted e-mails "backed-up" and/or
stored on one or more of Yanaki's personal computers.
A.

An Ex Parte Seizure Order Will Not Offend Due Process.

Should Yanaki be given any notice of information lomed seeks, he will have ample time to
destroy the evidence as to the nature and extent of his wrongdoing. While notice is generally
important, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that due process analysis must be flexible
enough to take into account "cases in which plaintiff could make a showing of immediate danger that
defendants will destroy or conceal disputed goods.5' Fuentes v. Shevin^ 407 U.S. 67,93 (1972). In
fact, notice may frustrate the ends ofjustice by making further prosecution of an action impossible.
See Mitchell v. WS. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). The Court observed in Mitchell that there are
valid reasons for dispensing with advance notice:
[TJhere is a real risk that the buyer, with possession and power over the goods, will
conceal or transfer the merchandise to the damage of the seller. This is one of the
considerations weighed in balance by the Louisiana law in permitting initial
sequestration of the property. The danger of destruction or alienation cannot be
guarded against if notice and a hearing before seizures are supplied. The notice itself
may furnish a warning to the debtor acting in bad faith.
Id. at 608-09.
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Unless lomed is immediately allowed access to Yanaki's laptop hard drive and Palm Pilot and
to demand the immediate return of lomed files, without forewarning to Yanaki, meaningful relief may
be impossible.
lomed does not seek to deprive Yanaki of any of his personal property or information that he
needs to conduct his affairs. Rather, loraed stcks an order that takes possession of the hard drives and
other storage media, such as ZIP drives, and the information stored on his Palm Pilot, while providing
Yanaki a copy of all live information. To the extent that Yanaki continues to have access to
confidential information of lomed, he will be on notice that he will be held accountable for any
improper use of such information. If Yanaki desires, he will be allowed to monitor and observe the
copying to assure that any information of which he is in need will be available to him. The copying
should take no more than three to four hours at most Further, Yanaki has no right to retain lomed's
Ceramatec and Aequitas files or any other lomed files containing important trade secret and
confidential information that Yanaki wrongfully removed from his office prior to his departure.
Moreover, the order sought by lomed would grant Yanaki every procedural protection — Yanaki has a
right to a prompt post-seizure hearing, and the right to seek damages or compensation for any wrongful
taking. Id at 605-06.
These procedures will protect the interests of Yanaki. Although Yanaki may be deprived of the
use of his computers for several hours, lomed's interests in preserving crucial evidence far outweigh
any concern about this short-term deprivation. Any confidential or privileged information will not be
disclosed, since the Yanaki Electronic Files will be filed under seal with the Court until Yanaki's
counsel has opportunity to review and make any appropriate objections. lomed does not seek to take

possession of the copies, to review the documents or otherwise use the evidence until such a review
has been completed and any objections resolved by the Court. Indeed, the order will avoid further
suspicion that evidence has been destroyed or altered upon notice of lomed 5s complaint. The
avoidance of such suspicion is as much the benefit of Yanaki as it is for lomed.
B.

The Seizure Order Will Not Violate Any Rights Under the Fourth Amendment

Execution on the order will involve taking possession of the Yanaki Electronic Files, making a
copy of those files to he retained by Yanaki and seizure of all lomed company files. All of the
electronic media and files that are taken will be placed immediately under seal in the file of this action,
lomed seeks the aid of the Sheriff's Office or other appropriate law enforcement authority to execute
the order and avoid conflict and resistence by Yanaki. The Order will require Yanaki to surrender
possession of his computers and Palm Pilot into the hands of a computer expert provided by lomed for
the time required to make a copy of the hard drives to be returned to him. lomed anticipates that the
copy can be made at the location of the computer expert or at Yanaki *s location if he so requests. Only
if Yanaki refuses to immediately turn over these items, will the Order require a search of Yanaki's..
personal residence. Because of possible Fourth Amendment issues, lomed seeks to limit the search
and seizure to the least intrusive activity possible, consistent with the preservation of evidence and the
protection of Iomed's trade secrets and confidential information. The proposed search is limited to
Yanaki's personal residence where he maintains a home office. Furthermore, the proposed order is
limited to taking possession of Iomed's company files that were illegally removed from its premises
without its knowledge or consent "The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that
searches and seizures be reasonable

" New Jersey v. LL. 0., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985). A search is

reasonable if it is both justified in its inception and conducted in a reasonable manner related in scope
to the circumstances by which the search was initially justified. See id at 341. In this case, the seizure
of lomed's files, and the potential search incidental to seizure, sought by Iomed are eminently
reasonable. The temporary and short term impoundment of Yanaki's computers and Palm Pilot is
justified by a clear showing that such an action will likely reveal and preserve crucial evidence.
Additionally, the impoundment is limited so as to allow Yanaki to remain at all times present while the
electronic copying is taking place and to allow him to retain a copy of all information on the Yanaki
Electronic Files. In addition, the seizure and temporary impoundment will be conducted in a
reasonable, limited manner.
Probable cause is the standard by which the initial decision to search or seize is tested against
the Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonableness. The United States Supreme Court has
defined "probable cause" to mean a reasonable basis for believing that the object of the search is
located in the particular place to be searched. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978);
reh*g denied, 439 U.S. 885 (1978). "Sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment." Hill v California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971).
In this case, there is clearly probable cause to justify a search of the business premises of
ActivaTek and Yanaki's personal residence where he maintains a home office. tcProbable cause" is
established by the fact that Yanaki has deleted e-mails, removed critical Iomed files, and established
ActivaTek, a competing business that intends to use lomed's valuable trade secret and business
relationships to develop a competing product.
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ID.

THE LAW RECOGNIZES THE RIGHT TO ACCELERATE DISCOVERY TO
PRESERVE EVIDENCE AT RISK OF DESTRUCTION.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 34 provides for the production and copying of designated

documents and also for the "entry upon designated land or property in the possession or control of the
party upon whom the request is served for the purpose of... photographing . . . the property

"

The authority to grant the relief requested by this motion is provided by these rules. Moreover,
pursuant to statute and the Utah Constitution, the Court has the power to compel compliance with its
orders and <cto control its process and orders to conform to law and justice." Utah Code Ann. §78-7-5
and Utah Constitution Art. VIII, § 5. The courts have generally recognized that the Court may exercise
its authority to preserve evidence. Expedited discovery should be granted when some unusual
circumstances or conditions exist that would likely prejudice the party if he were required to wait the
normal time." Fimab-Finaraiaria Mcglificio v. Kitchen, 548 F. Supp 248, 250 (S.D. Fla. 1982); see
also U. R. Civ. Pro. 30(a) and (b)(3) (permitting accelerated depositions on showing of good cause);
U. R. Civ. Pro. 33(a) and U. R. Civ. Pro. 34(b) (same with respect to interrogatories and document
requests). Iomed submits that expedited discovery is warranted in this case.
DATED this/£?— day of April, 2002.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

lark Wadddups
Jonathan O. Hafen
Justin P. Matkin
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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EXHIBIT A

% >

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INVENTION
AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT is executed effective
$*p^
Z
, 19 f 2 and between the undersigned employee ("Employee"), and K J M E D , Inc. ("IOMED").

. by

lOMED's activities and business utilize trade secrets, proprietary and confidential
information, including but not limited to business plans, projections and financial information, and
other intellectual property (the "Intellectual Property"), to which the Employee will have access.
In consideration of Employee's continued or future employment, the Employee and IOMED
mutually agree to the following:
1.
Non Disclosure. During the term of employment, and at all times thereafter, the
Employee will not, except in promoting the business of IOMED and performing the duties of their
employment, directly or indirectly, use or disclose any of lOMED's Intellectual Property without
lOMED's written consent As used in this Agreement, Intellectual Property includes information
disclosed to or known by the Employee as a consequence of his employment by IOMED which
is not generally known to the public or in the industry in which IOMED is, or may become
engaged, concerning lOMED's products, processes, formulas, designs, plans, projections,
financial position, business plans, customers list and services, including, but not limited to,
information relating to research, development, inventions, manufacturing, purchasing, engineering
and marketing.
Upon termination of employment, Employee will return to IOMED all documents,
records, data sheets, computer disks, notebooks and other repositories of Intellectual Property,
including copies thereof, whether prepared by him/her or others.
2.
Inventions. The Employee hereby agrees to keep IOMED informed of any and all
inventions, designs, formulas, works of authorship, compositions of matter and discoveries (the
"Inventions") made, conceived of or developed by the Employee, alone or with others, which
result from any work the Employee may do during and for six (6) months following termination of
employment with IOMED, and which may or may not relate to lOMED's activities or to those Of
affiliated companies. Ail such Inventions shaH be submitted on lOMED's standard Invention
Disclosure form for review by lOMED's Patent Committee. It shall be lOMED's policy to release
to the Employee any such Inventions determined by the Patent Committee not to be conceived
of or developed on IOMED time, using IOMED resources, or related to lOMED's activities. The
Inventions determined by the Patent Committee to be conceived of or developed on IOMED time,
using IOMED resources, or related to lOMED's activities shall be and shall remain the property of
IOMED or its nominees, whether patented, copyrighted or not, and the Employee shall, without
charge to IOMED, assign (and does hereby agree to assign) to IOMED alt right, title and interest
in and to the Inventions and copyrights. Upon request, the Employee will immediately execute,
acknowledge, and deliver any instruments confirming lOMED's complete ownership of the
Inventions,
The Employee will keep and maintain adequate and current written records of all the
Inventions, in the form of notes, sketches, drawings and reports relating thereto, which records
shall be and remain the property of, and shall not be removed from the premises of IOMED
without permission, and shall be made available at all times to IOMED,
3.

Agreement Not to Compete.

a)
During his or her employment with IOMED, the Employee will not participate
directly or indirectly, as an owner, agent or employee of a business engaged in activities that are
in direct competition with the activities of IOMED.
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b) After termination of employment with IOMED, the Employee may associate
with a competitive business and make use of his/her general knowledge and experience, but the
Employee shall not use any Intellectual Property nor approach current employees of IOMED
concerning their rendition of services for a competitive business.
The parties hereto acknowledge that this Agreement not to compete is reasonable
and necessary to protect the Intellectual Property and goodwill of IOMED.
4.
Representations and Warranties of the Employee.
represents and warrants to IOMED and specifically agrees that:

The Employee hereby

(a) Neither the execution of this Agreement by the Employee nor the performance
by the Employee of his duties of employment constitute a breach of any covenant not to
compete, confidentiality agreement or any other binding contract to which the Employee may be
subject
(b) IOMED shall have the right to disclose the obligations imposed upon the
Employee by this Agreement to future or prospective employers and/or business associates of
the Employee.
(c) The representations, warranties and agreements of the Employee, as set forth
herein, shall survive the execution of this Agreement
5.
Remedies. In the event of a breach or threatened breach of this Agreement, IOMED
shall be entitled to an injunction restraining the Employee from disclosing any Intellectual Property
and/or from rendering any services to a competitive business and/or from using any Invention in a
way which is inconsistent with lOMED's ownership thereof. IOMED may pursue any other
remedies available for such breach or threatened breach, including the recovery of damages from
the Employee.
6.
Binding Effect This Agreement shall be binding upon the parties hereto and upon
their respective executors, administrators, legal representatives, successors and assigns.
7.
Applicable Law. This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Utah, without giving effect to the choice of law rules thereof. If any provision of this Agreement is
declared void, the remaining provision shall remain in full force and effect
8.
Confidential Relationship. Both parties acknowledge that the employment
arrangement creates a confidential and fiduciary relationship between the Employee and IOMED.
9
Final Agreement This Agreement supersedes all previous agreements, written or
oral, relating to the subject matter hereof and shall not be changed orally. This Agreement will not
be affected by any present or future policy statertient Issued by IOMED.
10. Attorney's Fees. If either party engages an attorney in connection with a breach or
threatened breach of this Agreement, or to enforce its terms, the prevailing party in the
controversy shall be entitled to recover his/her or its reasonable attorney's fees.
In witness whereof, the parties have executed this Agreement effective on the date first
• set forth above.
IOMED, Inc.

I\ \

Employee.

By \ g i n W ^ T y W ^
Its.

v yv^ f j j j

v

y/W'^>^Y^^

V^A^y^, ^ j ^ t M a j
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EXHIBIT D

93

Clark Waddoups (3975)
Jonathan O. Hafen (6096)
Justin P. Matkrn (8847)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IOMED, INC., a Utah corporation,

AFFIDAVIT OF LAURA MILLAR

PlaintUff,
vs.
JAMAL YANAKI, ACTIVATE^ L.L.C., a
Utah limited liability corporation,
CERAMATEC, Inc., a Utah corporation,
ASHOK JOSHI, and JOHN DOES I-X

Civil No. 020903031
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

Defendants

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Laura Millar, having been duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am in excess of 21 years of age, have personal knowledge of all matters stated

herein, and am in all respects competent to make this Affidavit.

2.

I am employed as an executive assistant at Iomed, Inc. ('Iomed"), which position

I have held since May 2000.
3.

From the start of my employment with Iomed until his departure in January 2002,

I was assigned to work for Jamal Yanaki ("Yanaki"), in addition to several other Iomed
executives.
4.

Prior to Mr. Yanaki's departure in January 2002,1 assisted him in numerous

secretarial functions including, collecting and distributing his mail, delivering and sending faxes,
typing letters and short documents, assisting in preparation of financial documents, delivering
phone messages, and filing.
5.

While Mr. Yanaki kept his own calendar and checked his own email during the

period in question, I had proxy rights that allowed me to access both his calendar and email
correspondence he received on his Iomed email account. This access was part of my
responsibilities to coordinate schedules and follow up on assignments for Mr. Yanaki.
6.

Mr. Yanaki maintained his calendar on a Palm Pilot operating device, which was

"synced" with both his desktop computer in this Iomed office as well as his laptop computer he
used for Iomed business while traveling or while working at home.
7.

Beginning on or about February 2001, when documents were sent to Mr. Yanaki

or when he prepared documents during the course of his work, I would receive these documents
and file them in the files he maintained in his office. I performed all of Mr. Yanaki's filing, and
therefore, have personal knowledge of many files Mr. Yanaki maintained in the course of his
employment at Iomed.
2

8.

Prior to Mr. Yanaki5s departure, he became increasing withdrawn. He began to

work with his door closed and whenever he received a phone call he would talk with the door
closed.
9.

After Mr. Yanaki announced his departure, he informed me that he was going to

start his own company. I asked him what kind of business he was going to start, and he told me
a "manufacturing" business.
10.

Shortly after Mr. Yanaki left Iomed, I was checking email messages addressed to

Mr. Yanaki that had arrived after his departure. I opened one email dated February 1, 2002, that
was addressed to Mr. Yanaki as president of ActivaTek LC ("ActivaTek"), Salt Lake City, UT
(the "ActivaTek Email").
11.

The ActivaTek Email was sentfromAequitas Consulting Group ("Aequitas"), a

company "with whom I knew Iomed had business relationships.
12.

After briefly reviewing the content of the ActivaTek Email, it was apparent to me

that ActivaTek was being formed to develop a product very similar to those produced or under
development by Iomed.
13.

When I began my employment with Iomed, I was required to sign a

confidentiality agreement that required me not to disclose any of Iomed's trade secrets or other
<x>nfidential information,
14.

I believed that Mr. Yanaki was under the same confidentiality obligations as I

was, and therefore, I felt that the ActivaTek email evidenced Mr. Yanaki may be breaching his
obligations of non-disclosure to Iomed.

15.

I immediately went to Robert Lollini, Chief Operating Officer of Iomed, with the

ActivaTek Email and informed him that I thought it was important that he review the email as
soon as possible.
16.

In addition, after Mr. Yanakfs departure I was asked to review Mr. Yanaki's files

and catalog all of the files in his office.
17.

After completing the review of Mr. Yanaki's files, I discovered that at least two

files were missing.
18.

In performing my filing responsibilities for Mr. Yahaki, I have a specific

recollection that he maintained an "Aequitas" file. The Aequitas file, however, is missing from
Mr. Yanaki's office.
19.

Additionally, I remember seeing a file labeled "Ceramatec" that had a handwritten

label with a black magic marker. My catalog of Mr. Yanaki's files revealed that there is
currently no Ceramatec file in Mr. Yanaki's office.
f Jfc
EXECUTED this J2_ day of April 2002,

Laura Millar

Subscribed and sworn to before me this JO day of April, 2002

3^^-^NOTARY PUBLIC />
Residing at: S n ^ dok^-^

Cjfc-*

My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
MARY A. CROWTHER
3385W. 1820 So.
Sl_O.UT 84094
COMMISSION EXPIRES
MARCH 11,2003
STATE OF UTAH

" ~ Y ^ W A ^ - \ \ , X003
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EXHIBIT E

qq

Clark Waddoups (3975)
Jonathan O. Hafen (6096)
Justin P. Matkin (8847)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)532-7840
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IOMED, INC., a Utah corporation,
!

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT J.
LOLLINI

Plaintiff;
vs.
JAMAL YANAKI, ACTIVATED LX.C, a
Utah limited liability corporation,
CERAMATEC, Inc., a Utah corporation,
ASHOK JOSHI, and JOHN DOES I-X

Civil No. 020903031
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Robert J. LoUini, having been duly swom upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am in excess of 21 years of age, have personal knowledge of all matters stated

herein, and am in all respects competent to make this Affidavit

2.

I am the Chief Operating Officer of lomed, Inc. ("lomed"), which position I have

held since November 5,2001, and the Chief Financial Officer at lomed, which position I have
held since January 3,1993.
3.

Jamal Yanaki ("Mr. Yanaki") began his employment with lomed on or about

September 1,1992. When Mr. Yanaki tendered his resignation and terminated his employment
with lomed in January 2002, he was the Vice President and General Manager of Clinical
Systems. Mr. Yanaki had held the position of General Manager since February 2000.
4.

Mr. Yanaki's responsibilities at lomed included supervision and responsibility for

the following departments and/or directors of the commercial business operations at lomed: (1)
Manufacturing, Quality Control, Design and Engineering; (2) Customer Relations, Marketing
and National Sales; (3) Product Management and Product Development; (4) Regulatory Affairs;
and (5) Reimbursement.
5.

Mr. YanakTs position required him to be intimately familiar with many if not all

of Iomed's most sensitive and confidential business information. I have attended numerous
meetings at which Mr. Yanaki was present and during which confidential and proprietary
information was discussed.
6.

After Mr. YanakTs termination of employment, Laura Millar ("Ms. Millar"), one

of Iomed's executive assistants, reported to me that she had discovered an email on or about
February 4,2002 that had arrived at Mr. Yanakfs lomed email address. The email was
apparently sent to lomed by mistake, as it was addressed to Jamal Yanaki, President of

2

ActivaTek, LC, Salt Lake City, Utah. Ms. Millar has submitted an affidavit in support of this
motion explaining what she observed
7.

I have reviewed the email recovered by Ms. Millar and, based upon my

knowledge of the lomed's new product developments, the product described in that email is
essentially the same as a new confidential product lomed is developing (the "Confidential
Product") The email was sent from Aequitas Consulting Group - a company engaged by lomed
to provide sensitive consulting and business development services.
8.

The email described the Confidential Product under development and purported to

be a "Preliminary Market Review and Preliminary Reimbursement Analysis/' lomed has
invested significant resources in developing the Confidential Product. Mr. Yanaki had direct
knowledge of and involvement in the design, specifications, product market, vendors, suppliers
and other confidential information related to the Confidential Product
9.

The content of this email provided evidence that Mr. Yanaki was in fact

disclosing Iomed's confidential information and was involved with ActivaTek, a business
recently formed apparently to directly compete with lomed and develop a product nearly
identical to Iomed's Confidential Product
10.

After disco vary of this email, I requested that lomed employees investigate

whether there was other evidence of Mr. Yanaki's association with ActivaTek or the businesses
or persons potentially linked to ActivaTek. This investigation was conducted by Mary Crowther,
Brian Mower, and Ms. Millar, all lomed employees.

3

11.

During this investigation, Brian Mower ("Mr. Mower"), discovered that all of the

emails had been deleted from the "out box" on Mr. Yanaki's office computer for a critical twoweek from January 4,2002 to January 16, 2002 (the "Missing Emails"). The existence of certain
Missing Emails during that time period was evidenced by reference to or attachments to other
emails found in Mr. Yanaki's "in box" on his office computer. In addition, Mr. Mower
discovered numerous emails dated prior to January 4, 2002 which contained confidential
information of lomed and which had been forwarded from Mr. Yanaki's office computer to his
personal email account at jyanaki@vahoo.com.
12.

Despite attempts to retrieve and/or restore the Missing Emails, lomed has been

unable to do so.
13.

The Missing Emails were sent during a period in January, shortly before Mr.

Yanaki's departure from lomed. Based on the email intercepted by Ms. Millar, this period would
have been a period during which he likely would have been engaged in discussions and contacts
leading to the use of Iomed's confidential information.
EXECUTED this J_0_ day of April 2002.

Robert J. LojMi

4

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

IV day of April, 2002.

NOTARY
PUBLIC
INU1AKY rUtfL,K.
V| *
Residing at: " " ^ o Q j - c s l o J p c J
My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
MARYA.CROWTHER
3385 W. 1820 So.
S X . O . U T 84094
COMMISSION EXPIRES
MARCH 11, 2003
STATE OF UTAH
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PARR WADDODPS LAW OFFICE

Si 002

TOKESP
Clark Waddoups (3975)
Jonathan O. Hafen (6096)
Justin P. Mafkin (8847)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)532-7840
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER ALLOWING IMMEDIATE
DISCOVERY TO PREVENT THE
DESTRUCTION OR ALTERATION
OF EVIDENCE

IOMED, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff;
|
vs.
JAMAL YANAKL ACTTVATEK, LX.C, a
Utah Hmited liability corporation,
CERAMATEC, INC, a Utah corporation,
ASHOK JOSHL and JOHN DOES I-X

Civil No. 020903031
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

Defendants.
_

i n

-

•

i •

The ex parte motion of Plaintiff lomed, Inc. (*1omed")3 for an Order to Conduct
Immediate Discovery to Prevent the Destruction or Alteration of Evideacc came on for bearing
on April

,2002 at tie hour of

Waddoups and Jona&an O. Hafen.

, Iomed was represented by its counsel, Claik

04/12/02

10:13 FAX 801 532 7753

PARR WADDOUPS LAT? OFFICE

@003

NOW THEREFORE, the Court, having been advised in the matter, and based upon the
memorandum and affidavits filed in support of the motion andforgood cause shown, hereby
finds and orders as follows:
1.

Because of the limited relief sought by this motion and the possibility that

evidence may be destroyed or altered upon notice of this action, it is appropriate for the Court to
hear and issue this order ex parte.
2.

Defendant Jamal Yanald is hereby directed to preserve and maintain without

alteration all documents, including electronic media, in his possession or control relating to
Iomed or to any proposed product that is similar in concept to products offered by Iomed or
being developed by Iomed;
3.

The Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, or other appropriate law enforcement

agency as specified by the Court, is directed, with the assistance of Iomed, to execute this Order
at the residence and home address of Defendant Jamal Yanald, 385 North Wall Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84103, or such other address as Yanaki may indicate, and to do the following;
(a)

take custody of each of the hard drives in one or more computers, of other

electromc storage media, including specifically but not limited to ZIP drives and CD ROMS, and
of the electromc day planner (a Palm Pilot) in fee possession, custody or control ofDefendant
Jamal Yanaki (all of the above are herein after defined as the '"Yanaki Electronic Files") at the
above address or addresses;

2
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(b)

PARR, WADDOUPS UW OFFICE

a 004

supervise fee copying of informationfromfeeYanaki Electronic Files by the

computer expert provided by Iomed and to return such copy to Yanaki;
(c) file fee original Yanaki Electronic Files under seal with fee Court until they can
be reviewed for privilege by Yanaki's counsel and analyzed by computer experts for content and
evidence of deleted files; and
(d)

recover any Iomed confidential files in Yanaki's possession, custody or control,

including but not limited to files relatiDg to Ceramatcc and Aequitas, and to file feose documents
under seal wife fee Court
4.

Yanaki or his counsel shall be allowed to review fee Yanaki Electronic Files and

fee Iomed files upon reasonable notice to the Court and Iomedfin:feepurpose of determining if
Yanaki has objections feat such files contain privileged, confidential or other information that
would not be discoverable to this action. Except for good cause shown, such review shall be
completed no later than 20 days from fee date fee Yanaki Electronic Files and fee Iomed files are
filed wife fee Court
5,

Once Yanaki has completed his review for privilege or other non-discoverable

information, Iomed, its counsel, and its experts shall upon reasonable notice to fee Court and
Yanaki have access to the Yanaki Electronic Files andfeeIomed files to evaluate whether they
provide evidence relevant to this matter and use in fee prosecution of this matter.

vtfC
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Hie puipose of the Order is to prevent farther potential for alteration or destruction of
evidence.
DATED this ' ° ^ a y of April 2002.

\ 1*^.0

4A*^

BYjFfffiCOURT:

Honorable Tyrone E
Distil Court Judge

C~'iCT ^L DCCV^rXT ON »"
t >7i{\zr COURT. SALT LAKE CO'ul
C -UTAH.
, I

DATE
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EXHIBIT G

wo

Clark Waddoups (3975)
Jonathan 0. Hafen (6096)
Justin P. Matkin (8847)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)532-7840
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IOMED, INC., a Utah corporation,

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER IN AID
OF ENFORCEMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMAL YANAKI, ACTIVATEK, L.L.C., a
Utah limited liability corporation,
,
CERAMATEC, Inc., a Utah corporation,
ASHOK JOSHI, and JOHN DOES I-X

Civil No. 020903031
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

Defendants.

In furtherance and enforcement of the Order Allowing Immediate Discovery to Prevent
the Destruction or Alteration of Evidence, dated April 12,2002 (the "Order"), the Salt Lake
County Sheriffs Office is hereby directed and authorized to enter the residence and home
address of Defendant Jamal Yanaki, 385 North Wall Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 and use
reasonable force, if necessary and appropriate under the circumstances, to execute the Order,

including entering through unlocked doors, conducting a search of the premises, and detaining
any person who resists enforcement of the Order.
DATED this

dayofApnl^^-,

Vtif

r
STATE OF UTAH
County o* Salt Lake

j s$

Uah. Sait lake County, Salt
certify that the annexed am
copy of an ongmat documi
ciwk.
Witness
day of

J^fift*.

y^^uMTV<^fc-

Tab J

DAVID W. SCOFIELD - 4140
RONALD

F. PRICE - 5535

PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE

A Professional Corporation
340 Broadway Centre
111 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)322-2002
Facsimile: (801) 322-2003
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SUSAN L MOSS and JAMAL S. YANAKI,
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
-vsCase No. 050913371
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE &
LOVELESS, a Utah professional
corporation; CLARK WADDOUPS;
JONATHAN O. HAFEN; JUSTIN P. MATKIN;
and JOHN DOES I THROUGH XX,

g

Honorable Leslie A. Lewis

H

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Defendants.
Plaintiffs, for their claims against defendantst allege as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Susan I. Moss ("Moss") is an individual residing in Salt Lake

County, State of Utah, whose home is at 385 North Wall Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
(the "Home").
2.

Plaintiff Jamal S. Yanaki ("YanakO, who resides at the Home, is a former

employee of lomed, Inc. ("lomed"), at which his last day of employment was January
17,2002.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

3.

This case arises out of a successful conspiracy to misuse a legal process

and to cause an illegal search of the Home and seizure of property therein by the Salt
Lake County Sheriffs Office (the "Police"), named defendant Justin P. Matkin ("Matkin")
and certain unnamed co-conspirators. The Police, together with Matkin, illegally
entered the Home and illegally conducted a search of the Home and seizure of property
without a valid search warrant, with no exception to the requirement of a valid search
warrant and in violation of the Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States
of America (the "Illegal Search and Seizure"). The Illegal Search and Seizure, being
illegal, constituted an actionable invasion of privacy, conversion, trespass to land and
chattels and extreme and outrageous conduct.
4.

lomed conspired with the named defendants to cause the misuse of a

legal process and the Illegal Search and Seizure by the Police, pursuant to which the
Police and the co-conspirators, some of whom are the named defendants herein,
committed the torts alleged herein. The details are set forth below.
5.

On April 9,2002, a complaint was filed in the Third District Court, Salt Lake

County, State of Utah in a case captioned lomed, Inc. v. Jamal Yanaki, Activatek, L.L.C.,
Ceramatec, Inc., Ashok Joshi and John Does I-X. The complaint was assigned case
number 020903031 and was assigned to the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, Third District
Court Judge. Co-conspirator Robert L. Lollini, who was then the Chief Operating Officer
of lomed, gave the instructions to defendants to cause the complaint to be filed.
6.

The following day, on April 10,2002, lomed and its lawyers, defendants

Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, P.C. ("Law Firm"), Clark Waddoups

2

("Waddoups"), Jonathan O. Hafen ("Hafen") and Matkin, in furtherance of the conspiracy,
caused to be filed an Ex Parte Motion for Order to Conduct Immediate Discovery to
Prevent the Destruction or Alteration of Evidence (the "Search Motion"). At the time they
caused such Search Motion to be filed, defendants knew that the relief they sought was
illegal under both the Constitutions of the State of Utah and of the United States of
America.
7.

Although the co-conspirators purported by the Search Motion to seek a

legal process for ostensibly lawful purposes, i.e., to protect trade secrets and conduct
discovery, they in fact sought a legal process for illegal purposes and with ulterior
motivations.
8.

Yanaki had left lomed's employment approximately three months before the

Search Motion was filed. Co-conspirator lomed was, during the material time period
surrounding the filing of the Search Motion, seeking to get its employees to sign new
forms of non-compete agreements. lomed desired to misuse a legal process to cause an
illegal raid on the Home as a form of message to its employees that they would be better
off signing new agreements than leaving and risking their own homes being raided. The
ulterior motive of misusing the legal process to conduct the Illegal Search and Seizure of
the Home was thus designed to put an exclamation point on the dangers to lomed
employees of leaving lomed rather than signing the new form of agreements.
9.

Defendants agreed to help their client, lomed, place such exclamation point

by seeking legal process purporting to authorize a search and seizure by the police, and
by using the diversionary approach to the state judge of ostensibly protecting trade
secrets and conducting discovery in civil litigation, rather than what they were really
doing, namely, seeking to have the Police conduct an illegal raid.
3

10.

However, as defendants knew,

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-23-204(2)(a)

expressly limits the class of applicants for a search warrant to a "peace officer o r . . .
prosecuting attorney." The defendants knew they did not fit into either such class.
11.

In addition, defendants knew that private search warrants have long been

outlawed by the states. See, e.g., Womack v. State, 281 Ala. 499, 503,205 So.2d 579,
582 (1967) ("Search warrants are criminal processes, issued under the police power of
the state, to aid in the detection or suppression of crime, and have no relation to civil
process or trials.");Upp/naA7 v. People, 175 III. 101,111, 51 N.E. 872, 874-75 (1898) (The
premises of a citizen cannot be intruded upon under a search warrant, for any such
private purpose."); State v. Deny, 171 Ind. 18, 24, 85 N.E. 765, 768 (1908) ("Neither at
common law, nor under the statute, is such process [search warrants] available to
individuals in the course of civil proceedings, nor for the maintenance of any mere private
right. It may only be invoked in the furtherance of public prosecutions."); Robinson v.
Richardson, 79 Mass. 454,456 (1859) ("Search warrants were never recognized by the
common law as processes which might be availed of by individuals in the course of civil
proceedings, or for the maintenance of any mere private right; but their use was confined
to cases of public prosecutions, instituted and pursued for the suppression of crime or the
detection and punishment of criminals."); State ex rel. King v. District Court, 70 Mont.
191,197, 224 P. 862, 864 (1924) ("The power to make searches and seizures is
absolutely necessary to the public welfare. But the process may be invoked only in
furtherance of public prosecutions."); Luciano v. Marshall, 95 Nev. 276,278, 593 P.2d
751,752 (1979) (*[T]he legitimate use of the search warrant is restricted to public
prosecutions, and . . . in no event may such proceeding be invoked for the protection of
any mere privateright.");Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36.49,110 P.2d 355,361 (1941)
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("Search warrants were never recognized by the common law as processes which might
be availed of by individuals in the course of civil proceedings or for the maintenance of
any mere private right; but their use was confined to cases of public prosecutions,
instituted and pursued for the suppression of crime or the detection and punishment of
criminals." quoting People v. Kempner, 208 N.Y. 16,101 N.E. 794, 797 (1913)).
12.

Defendants knew at the time they agreed to seek such legal process that it

would constitute a violation of, at the least,

UTAH CONST, ART.

I, § 14,23-24,

ART.

VI, §

26, according to the holding of Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36,49,110 P.2d 355, 361
(1941), as well as U.S.

CONST, AMEND.

IV, V, XIV, to use such legal process to conduct a

search and seizure at a private home.
13.

The legal process obtained, the Search Order, was unlawful for any such

purpose.
14.

At approximately 8:00 a.m. on Monday morning, April 15,2002, Matkin

and Salt Lake County Sheriffs Deputy, Heinz Kopp ("Kopp"), rang the doorbell of the
Home three separate times, awakening Moss. Kopp and the Police agreed to join the
conspiracy, by misusing the legal process to commit the Illegal Search and Seizure,
and to be paid by the conspirators for doing so, no later than this time.
15.

Yanaki was then in the state of Colorado.

16.

Moss, still in her pajamas, looked through the small window in the front

door and saw a police officer, whom she did not then know was Kopp, with another
man, whom she did not then know was Matkin. Only because of the Police presence,
Moss answered the door to her Home. Kopp handed Moss a summons, complaint and
copy of the legal process in the form of the Search Order.
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17.

After reading portions of the Search Order and seeing that is was directed

to Yanaki, Moss advised Matkin and Kopp that Yanaki was not Home and she would
not allow them in her Home without Yanaki being present.
18.

Matkin then said "We can come in now, or we can come in later." Kopp,

to support Matkin's statement and to intimidate Moss, said: "We can kick in this door,"
and Matkin advised Moss that he was going to get a further legal process, impliedly
allowing them to do so.
19.

Matkin then left while Kopp remained, surveying the Home and thereby

intimidating Moss.
20.

On information and belief, Matkin then, in furtherance of Kopp's threat to

kick down the door to gain entrance to Moss and Yanaki's Home, made a second, ex
parte, approach to Judge Medley the morning of April 15, 2002, requesting a further
legal process in the form of a writ of assistance for the Search Order. Neither the state
court docket nor state court file reflect what Judge Medley was told by Matkin when he
sought that writ.
21.

Nevertheless, Matkin obtained the second legal process he sought on

lomed's behalf, and procured Judge Medle/s signature on a writ of assistance,
captioned: "Supplemental Order in Aid of Enforcement" (hereinafter "Writ of
Assistance") and dated and entered by the Court on April 15, 2002. The Writ of
Assistance, no different than the Search Order, constituted a legal process that, under
both the Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States of America, could not
be lawfully used to conduct a search and seizure.
22.

The Writ of Assistance expressly directed the Salt Lake County Sheriffs
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Office first, "to enter the residence and home address of Defendant Jamal Yanaki, 385
North Watl Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103" and, then, "use reasonable force, if
necessary and appropriate under the circumstances, to execute the Order [Allowing
Immediate Discovery to Prevent the Destruction or Alteration of Evidence], including
entering through unlocked doors, conducting a search of the premises, and detaining
any person who resists enforcement of the Order."
23.

As was the case with the Search Order, the Writ of Assistance was

obtained not at the request of any law enforcement agency or other governmental
agency, but instead solely at the request of a private party in civil litigation.
24.

The Writ of Assistance was not obtained for the benefit or in furtherance

of the desires of law enforcement pertaining to any criminal action or investigation or of
any governmental agency to investigate civil violations of any governmental regulatory
scheme or to pursue any civil forfeiture action of any governmental agency or otherwise
to further any interest of any governmental agency of any kind or nature, but solely and
strictly for the benefit of an individual citizen.
25.

Because there is no record currently available to plaintiff showing the

grounds presented to Judge Medley to obtain the Writ of Assistance, plaintiff infers the
same bases were proffered as for the Search Order, which do not incorporate any
prescribed statutory or administrative standards, that, themselves, are reasonable in
their careful balancing of governmental and private interests before an order may issue
thereunder authorizing a search of a person's home, by use of force, seizure of their
property, or arrest of the person of anyone interfering with the foregoing activities.
26.

Nor did any proffered legal basis for the Writ of Assistance mandate a
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right to a prior hearing before any search, contain any standards for determining
reasonableness or even require, as a prerequisite to the relief sought, that a prior
request for materials be made and refused, before invading a private citizen's home or
arresting any citizen. Nor did any proffered legal basis for the Writ of Assistance
provide any prior opportunity to be heard before a seizure or even any post-seizure right
to hearing.
27.

Matkin returned to Moss' Home with the Writ of Assistance, and Matkin,

Kopp and two other co-conspirators, all, in a deliberate show of force, came to the door
of Moss' Home while the illegal Writ of Assistance was served on Moss.
28.

Moss, under the illegal threat of having the door to her Home kicked in

and under the illegal threat of being "detained" if she interfered with the illegal search
and seizure, had no voluntary alternative and stepped aside as Matkin, Kopp and two of
the other co-conspirators illegally entered her Home and commenced the Illegal Search
and Seizure.
29.

Shortly thereafter, another Salt Lake County Sheriffs Deputy, Sergeant

Kendra L Herlin, also arrived to reinforce the illegal threat to "detain" Moss if she
attempted to stop the Illegal Search and Seizure.
30.

Kopp, Matkin and the two other co-conspirators who illegally entered the

Home without lawful authority, justification or consent, then illegally searched it and
illegally seized property belonging to Moss, Yanaki and third parties; all the while, Kopp
and the defendants knew that the legal process obtained could not be used lawfully to
threaten to kick in the door to the Home, threaten to "detain" anyone who interfered with
such illegal act, search the Home or seize property therein.
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31.

The property of Yanaki and Moss was then taken, without the consent of

either, to, on information and belief, the place of business of one of the co-conspirators.
32.

The object of the conspiracy was to misuse the legal processes obtained so

as to conduct an illegal search and seizure. That object was successfully carried out on
April 15, 2002, when the Police, Matkin and other coconspirators used the legal process
to illegally entered into the Home, through the illegal threat of force and detention,
conducted an illegal search and illegally seized property.
33.

Each of the co-conspirators, including without limitation the defendants and

the police, agreed to commit, and did commit, one or more acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy, in order to allow the conspiracy to obtain its object successfully.
34.

On April 14, 2003, Moss and Yanaki each filed suit against defendants and

certain other private co-conspirators in the United States District Court for the District of
Utah, seeking relief under the federal civilrightslaws and under state law. That action
was dismissed, as to the federal claims, the district court finding that the actions of the
private defendants did not amount to "state action" as is required to sustain a federal civil
rights claim. However, the district judge expressly found, referring in part to the same
defendants who appear now before this Court: "The invasion of Plaintiffs home,
supported only by an ex parte submission of Plaintiffs1 opponents in a civil lawsuit,
appears to be precisely the type of unreasonable intrusion into a private dwelling that the
Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent. Defendants' protestations to the contrary, an
ex parfe motion presented to a judge in the course of civil litigation is not the equivalent of
a probable cause search warrant affidavit submitted by an independent law enforcement
officer. If there was a sufficient basis for finding that Defendants1 actions in this case
were committed under color of state law, this Court would find that Plaintiffs were
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deprived of a right secured by the 'Constitution and Laws' of the United States." Yanaki
v. lomed, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1261,1264 n.7 (D. Utah 2004). The district court
suggested the possibility that defendants' conduct may give rise to an abuse of process
claim: "As noted in footnote seven, above, the behavior of the Defendants may have
been inadvisable and abusive of Plaintiffs' rights, and may or may not give rise to other
legal causes of action, such as perhaps abuse of process, but the Defendants' actions
were undisputedly not initiated by the state, and therefore pursuant to the precedent
referred to in the body of this opinion may not serve as a basis for a claim under § 1983."
Id. at 1265 n.8. The dismissal was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, Yanaki v. lomed, Inc., 415 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2005), and that case is
now before the United States Supreme Court, Docket No. 05-940, on a petition for
certiorari to review the Tenth Circuit's decision.
35.

Plaintiffs had entered into a settlement agreement with the defendants and

certain of the other co-conspirators on December 12, 2003.
36.

Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Jamal S. Yanaki was to be

paid the settlement sum, in exchange for a full release to the settling co-conspirators by
Moss and Yanaki.
37.

Defendants breached the settlement agreement by failing to timely pay or

cause to be paid the settlement sum to Yanaki.
COUNTI
(BREACH OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT)

38.

Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 37, above.

39.

Defendants have materially breached the settlement agreement.

40.

Such breach has been the cause of damages to Moss and Yanaki,
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including without limitation the foreseeable, consequential damages of being required to
incur attorneys1 fees, costs and expenses in litigation that was to be resolved by the
settlement
41.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of damages for defendants' breach,

including consequential and special damages in the form of attorneys* fees, costs and
expenses, together with interest on all the damages that have accrued, both before and
after judgment.
COUNT II
(ABUSE OF PROCESS)

42.

Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 41, above.

43.

Ulterior motives existed that were served by the object of the conspiracy,

such that the process at issue in this case was sought for the purpose of using it
improperly to commit illegal acts.
44.

The Illegal Search and Seizure constitute acts, in the use of the legal

processes obtained, that are not proper in the regular prosecution of civil proceedings
and the misuse of the processes constitutes an actionable abuse of process.
45.

The abuse of process took place in the respective course and scope of

employment of Matkin, Waddoups and Hafen with Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee &
Loveless, and it is liable under respondeat superior.
46.

The acts of the defendants if furtherance of the conspiracy constitute an

actionable abuse of process, and such abuse has been the cause-in-fact and legal cause
of injury to plaintiffs. Moss has been damaged in the sum of not less than
$15,000,000.00, or such other and greater sum as may be proven at trial. Yanaki has
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also been damaged in such sum, together with additional damages for physical injuries
and special damages incurred in the form of health care expenses incurred to treat his
physical injuries.
47.

The abuse of process represents a wilful disregard for the rights of

plaintiffs, thereby entitling each of them to a punitive damages award against each
defendant in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003),
COUNT III
(INVASION OF PRIVACY)

48.

Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 47, above.

49.

The invasion of the Home by Matkin, in furtherance of the conspiracy, and

the seizure of plaintiffs' private financial records and property, as well as Yanaki's
confidential medical records, constitutes an actionable intrusion upon plaintiffs1 seclusion.
50.

The intrusion described would be highly offensive to any reasonable

person.
51.

The intrusion took place in the respective course and scope of employment

of Matkin with Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, and it is liable under respondeat
superior,
52.

Further, the intrusion on seclusion was part and parcel of the pleaded

conspiracy, making all conspirators liable. The intrusion upon plaintiffs' seclusion has
been the cause-in-fact and legal cause of injury to plaintiffs. Moss has been damaged in
the sum of not less than $15,000,000.00, or such other and greater sum as may be
proven at trial. Yanaki has also been damaged in such sum, together with additional
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damages for physical injuries and special damages incurred in the form of health care
expenses incurred to treat his physical injuries.
53.

The intrusion on seclusion represents a wilful disregard for the rights of

plaintiffs, thereby entitling each of them to a punitive damages award against each
defendant in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co, v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
COUNT IV
(INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS)

54.

Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 53, above.

55.

The invasion the Home by Matkin, in furtherance of the conspiracy, and the

seizure of plaintiffs' private financial records and property, as well as YanakPs confidential
medical records, was outrageous and intolerable in that it offended generally accepted
standards of decency and morality, including such standards as are expressly
enumerated in the Constitutions of the state of Utah and the United States of America.
56.

Defendants intended to cause or acted with reckless disregard of the

likelihood of causing emotional distress to plaintiffs.
57.

The defendants' extreme and outrageous conduct was the cause-in-fact

and legal cause of plaintiffs' severe emotional distress.
58.

The extreme and outrageous conduct of defendants took place in the

respective course and scope of employment of Matkin, Waddoups and Hafen with Parr.
Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, and it is liable under respondeat superior.
59.

Further, the extreme and outrageous conduct was part and parcel of the

pleaded conspiracy, making all conspirators liable.
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60.

The extreme and outrageous conduct has been the cause-in-fact and legal

cause of injury to plaintiffs. Moss has been damaged in the sum of not less than
$15,000,000.00, or such other and greater sum as may be proven at trial. Yanaki has
also been damaged in such sum, together with additional damages for physical injuries
and special damages incurred in the form of health care expenses incurred to treat his
physical injuries.
61.

The extreme and outrageous conduct represents a wilful disregard for the

rights of plaintiffs, thereby entitling each of them to a punitive damages award against
each defendant in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
COUNTV
(TRESPASS TO LAND AND CHATTELS)

62.

Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 6 1 , above.

63.

Plaintiffs were, at all times material hereto, lawfully in possession of the

Home and its contents.
64.

The invasion of the Home by Matkin, in furtherance of the conspiracy, and

the seizure of plaintiffs' private financial records and property, as well as Yanaki's
confidential medical records, was a trespass to land and chattels.
65.

The trespasses took place in the respective course and scope of

employment of Matkin with Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, and it is liable
under respondeat superior.
66.

Further, the trespasses were part and parcel of the pleaded conspiracy,

making all conspirators liable. The trespasses have been the cause-in-fact and legal
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cause of injury to plaintiffs. Moss has been damaged in the sum of not less than
$15,000,000.00, or such other and greater sum as may be proven at trial. Yanaki has
also been damaged in such sum, together with additional damages for physical injuries
and special damages incurred in the form of health care expenses incurred to treat his
physical injuries.
67.

The trespasses each represent a wilful disregard for the rights of plaintiffs,

thereby entitling each of them to a punitive damages award against each defendant, for
each trespass, in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
COUNT VI
(CONVERSION)

68.

Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 67 above.

69.

Plaintiffs, at all times material hereto, were in lawful possession of the

chattels seized and removed from the Home.
70.

Matkin, in furtherance of the conspiracy, converted plaintiffs' chattels with

an intent to deprive plaintiffs of their possession or use for a period of time.
71.

The conversions took place in the respective course and scope of

employment of Matkin with Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, and it is liable
under respondeat superior
72.

Further, the conversions were part and parcel of the pleaded conspiracy,

making all conspirators liable. The conversions have been the cause-in-fact and legal
cause of injury to plaintiffs. Moss and Yanaki have been damaged in such sums as may
be proven at trial for the reasonable value of their property, together with all reasonably
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foreseeable consequential damages.
73.

The conversions each represent a wilful disregard for the rights of plaintiffe.

thereby entitling each of them to a punitive damages award against each defendant, for
each conversion, in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
COUNT VII
(CIVIL CONSPIRACY)

74.

Moss incorporates paragraphs 1 through 73, above.

75.

Each of the defendants acted in concert, by way of a combination of two or

more persons, with the police and other co-conspirators.
76.

The conspiracy had one or more objects, as described above, in If 30, or as

otherwise may be uncovered in discovery in this action.
77.

There was a meeting of the minds between each combination of two or

more conspirators as to the object of the conspiracy and/or the courses of action by
which it would be carried forward.
78.

Each of the conspirators undertook one or more unlawful, overt acts in

furtherance of the conspiracy.
79.

The acts of one or more conspirators in furtherance of the object of the

conspiracy have been the cause-in-fact and legal cause of damages to plaintiffs. Moss
has been damaged in the sum of not less than $15,000,000.00, or such other and greater
sum as may be proven at trial. Yanaki has also been damaged in such sum, together
with additional damages for physical injuries and special damages incurred in the form of
health care expenses incurred to treat his physical injuries.
80.

The conduct of the conspiracy in pursuit of its object represents a wilful

disregard for the rights of plaintiffe, thereby entitling each of them to a punitive damages
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award against each defendant in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiffs each hereby demand trial by jury of all issues triable by a jury herein.
WHEREFORE,

plaintiffs demand judgment in their favor, and against defendants,

jointly and severally, as follows:
A.

For all damages proved to the satisfaction of the court and jury. Such

damages including without limitation damages for the injury to specific rights invaded,
damages for the emotional distress caused, damages for the physical injury caused by
such emotional distress, pain and suffering and special damages in the form of health
care expenses, attorney fees, costs and expenses and all other reasonable foreseeable
consequential damages, together with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest
B.

On Counts ll-VII, for punitive damages against each defendant, awarded in

conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
D.

For all of plaintiffs reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses as

allowed at law, in equity, by statute, rule, inherent power of the Court or otherwise.
E.

For all such other and further relief of any kind or nature to which plaintiffs

may show entitlement by proof and as the Court deems Just, proper and equitable in the
premises.

[THIS SPACE LEFT BLANK
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INTENTIONALLY]

DATED this

1r

day of February, 2006

l W . SCOFIELC
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Plaintiffs' Address:
385 North Wall Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
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